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1.

INTRODUCTION

One truism of a free market economy is that there will be insolvencies.1 Just as this is true in the domestic market, it is true in
* Associate Professor, Hokkaido University School of Law, Sapporo, Japan. B.A., Middlebury College; M.A., J.D., Washington University; M.Jur.,
Oxford University. I am indebted to the following people for their comments,
advice, and assistance: Andrew Clayton, Thomas Flippen, Dan Fenno
Henderson, Ayumu Iijima, Masafumi Kodama, Curtis MilHaupt, Michiaki Nakano, Kenji Nakashima, Koji Takeuchi, David Tulloch, Koshi Yamaguchi, and
particularly7 Professors Lynn LoPucki and Susumu Takami. This Article also
benefited from comments at presentations for Hokkaido University's Financial
Law Research Forum and Civil Law Research Forum. Finally, all of the usual
rules apply: I made and accept responsibility for all mistakes; to the extent
possible I have cited to English language sources; I generally follow the citations rules for Japanese materials in Dan Fenno Henderson et al., Form of Citation of JapaneseLegal Materials, 42 WASH. L. REv. 589 (1967); translations of
Japanese statutes are from EHS (Eibun htrei sha) Law Bulletin Series when
available and my own otherwise; no translation or foreign language source has
been verified by the University of PennsylvaniaJournal of International Economic Law. For simplicity, all dollar to yen conversions are at the rate of
U.S.$1: Y100.
1 See Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization ofInternationalBankruptcy Law and
Practice:Is It Necessary? Is It Possible?, 27 INT'L L. 881, 885 (1993) ("Municipal
bankruptcy law is based upon a simple truth- some businesses and commercial transactions will fail, and consequently, some obligations will not be satisfied in full."); Robert M. Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris, Professional Fees and
Other Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Business Liquidations, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1207
(1997) ("To function effectively, market economies must efficiently process
those businesses that inevitably fail because of the market's workings."); When
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the now universally recognized global economy. The problems
raised by these so-called cross-border insolvencies2 are not new
Countries Go Bust, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at 88 ("It is universally accepted

that well-functioning economies need well-designed bankruptcy procedures.").
2 This Article uses the terms "insolvency" (in Japanese, "t6san") and "insolvency proceeding to describe all formal liquidation and reorganization pro-

ceedngs. C. 11 U.S.C. 5 101(32) (1994) (defining "insolvent" in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to mean, inter alia, a "financial condition such that the sum of
such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation"); U.C.C. % 1-201(22), (23) (1999) (defining an "insolvent" for the U.C.C.

as, inter alia, "[one] who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary
course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent
within the meaning of the fecteral bankruptcy law"); Chasha kigya t6san b6shi
ky6sai h5 [Medium and Small Industry Insolvency Mutual Prevention Act],
Act No. 84, 1977, art. 84(2) (defining insolvency (tisan) to be any proceedings
in bankruptcy, composition, reorganization, administration, or special liquidation or when a party cannot pay its debts as they come due).
It is acknowledged that in the United States insolvency is used interchangeably with the term bankruptcy on the one hand, but used narrowly to
describe an economic condition on the other. Internationally, such usage appears to be the exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., YOsHRITrrsU AOYAMA

ET AL., TOSAN HO GAISETSU [GENERAL STATEMENT ON INSOLVENCY LAW] 1-

3 (7th ed. 1994) (discussing the broad meaning of insolvency in contrast to the
narrow meaning of bankruptcy); ROY M. GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 1(2d ed. 1997) (noting that unlike the United

States, in Britain the general term insolvency is used rather than the specific
term bankruptcy). This Article uses the term bankruptcy (hasan)to refer only
to liquidation proceedings of both natural and judicial persons, such as those
mentioned in Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. % 701-766
(1999). See Hasan ha [Bankruptcy Act], Law No. 71, 1922, art. 105 (providing
jurisdiction for the bankruptcy liquidation of both natural and juridical persons). Cf GOODE, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that the term bankruptcy, in England, refers more specifically to an individual insolvency, with companies go-

ing into liquidation.

In addition, for the sake of creating international uniformity of terminol-

oy,this Article employs the term "cross-border insolvency" to refer to an insolvency proceeding involving more than one country. Using various phrases

to describe the same concept creates confusion and complicates matters unnec-

essarily. A general survey of the literature suggests that the most often used

phrase is "cross-border insolvency," which is the term the United Nations, the

American Bar Association, and the International Bar Association have decided
upon. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-BorderInsolvency, U.N. GAOR,

52d Sess., Annex I, at 68-78, U.N. Doc. A/52/17 (1997) [hereinafter
UNC1TRAL Model Law]; Cross-BorderInsolvency and Related Credit Issues Pro.
gram, A.B.A. SEC. OF INT'L L. & PRAC. (2000), www.abanet.org/intlaw/

publications/wshop/Spring200.html; Cross-Border Insolvency "Concordat",
I.B.A., Committee J, (1996), http://www.ibanet.org/general/-Bookdetails.
nspID=Bk234. As noted above, most U.S. writers have employed the term
bankruptcy on the one hand and a variety of cross-border, international, or
transnational terms on the other. See Gaa, supra note 1, at 881 n.1 (identifying
the issue and citing various examples, but ultimately opting to use the phrase
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and have been the subject of debate for nearly 700 years.3 Traditionally, the way most states and scholars resolved the international issues inherent in these cases was by partitioning an insolvency along national borders.
This approach- known as
territorialism- is consistent with classical concepts of sovereignty
and jurisdiction and permits local courts to control local assets
pursuant to local laws. The system is simple and predictable, but
results in duplicative administrative costs and potentially disparate treatment of similar creditors who happen to be in different
countries. In response to these limitations, various commentators
have sought to create a more fair and. efficient system. For the
greater part, the answer that those theorists devised was a system- known as universalism- where an international insolvency
proceeded in a single forum and under a single law regardless of
the actual location of the parties, claims, or assets. As a result of
these efforts, in the mid-1970s the cross-border insolvency "paradigm"4 shifted from a territorial approach to the universal model.'
"international insolvency and bankruptcy"). I have modest hopes that others,
including U.S. legislative drafters, will-embrace the uniform term "cross-border
insolvency." See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 PartI-Hearingon H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on CommercialandAdmin. Law and the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,106th Cong. (1999) (referring to "Ancillary and Other Cross-Border

Cases").

3 See PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 291
(1995) (discussing a treaty signed in 1204 between Verona and Trent regarding
transfer of debtor's assets); Kurt H. Nadelman, Bankruptcy Treaties, 93 U. PA.
L. REv. 58, 62 (1944), reprinted in KURT H. NADELMANN, CONFLICT OF
LAWS: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE 299, 303 (1972) (reviewing the debate on the Pope's coordination of the Ammanati Bank insolvency involving
interests in Italy, Spain, England, Portugal, Germany, and France in 1302 and
one of the first insolvency conventions between Holland and Utrecht in 1679).
4 A "paradigm" is an analytical model that defines "the legitimate problems
and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners" and
"from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research."
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed.

1970).
5

Compare JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

410, at 346 (1834) (rejecting the "ubiquity" rule of insolvency for a territorial
approach favoring "ocal diligence") with Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of
Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 515 (1991)
(stating that "[u]niversality... has long been accepted as the proper goal of international bankruptcy law by leading writers"). See also Chin Kim & Jimmy
C. Smith, InternationalInsolvencies: An English-American Comparison with an
Analysis of ProposedSolutions, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 5 (1992)
("[T]he universality theory has provided a starting point for countries wishing
to enter into bankruptcy treaties or seeking to revise their own bankruptcy
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The problem that remained, however, was that universalism
in its pure form was not feasible without an international convention, because states were generally unwilling to allow, or give effect to, a foreign court's unfettered extraterritorial actions.' In response to this impediment, a number of nations created modified
or hybrid systems that integrated some of the benefits of univer-

salism while still recognizing many of the practical effects of territorialism.7 These new regimes- called modified universalism and
secondary insolvency- combined extraterritorial statutes for local insolvencies with laws that allowed for, but did not require,
cooperation with foreign insolvencies.8 Most academics tended to

codes.").
Identifying exactly when the paradigm shifted is a difficult endeavor, but
in the United States, and perhaps Europe, the shift arguably occurred following the Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G.a.A., Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd.,
and Banque de Finacement, S.A. cross-border insolvencies in the mid-1970s.
See Charles D. Booth, A History of the TransnationalAspects of United States
Bankruptcy Law Priorto the Bankr-ptcy Reform Act of 1978, 9 B.U. INT'L LJ.1,
27-37 (1991). In Japan, the paradigm likely shifted following the 1978 Kosei
Maru case. See infra note 331. See Yasuhei Taniguchi, InternationalBankruptcy
andJapaneseLaw, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 449, 461-62 (1987).
6 See GOODE, supra note 2, at 495.
7 See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY:
SHOULD NEW ZEALAND ADOPT THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSSBORDER INsOLvENCY?, Parliamentary Paper E31AM, N.Z.L.C. Rep. 52, 14
(Feb. 1999), available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/CrossBorder'/R52con.
htm [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION] ("There has been debate
internationally for many years over whether a bankruptcy has universal application or whether its application is limited to the place of adjudication ....
Out of that debate a third theory emerged which is known as 'modified universality."). Other commentators have stated:

To bridge the universality and territoriality theoies, a modified universality,
or quali"ed universality, theory has emerged. Modified universality recognizes the difficulty, given strong nation interests in the preservation of
sovereignty and the absence of treaties, in creating truly unified proceedings. Tie result under the modified universality theory is a centa admin-

istrative forum located in one country, supplemented by ancillary, or secondary, proceedings located in other countries. The modified universality

theory represents a realistic solution to the conflict inherent in the princi-

ples of universality and territoriality. It combines both principles, maximizing the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages of both.

Anne Nielsen et al., The Cross-BorderInsolvency Concordat:Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of InternationalInsolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 534
(1996) (internal citations and punctuation omitted).
I See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, arts. 15-24; Corporations
Act, 1989 5 581 (Austl.); Bankruptcy Act, 1966 5 29 (Austl.); Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act, 1997 S 271 (Can.); Insolvency Act, 1986 S 426 (Eng.); Ein-
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view these solutions as compromises or intermediate steps on the
way to the eventual goal of pure universalism.9

This status quo continued until just recently, when a revisionist or backlash movement began to question the universal para-

digm.1" The revisionists have challenged the assumptions of the
universalism system and recharged a debate most thought was
long finished." One branch of this movement has suggested a return to the original system of localized procedures, i.e., territori-

alism, though with some cross-border coordination.12 Another
branch has creatively proposed a model based on a contract theory of bankruptcy. 3 That is, allowing companies and their credi-

tors to agree freely on any applicable insolvency law and forum
that, in the event of their demise, will govern all aspects of their
insolvency. 4
Whether or not legislators, courts, and other policy makers

eventually decide to follow the revisionists' approach, their arguments have been extremely beneficial in helping to identify, isolate, and address many of the problems that must be overcome in
any cross-border insolvency system." Furthermore, unlike many
f-6hrungsgesetz zur Insolvenzordnung (EGInsO) [Introductory Code to the Insolvency Code], art. 102 (Ger.); Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 S 126
(India); Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 S 77 (India); Bankruptcy Act, 1988 S
142 (Ir.); Insolvency Act, 1967 S 135 (N.Z.); 11 U.S.C. 5 304 (1999) (U.S.).
9 See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A GlobalSolution to MultinationalDefault, M&CH. L. REV. *26, *38 (forthcoming 2000) (describing modified universalism as "an awkward, interim solution" and as the "second best universalist
solution" to pure universalism).
" See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in InternationalBankruptcy: A PostUniversalistApproach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999); Robert K. Rasmussen,
A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997). A
backlash of sorts might also be seen in the EU's rejection of universalism for a
secondary approach. See, e.g., Hans Hanisch, "Universality" Versus Secondary
Bankruptcy:A EuropeanDebate,2 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 151 (1993).
n See Hanisch, supra note 10, at 153 ("It could most probably be agreed
that pure territorialism ... should be abandoned.").
12 See LoPucki, supranote 10, at 701-02.
13 See Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 5.
14

id at 4-5.

In addition to this Article, the revisionists have spurred a flurry of responses. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking InternationalInsolvency: The Neg7ected Role of Choice-ofLaw Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 23 (2000);
Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in TransnationalInsolvencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 385, 385-86 (1999); Symposium, Cross-Borderinsolvency, MICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2000) (containing essays by professors Arthur T. Guzman,
15
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theoretical debates, this one actually matters. Global, regional,
bilateral, and domestic proposals to address international insolvencies are on the table worldwide, and many will likely be
adopted in some form in the next few years.16 Thus, now more
Lynn LoPucki, Robert Rasmussen, and Jay Westbrook); Lisa Perkins, Note, A
Defense ofPure Universalism in Cross-BorderCorporateInsolvencies, 32 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. (2000).
"6 The most obvious global proposal is the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra
note 2, which is actually a model f6r unilateral domestic legislation. See The
Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-BorderInsolvency,
[1997] XXVIII UNCITRAL Y.B., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/english/sessions/wg il/acn9-442.htm, reprinted in 6
TuL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 415 (1998) [hereinafter Guide to Enactment of
UNCITRAL Model Law]; Ron W. Harmer, UNCITRAL Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency, 6 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 145 (1997). True multilateral
treaty approaches most notably include the International Bar Association
Committee J's 1986 Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA)
and its 1996 Cross-Border Insolvency "Concordat." See Harold S. Burman,
Harmonizationof InternationalBankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64
FoRDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2557-58 (1996); Nielsen et al., supra note 7 (reviewing
the Concordat).
Regionally, the most obvious project is within the European Union, see
European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 1223 [hereinafter EU Convention], which is now being enacted as a
regulation. Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1. The American Law Institute ("Al") is reviewing
the various possible approaches to insolvency co-operation among the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") nations. See E. Bruce Leonard,
The American Law Institute's TransnationalInsolvency Project, 1999 ABI JNL.
LExIS 210.
Bilaterally, a number of proposals have been made. See, e.g., RAJ BHALA,
BANK OF JAPAN, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF JAPANESE INSOLVENCY
LAW: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 58-59 (Inst. for Monetary and Econ. Studies, Discussion Paper No. 99-E-26, 1999); Peter G. Totty, Proposalfor a Model
InternationalBilateral Insolvency Treaty, with Capability for Adoption by the
E.E.C., in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS 271-284
(Ian F. Fletcher ed., 1990) (proposing a series of interlocking bilateral insolvency treaties); Shoichi Tagashira, IntraterritorialEffects of Foreign Insolvency
Proceedings:An Analysis of "Ancillary"Proceedings in the United States andJapan, 29 TEX. INT'L LJ. 1, 38 (1994) (proposing a bilateral treaty between the
United States and Japan and stating, "further progress towards universality can
best be accomplished through bilateral treaties. As the economic relationship
between the United States and Japan develops further and cases involving the
two countries accumulate, the time will become ripe for a bilateral treat in
the field of insolvency law."). But see Kim & Smith, supra note 5, at 29-30 (concluding that the bilateral treaty approach is not practical given temporal and
substantive obstacles).
Legislation for revision of domestic insolvency statutes consistent with the
UNCITRAL Model Law has been introduced in, among others, New Zealand,
South Africa, and the United States. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION,
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than ever before in the seven centuries of theoretical philosophiz-

ing, the issue is ripe.
Sitting in the midst of this debate is Japan. Japan is in a
unique position. First, Japan's insolvency system is among the
most territorial of those employed by developed nations today.
The Japanese experience, therefore, provides an excellent case
study of how the territorial approach actually performs in the
modern global economy. Second, the debate is particularly im-

portant to Japan, which is currently in the process of revising its
entire insolvency scheme."

The results of the debate will likely

supra note 7, 75. As of June 8, 2000, only Eritrea and Mexico have reported
adopting legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. See UNCITRAL,
STATUS OF CONVENTIONS AND MODEL LAWS, pt. II, para. 13 (2000), available
at http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/ndex.htm (last modified Oct. 11,
2000). Japan presently is reviewing its insolvency statutes. See infra note 17.
17 The government recently initiated an official comprehensive review of
Japan's insolvency proceedings; however, final recommendations are not expected for some time. See Shozo Miyake, JapaneseInternationalInsolvency: The
Problem of Territoriality,INTL Bus. LAW. 238, 240 (May 1996); Kokusai t6san h
sei seibi e [Towards Completion of the Cross-border Insolvency Law System],
ASAHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 23, 2000, at 3. It was recently reported:
Japan is set to install a new legal framework for cross-border insolvency to cope with the growing number of corporate bankruptcies
that cut across national boundaries, Justice Minister Hideo Usui said
.... The Justice Ministry plans to extend the scope of domestic bankruptcy procedures to cover overseas assets and in turn subject domestic assets to bankruptcy proceedings initiated outside Japan upon approval from domestic courts.
Cross-BorderInsolvency Steps Slated to Meet Times, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 23, 2000,
at 9. Further, the Supreme Court of Japan, as administrator of the judicial system, has stated:
[W]e are now facing another problem, which is revision of the insolvency system. Insolvency cases, which range from consumer bankruptcy cases to big corporation bankruptcy or reorganization cases,
have been increasing sharply these days. But the insolvency procedure
in this country is set up mainly on the basis of the Bankruptcy Law
and the Composition Law, each of which was enacted more than seventy years ago. So the insolvency system has been criticized as being
malftinctioning and not meeting the demand from the society. Under
these circumstances, the insolvency system is now under revision. It is
expected that a draft of the new law will be introduced within about
five years. In any case, in order that civil justice can be made to function more adequately and efficiently and meet the demands and needs
of ever-changing society, a constant vigilance must be maintained to
improve the system and the law must be revised whenever deemed
necessary.
IV,
Supreme Court of Japan, Outline of Civil Trial in Japan,
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influence the shape of any new Japanese legislation. Third, since
the burst of the economic bubble in the early 1990s, Japan has
seen a wave of mega-insolvency filings that impact countless people and interests both in Japan and abroad."8 The way in which
Japan and other foreign countries address these international
debtors, as well as their creditors and assets, has an immediate
practical effect inside Japan and throughout the world.
This Article addresses the debate surrounding the optimal
cross-border insolvency system by considering Japan's experience
with international insolvencies as a case study. Following the introduction, Section 2 briefly sets out the various cross-border insolvency prototypes and the arguments for and against each
model in a semi-systems analysis framework. Next, Section 3 reviews the Japanese experience, outlining the structure of Japan's
insolvency system and examining Japan's territorial statutes and
the courts' strict enforcement of these proceedings until the
1980s. The Section then discusses how Japanese courts, over the
past twenty years, have struggled with and inconsistently deviated
from the strict territorial framework in order to accommodate
modern global concerns and incentives. The Section concludes
with a summary of Japan's actual treatment of cross-border insolvency issues. In Section 4, I argue, based on Japan's experience,
that the cross-border insolvency paradigm should be adjusted to a
modified universal approach, which is feasible, flexible, fair, and
efficient. Finally, Section 5 offers a brief conclusion regarding the
lessons to be learned from the Japanese experience as well as the
lessons Japan has to learn from the theoretical debate on the
paradigm for cross-border insolvencies. 9
http://courtdomino.courts.go.jp/civil.nsf/ffc82aOa5fb61e5O4925648f00352937/
b4615015bcd825e849256739001101b8?opendocument#3-3.
11 Among the larger and more notorious Japanese insolvencies in the 1990s
are Maruko (1991); Ken International (1991); Kizu Credit Bank (1995); Hyogo
Bank (1995); Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (1997); Yamaichi Securities (1997);

Mita Industrial (1998); Nippon Credit Bank (1998); the Long Term Credit
Bank and its subsidiary Japan Leasing Corporation (1998); Nagasakiya (2000);
and Sogo Department Store (2000). A listing and description of every major
insolvency in Japan from 1997 to the present is available at Tokyo Shoko Re-

search, http://wvww.tsr-net.co.jp/topics/ogata/index.html (last visited Nov. 15,

2000).

9 1provide one caveat or reader's guideline at the outset. This Article has
two focuses: cross-border insolvency and Japan's insolvency system. Thus, if
your interests are only in international insolvency, Sections 3.1-3.3 may be
skipped. Conversely, if your interests lie in Japanese insolvency, you may skip
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MODELS OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS

The various approaches to a cross-border insolvency may be
classified into five general categories: (1) universalism; (2) modified universalism; (3) secondary insolvency; (4) corporate-charter
contractualism; and (5) territorialism. The following Section, relying on the work by Professor Lynn LoPucki, ° reviews the arguments for and against each of those systems. The Section does
not, however, attempt to build an argument in favor of or opposed to any of the models based on this systemic review; the

narrative is brief and descriptive rather than argumentative.
2.1. Universalism
Universalism, also known as pure universalism, unity, and
ubiquity,21 is a system in which all aspects of a debtor's insolvency
are conducted in one central proceeding under one insolvency
law.' Because countries are generally unwilling to allow another
Sections 2 and 4. Of course, I hope that some readers' interests overlap with
mine and that their time allows for a full review of the entire Article.
20 See LoPucki, supra note 10.
21 There are subtle differences among the various terms, including universalism itself, that differ depending upon the commentator and the examples
used. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 2, at 495-96 (distinguishing universalsm
from unity); NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 282 (using distinctively the terms
universalism, unity, and ubiquity). See also Kurt H. Nadelmann, Creditors
Equality, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 54 (1949/50) ("Use of such terms as 'unity,'
'universality,' and 'territoriality' of bankruptcy has not been found helpful in
international discussions because of different meanings given to the terms in
different countries."). This Article uses the term universality as defined in Section 2.1.
' See, e.g., Donald T. Trautman et al., FourModels for InternationalBankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 579 (1993).
A "partial" pure universal system is also possible. It would resemble a pure
universal system, but would apply only to a limited number of countries. Such
a system could be established through a bi- or multi-lateral treaty. See, e.g.,
Nordic Convention, infra note 27 (discussing the universal regime created by
treaty among Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland). In addition,
a country may unilaterally establish a "partial" pure universal system. For example, Australia has a two prong system that applies a pure universal framework Zealand,
to prescribed
wich Singapore,
to date incSwitzerland,
rude Canada, the
Jersey,
Malaysia,
United
KingNew Guinea,
New
Papuacountries,
dom, and the Umted States. See Bankruptcy Act 1966 5 29(2)(a), Schedule 5
(Austl.); Corporations Law 5 581(2)(a) (Austl.); Re Ayers, 34 A.L.R. 582, 591
(Fed. Ct. 1981), affd en banc sub nom., Ayers v. Evans, 39 A.L.R. 129, 145 (Fed.
Ct. 1981) (Austl.) (interpreting the statute to apply in a universal manner); IAN
FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 783-84 (1999.
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state's courts to have unfettered control over local assets and persons, the universalist system relies predominately on some level
of international treaty or convention.' The chief arguments in
favor of universality are efficiency and economy, which produce
larger distributions in liquidations and greater likelihood of success in reorganizations.24 Universalism generates economies in a
number of areas: avoiding duplication of administration expenses, selling cross-border assets as a whole, coordination of reorganization efforts, and encouraging efficient investment patterns.' In addition, an underlying argument, often unstated, is
that the universal approach produces the fairest results because all
creditors, wherever located, are treated equally by class.26
A number of obstacles limit the use of the universal model,
however. First, it has proven impossible to obtain the requisite
international agreements at the bilateral, regional, and international levels.' Second, some argue that a universal system will
The second prong applies a modified universal approach to all other countries.

See Bankruptcy Act 1966 S 29(2)(b) (Austl.); Corporations Law 5 581(2)(b)
(AustI.). New Zealand and England statutorily apear to have a similar system.
See Insolvency Act 1967 135 1)-(2) (N.Z.); Insolvency Act 1986 5 426 (Eng.).
However, they have tended to apply the purely universal provisions ina modified universal manner. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, supra note 7, at
37 (reviewing New Zealand's approach and discussing the unreported case of
Re Beadle, No. B116/80 (High Ct. Auckland, Sept. 1, 1980)); Kent Anderson,
Statutory Co-OperationMechanismsfor Cross-BorderInsolvencies in Englandand

America, 1 Co. FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 44, 48-61 (2000) (reviewing Eng-

land's approach).
2 See GOODE, supra note 2, at 494-95. As noted above, it is also possible
to create a pure universal system without international treaties or conventions
through unilateral domestic legislation for the automatic recognition of insolvencies from designated foreign countries. See supra note 22 (discussing Australia's systems).
24 See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatismin Global Insolvencies: A Choice ofLaw and Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 465 (1991).
s See id.; Lucian Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An EconomicAnalysis of
TransnationalBankruptcies, 42 J. LAW & ECON. 775, 778-79 (1999) (arguing

that universalism is more economically efficient ex ante); Rasmussen, supra
note 10, at 18.
26 See Ulrich Drobnig, Secured Credit in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27, 66 (1998).
27 For an example of the problem at the bilateral level, see Burman, supra

note 16, at 2556 (1994) (noting the failure of the United States and Canada to
ratify the draft United States of American-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty (Oct. 29,

1979)). C. WOOD, supra note 3, at 292 (noting France's multiple bilateral trea-

ties); Michael Prior, Bankruptcy Treaties Past Present, andFuture: Their Failures
and Successes, in INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE 226 (Harry Rajak ed., 1993)
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confuse debtor-creditor relationships and defeat domestic expectations by making some otherwise routine insolvencies subject to
separate laws and regimes." Third, there are practical problems

to its implementation. Most significantly, because the universal
forum applies its lex fori to issues such as priorities, avoidances,

and qualifications for reorganization protection, conflicts may
arise with how other laws, such as the lex situs of various assets,
resolve the same issues.2 9 Furthermore, a general rule to deter-

mine which jurisdiction should act as the universal forum has yet
to be conclusively defined, thus allowing for manipulative filings

and forum shopping.3" Fourth, the universal system makes no at(noting that Tunisia has successfully entered into nine bilateral insolvency treaties with, among others, Russia, France, Italy, and its North African neighbors).
For a discussion of regional treaties, see Burman, supra note 16, at 2555
(noting the failure of the European Union to adopt insolvency conventions in
1982 and 1990); Prior, supra note 27, at 226 (noting that an Arabian multilateral convention, Bankruptcy of the Arab Maghreb Union, has yet to be ratified). See also 1933 Nordic Convention on Bankruptcy, Nov. 7, 1933, 155
L.N.T.S. 115, as amended Oct. 11, 1977 and Oct. 11, 1982 (providing a universal system among Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland);
FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 221-236 (reviewing the 1928 Bustamente Code
among, inter alia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela, and other Central American countries and the Montevideo Treaties among Argentina, Columbia, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay); Michael Bogdan, The Nordic
Bankruptcy Convention, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY 701-08 [.S. Zeigel ed., 1994);
Michael Bogdan, International Bankruptcy Law in Scandinavia, 43 INTL &
COMP. L. Q. 49 (1985) (reviewing the Nordic Convention); Burman, supra note
16, at 2557-58 (discussing the International Bar Association's 1988 Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act and the 1995 Cross-Border "Concordat",
both of which have failed to be adopted by any country); Prior, supra note 27,
at 227-28 (reviewing the 1928 Bustamente Code and the Montevideo Treaties).
28 See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 713-18. Commentators made similar arguments, unsuccessfully, concerning the United States' adoption of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna,
1980). See, e.g., Arthur Rosett, CriticalReflections on the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 265,
268-269 (1984).
29 See Hanisch, supra note 10, at 154-56; LoPucki, supra note 10, at 709-713.
10 See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 713-18. Despite some arguments to the
contrary, a standard- debtor's "center of interests" or "principal place of business" - does appear to be developing regarding a rule for determining a
debtor's home or main forum in a multinational insolvency. See, e.g., EU
Convention, supra note 16, art. 3.1 ("The place of [debtor's] registered office
shall be presumed to be the center of its main interests in the absence of proof
to the contray.); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, arts. 2(b), 16(3) ("[1n
the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor's registered office... is pre-
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tempt at creating the optimal insolvency law and is neutral at best
regarding the substantive social and economic values of the applicable law, i.e., the universal forum's law. 1
2.2. Modified Universalism
Modified universalism incorporates the philosophy of universalism but accepts that a country may only unilaterally control its
own territory and laws. Under a modified universal regime, a
country does not try to coordinate its legislation with another
country but rather creates a system that is open to cooperation
while seeking the broadest impact possible for its own laws.
There are two distinct aspects to this framework. The first aspect
is that a state's insolvency laws must be drafted to reach out as
widely as possible by providing for extraterritorial effect in all areas, including the creation of an estate, the issuance of protective
stays, and the recognition of claims.32 In many cases, this doctrine
of worldwide impact is merely overreaching that has no actual
foreign effect. As a foundation, though, it allows for the possibility of full foreign enforcement. Second, the local courts must occasionally be willing to give up control of domestic assets and interests for the benefit of a foreign insolvency.33 A local court in a
sumed to be the centre of the debtor's main interests."); GOODE, supra note 2,

at 496. This standard appears consistent with the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's a
proach that makes ancillary assistance available under S 304 to foreign bantruptcies from a country "jin which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal
place of business, or principal assets were located at the commencement of such
proceedings...." 11 U.S.C. SS 101(23), 304 (1994).
31 See Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 19 (noting that the most popular form
of universalism among commentators does not assert a new, substantive universal law, but merely recognition of the universal forum's administration of
all aspects of an insolvency under its own law, regardless of its intrinsic value).
32 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. S 541(a) (1994) (providing that an estate includes all of
debtor's property "wherever located"); Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act SS 2(1),
71(2) (defining property of the estate in Canada to include all of debtor's movables and immovable items, wherever situated).
3 Such willingness to defer to a foreign court may be based on a statute,
see, for example, 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994) (providing framework to assist foreign
insolvency proceedings); Insolvency Act 1986 S 426 (Eng.) (providing English
courts shal assist insolvencies in certain designated forelgn countries), or it
may be based on a a court's general equitable power, see, ?or example, Victrix
S.S. Co., SA v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1987) (assisting a foreign insolvency based on the U.S. district court's general equitable
power); Re Commercial Bank of South Australia, 33 Ch. D. 174, 178 (Chancery Div. 1886) (assisting a foreign insolvency based on the English court's equitable jurisdiction).
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modified universal regime- usually referred to as the ancillary
court- may relinquish control of those aspects of a case directly
under its authority, but only after a review of the foreign insolvency proceeding." The net result of this approach is that not
only must a modified universal system be prepared to address cooperative universal-like cases, but it must also be structured to accommodate territorial proceedings, whether brought about by

foreign non-recognition or by domestic denial of cooperation."
The advantage of the modified universal model is that it retains some of the efficiencies of pure universalism while incorpo-

rating the flexibility and discretion of the secondary and territorial approaches described below. The modified regime does not
achieve the administrative efficiencies of pure universality, but it

limits duplicative administrative expenses while allowing for coordinated liquidation and reorganization. In addition, the modified regime also accommodates those who are concerned about re-

linquishing national sovereignty, since ancillary courts retain the
power to refuse to subvert those aspects of the insolvency over
which they have direct control. In other words, the modified
universalism allows for a flexible approach- either cooperative or
independent- depending upon the particular circumstances of

the insolvency case and the system requesting assistance.

The

modified model is also attractive because it is independent of international conventions and can therefore be accomplished unilaterally through domestic legislation.3 Finally, the approach
"4 For

a discussion of the standard of review in the United States and Eng-

land, see Anderson, supranote 22 passim.
" One of the best examples of this breakdown of the modified approach
into territoriality is the (in)famous Felixstowe Dock case. See Felixstowe Dock
and Railway Co v. United States Lines Inc., [1989] Q.B. 360 (denying assistance
to U.S. reorganization by English court); Leonard Hoffmann, Cross-BorderInsolvency: A British Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2507, 2512-17 (1996) (discussing the Felixstowe opinion delivered by Lord Hoffmann of the British
House of Lords). Ironically, the debtor, U.S. Lines, was able to get relief in
Japan, albeit by filing a separate, independent bankruptcy. See Koji Takeuchi,
Treatment of InternationalInsolvency Issues in Japan, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY AND REORGANIZATION 69, 83-84 (E. Bruce

Leonard & Christopher W. Besant eds., 1994) (reviewing the unreported case
of In re U.S. Lines, Inc., No. (Hu) 215 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., 1987)).
36 As exemplified by the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, the modified universal approach is not a negotiated international agreement; therefore,
it may be implemented subject only to domestic concerns, influences, and constraints. See Guide to Enactment of UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 16, art.
1.
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benefits from the fact that it is, or is becoming, the most common
international system.3"

As with all of the other options, the approach has certain
problems. First, the modified system may be unpredictable for

planning purposes. A creditor does not know for certain the
court in which a debtor will file its insolvency or whether the ancillary courts will deny or assist that court.38 Second, some argue
that any transaction costs saved by avoiding duplicative administrations are offset by the costs associated with petitioning for as-

sistance from the ancillary courts.39 Third, critics suggest that the
end result of a modified approach is no different from that of territorialism, because most systems allow debtors to avoid triggering the modified universal mechanisms by filing local plenary

cases and because ancillary courts are presumably hesitant to provide assistance in support of a foreign state's extraterritorial

laws.4" Finally, as with universalism, the system is burdened with
practical problems: what standard should be applied to determine
the main forum and how should courts deal with choice of law
questions, such as differing priority and preference rules?
2.3. Secondary Insolvency
The secondary insolvency system operates in a manner similar
to the modified universal framework.4 First, local proceedings
37 In addition to those countries that eventually adopt the UNCITRAL
Model Law, countries that follow a modified universal approach include,
among others, Australia, Canada, England, Germany, India, Ireland, New Zealand, United States, and, arguably, Japan. See supra note 8 (providing statutory
citations); infra Section 3.5. (reviewing Japan's movement to modified universalism). Commentators, however, disagree over what the majority ap roach is.
See GOODE, supra note 2, at 496 (stating that a majority of nations Follow the
territorial approach); LoPucki, supra note 10, at 735 (suggesting that the secondary approach is dominant); Kim & Smith, supra note 5, at 4 (stating territoriality prevails); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, UniversalPriorities,33 TEX. INT'L L.
J. 27, 29 (1998) [hereinafter Westbrook, UniversalPriorities](asserting "the realities of a world of modified territorialism").
31 See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 729.

39 See id.
40 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (1994) (allowing a "foreign representative
of the estate in a foreign proceeding" to file a full plenary case in lieu of pursuing a modified universal resolution under § 304 of the Code). See also LoPucki,
supra note 10, at 728-30 (arguing this will occur by direct refusals to cooperate
and by manipulation of the standards for cooperation so that the balance falls
for non-cooperation).
41 The secondary proceeding described here is largely based on the system
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seek to have an extraterritorial effect.42 Second, local courts are
willing to give some limited assistance to foreign-originated
cases. 43 In contrast to modified universalism, a secondary system
automatically denies any cooperation for locally secured and priority claims, which are administered in a local proceeding pursuant to the local insolvency law until satisfied by local assets.'
Once this has been completed, the court has the option, as it does
with modified universalism, to cooperate regarding any remaining
assets or claims.45 At this stage, the proceeding is the same as a
modified universal one, and the secondary court contributes all
the residual assets and claims (viz., general unsecured claims) to be
administered and settled by the main forum pursuant to its laws.
The chief benefit of the secondary framework is that it largely
avoids the problems associated with a conflict between the preference and priority rules of the main forum and the local forum.
Because local secured and priority claims are automatically treated
pursuant to local insolvency law to the extent that there is local
property, the alleged and real problems associated with universalism's and modified universalism's application of foreign insolvency law to local issues are eloquently side-stepped. That in turn
is beneficial because it guarantees predictability in local lending
relationships and allows domestic public policy concerns, to the
extent that they are represented in priority rules, to be partially
served. Nevertheless, a secondary insolvency may still facilitate
some international cooperation by transferring the unsecured
creditors and surplus assets to the main insolvency for pro rata
treatment. A further benefit is that the approach is politically
feasible, since local courts retain control over the most important
aspects of an insolvency and discretionary control over the rest.

in Switzerland. See Private International Law of 18' Dec. 1987, arts. 166-75
(Switz.); Hanisch, supra note 10, at 159. See also EU Convention, supra note
16, ch. III (creating a partially secondary system within the European Union);
FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 246-301 (reviewing the EU Convention); Manfred

Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 485, 519-27 (1996); Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings:An Overview and Comment, witb U.S. Interest in
Mind, 23 BROOK. J. INTL L. 25, 4045 (1997).
42 See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 732-33.
43 See id. at 733.
44

See id.

45 See ida
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As LoPucki points out, the principal disadvantage of the secondary approach is that the exception for dealing with local se-46
cured and priority claims swallows the rule of cooperation.
Most assets in an insolvency are used to satisfy secured and priority claims; thus, any cooperation generated by contributing the
remains of the estate and directing general claimants to the main
proceeding is illusory.4' The argument continues that the secondary approach also inflects a corruptive influence on domestic insolvency laws by creating pressure to increase the number and
size of priority categories, which local creditors may exploit.48
An additional problem is that the secondary system makes few

gains in efficiency; it requires both a local proceeding and an additional deliberation to determine whether the court should participate, even in a limited sense, with the main insolvency.49
2.4. CorporateCharterContractualism
In 1997, Professor Robert K. Rasmussen triggered a departure
from the increasing movement toward pure universalism,
through various modified and hybrid schemes, by suggesting that
a corporate debtor should choose the substantive system governing its insolvency."0 The proposal- an outgrowth of the "contract bankruptcy" movement in the United States 5'- honors
whatever choice a corporation and its creditors make regarding
the applicable forum, law, and cross-border regime, in the event
of an insolvency. To avoid post ante manipulation, among other
46 See ia. at 734.
47 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASE RECEIPTS PAID TO

CREDITORS AND PROFESSIONALS 39 tbl.mIT.2 (1994) (providing that 21.8% of
liquidation estates are distributed to priority unsecured creditors and 36.4% to
unsecured creditors); Lawless & Ferris,supranote 1, at 1217 tbl.3 (showing that
only 4.6% of distributions from a business liquidation go to unsecured creditors); LoPucki, supra note 10, at 734 n.194. -Thus, in the United States, approximately only 2% of a liquidated estate would be available for transfer to
the general pool.
48 See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 735.
41 See id. (arguing that even if a court does decide to participate, there is an
incentive to minimize the participation "to the extent that local priorities absorb less than the entire estates of bankruptcy debtors.., each country has an
incentive to expand those priorities. Failure to expand them results in the export of assets with no assurance of corresponding return.").
50 See Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 4-6.

See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 71 YALE Lj. 1807 (1998).
51
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things, the rule requires that a corporation make the determination in its corporate charter.5 2 The approach is more procedural
than substantive; it merely advocates giving debtors the flexibility
to select any substantive law. 3 The obvious lynchpin to the theory is that all countries included in a debtor's insolvency must
agree to recognize and enforce the debtor's chosen forum. To facilitate this, the proposal allows a country to refuse to enforce the
debtor's choice where it would produce "unreasonable or unjust"
results, i.e., results contrary to domestic public policy.54
The main attraction of the corporate-charter model is that it
encourages debtors to select the most efficient insolvency system.
In theory, this should eventually result in a greater likelihood of
success in a reorganization by making more assets available for
distribution to creditors in a liquidation.5" Further, like U.S. corporate law, the freedom of choice should create competition
among nations to produce the most efficient insolvency law- a
so-called "race to the top" for insolvency law. 6 Finally, because
the approach enables a company to change its declared insolvency
forum only with the consent of all of its creditors, it effectively
prevents a debtor from forum shopping on the eve of filing.5
0
52 See Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 31. Rasmussen would also allow a
debtor to make a subsequent change to its declared choice of forum, but only
with the approval of its creditors. Id
s In the same vein, Rasmussen points out that pure and modified universalism are equally procedural rules, since they call for the application of the
home forum's law without any paicular weight to the law's substantive value.
See id. at 4. Arguing from a different perspective, Gaa has submitted that public policy makers treat insolvency law as a matter of private law in which the
state has only a peripheral interest. See Gaa, supra note 1, at 897. Thus, in
nearly diametric opposition to Rasmussen's most basic assumptions, Gaa condudes that such treatment by policy makers actually hinders the harmomzation of cross-border insolvency law. Ia
s4 Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 32-35.
55 See id at 20-21.
56 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
14-24 (1993) (arguing that laws may improve from comparative competition);
Daniel R. Fischel, The 'Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982)
(claiming that the "race to the bottom" characterization of corporate law requires shareholders to behave irrationally); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977) (arguing that competition in various markets causes corporations to
compete to select the most efficient governance structure).
17 See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 738 n.207, citing Robert K. Rasmussen,
Debtor'sCboice:A Menu Approacb to CorporateBankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51,

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa J. In IEcon. L.

[21:4

The corporate insolvency approach, however, suffers from
both pragmatic and theoretical problems. Perhaps most significantly, the practical barrier of convincing nations to accept the
approach is daunting. These obstacles are best seen within a conflict of laws framework."8 For example, complete freedom to
choose the applicable law and forum, even under the auspices of a
two-party international contract, is far from a given in the global
community.59 Furthermore, even those countries that view most
expansively the principle of freedom of contract, such as England,
generally do not apply it where the subject matter is one of significant domestic public policy interest, such as family law or

118 (1992)

(noting that Rasmussen himself is not concerned with the issue of

forum shopping).
" Rasmussen indirectly acknowledges the need to address conflict issues
by providing a public policy exception to enforcement by ancillary courts. See
Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 32-35. He fails, however, to entertain fully the
issue (which necessarily involves a consideration of how various jurisdictions
would address such a proposal), choosing instead to rely solely on two citations
to the conflicts approach only in the United States. See id. at 32-33, citing The
Bremmen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, 188 (1992) (adopting a substantial
relationship to the transaction test).
" Even the U.S. contract authorities cited by Rasmussen do not support
the selection of a forum with no "substantial" relationship with the matter. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS S 187(2)(a) (1992); see also
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.6-18.12 (2d ed.
1992) (reviewing U.S. cases and authorities restricting parties' autonomy to select a law beyond those with a "substantial" relationship to the matter). Further, party autonomy in contract disputes is limited for all members of the
European Union by the requirements of the Rome Convention. See, e.g.,
European Union Convention on the Law Applicable to Contraction Obligations, June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 1492 (1980), art.
3(3) [hereinafter "Rome Convention"] (requiring application of the mandatory
rules of a third jurisdiction, even though not the selected law, where all connections are with that forum), art. 7(1) (providing that the mandatory rules of a
third jurisdiction may apply where there is a close connection with that country). Article 7(1) was not adopted by the United Kingdom. See Contracts
(Applicable Law) Act 5 2(2) (1990) jEng.). Further, the Rome Convention
does not apply to insolvency given its strong domestic public policy nature.
See Rome Convention, art. 1(2)(e); see also Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968,
amended hy Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Oct. 9,
1978, art. 1(1) (schedule 1 to Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of 1991)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention] (providing that the Brussels Convention on
Enforcement of Judgments among the EU states does not apply to insolvency
judgments).
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property law.6" From a private international law perspective, insolvency law is generally considered within this class.6"
The theoretical obstacles to the contractual model center on
the fact that such an approach effectively excludes a number of interested parties from the contracting process and thus eviscerates
the protection provided by mandatory domestic legislation.62 For
example, involuntary creditors who are normally protected at
home with priorities will likely have their claims lumped in with
general claims, or not enforced at all, in a foreign insolvency forum selected by the debtor. Similarly, small creditors have neither the resources nor the practical power to resist or investigate
selection of forums unacceptable or disadvantageous to them.63
Considering these limitations, the pressure on insolvency reform
might actually create a "race to the bottom," with large creditors
and debtors disproportionately influencing the competitive drafting process." Furthermore, from the economic framework upon
which the proposal was based, Bebchuk and Guzman ague that
the alleged efficiency gains of the contractual model are not feasible.65
2.5. Territorialism
Territorialism is the default system for all cross-border insolvency systems, because it relies on actual in rem control over assets.66 Under the territorial approach, a separate and independent
plenary case is pursued in each forum in which the debtor's assets
60 Compare Vita Food Prods. Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd., [1939] App.
Cas. 277 (P.C. 1939) (appeal taken from Nova Scotia), 1 All E.R. 513, 521
(1939) (Eng.) (stating wit regard to contract law that a "connection with English law is not, as a matter of principal, essential") with ALLEN V. DICEY &
J.H.C. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 639-40, 807, 960 (Lawrence Collins
ed., 12th ed., 1993 & Supp. 1997) (stating that English law (lexfori and lex situs)
governs most family and property matters).
61 See WOOD, supranote 3, at 227; Gaa, supra note 1, at 885, 889-91, 893-95.
Thus, the choice of law rule for insolvencies is lex fori, which is one reason
why international conventions have proven so difficult. See DICEY & MORRIS,
supra note 60, at 1131, 1169 (setting forth Rules 159(2) and 165).
62 See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 73840.
63 See id. at 738-39.

+ See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections upon
Delaware,83 YALE LJ. 663, 666 (1974) (coining the term "race to the bottom"
to describe negative competitive pressure on legislative efforts).
65 See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 25, at 800-02.
66 See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 742.
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are located.67 LoPucki enhances this framework slightly by advocating for cooperation among the independent courts and corresponding administrators." The benefits of territorialism are varied. At the most basic level, territorialism, unlike any of the
alternatives, does not require any special legislation, nor does it
deviate from the universally adopted rules of jurisdiction and sovereignty. The territorial approach also avoids conflicts among
priority and other substantive insolvency rules, because each
court deals exclusively with local interests pursuant to local laws.
In addition, it is argued that the territorial rule is more consistent
with the expectations parties hold when making lending decisions." That is, creditors extend credit based on the assets available in, and the insolvency laws of, the local jurisdiction; therefore, it is unfair and inefficient to apply another state's rules
where they might defeat these legitimate expectations. Furthermore, the territorial approach arguably better reflects the fact that
global businesses are largely organized by independent incorporation in each country where the debtor is doing business." In
other words, companies are already opting for the territorial approach on a de facto basis by limiting corporate entities to political regions. Finally, the territorial rule may be viewed as more
respectful of foreign legal systems because a court never has to
deny 7 1recognition to a foreign case based on a discretionary balance.
The shortcomings of the territorial approach were the original

catalyst for the movement towards the universal model. First,
territorialism creates inefficient duplications of administration.'
67 It is unclear whether a debtor would have standing in a territorial regime where it had no assets in the forum for discovery purposes. See, e.g., In re

Brierley, 145 B.R. 151, 160 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (allowing ancillary applica-

tion for discovery assistance, but noting debtor would not be eligible for a full
plenary proceeding).
68
69

LoPucki, supra note 10, at 742-50.

70

See id. at 751-52. Cf infra note 387 and accompanying text.

See i at 751.

See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 752. For similar sentiments, see Attorney
Gen. (United Kingdoin) v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Proprietary Ltd.
7

[No. 2] (1998) 165 C.L.R. 30 (Austl.) (establishing Australia's policy of respect

by non-review of foreign public policy laws and quoting with approval Judge
Learned Hand's opinion in Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929)).
72 See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 24, at 460-61. These inefficiencies are
particularly seen in a case such as the one involving Bank of Credit, Commerce
International, which occurred in seventy-two jurisdictions. Under a territorial

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss4/1

2000]

CROSS-BORDER INSOL VENCYPARADIGM

The administrative duplications increase the costs of the insolvency proceeding and hinder the sale of multi-state assets and reorganization of cross-border businesses.7 3 Similarly, some commentators argue that territorialism is less economically efficient
on an ex ante as well as ex post basis.7 4 Further, the concurrent
proceedings can subject creditors to conflicting decisions, unequal
distributions among similar creditors from different countries,
and increased costs where the creditors are required or allowed to
file in more than one proceeding."5 In addition, contrary to previous assertions, many creditors extend credit based on assumptions about worldwide assets rather than merely local or domestic
assets.7 6 Denying or complicating those creditors' access to the resources defeats their expectations. Finally, the territoriality approach's inclination to "go-it-alone" has the unintended consequence of denying ancillary assistance to foreign insolvencies,
which in turn breeds disharmonious international relations.
The variations and sub-categories of the five models for crossborder insolvency are limitless.' Further, states complicate any
wholesale classification of a legal system by employing more than one
model simultaneously and by creating sui gmenris approaches. Moreover, among those laws that can be categorized, few are applied in accordance with their plain language." In spite of such labeling problems, the five rough categories provide a helpful comparative
approach, seventy-two trustees would have to be appointed, seventy-two judges
would have to become familiar with the case, and issues of fraud could be litigated seventy-two times.
at 460-61, 465.
' See, e.g., id.
74See

Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 25, at 778.

7' See Kim & Smith, supra note 5, at 4; GOODE, supra note 2, at 496.
76 See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. World of English, 23 B.R. 1015, 1016 (N.D.

Ga.

1982) (suggesting that by Bank of America "BoA") requiring the debtor's foreign subsidiaries to co-sign the subject loan, BoA made the decision to extend
the credit based on debtor's assets in both the United States and Japan, as well
as its multinational incorporation structure). This case is discussed in greater

detail at infra notes 275-79, 303, 392 and accompanying text.
17 See EU Convention, supra note 16 (combining traits of pure univer-

salism, modified universalism, and secondary insolvency); WOOD, supra note 3,
at 228 ("1In practice, most developed states adopt[ed] a combination of the...
extremes [between universalism and territorialism]."); Hanisch, supra note 10,
at 160-61, 164 (discussing and advocating mixed and combined systems).

78 See infra Section 3.5. (discussing the application of Japanese laws); see also
Anderson, supra note 22, at 48-61 (discussig application of England's Insolvency Act, S 426 (1986)).
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vocabulary and framework that may be used to investigate the optimal
approach to cross-border insolvency problems. This Article employs
that framework below.

3. THE JAPANESE ExPERIENCE 79
3.1. Introduction

Japanese insolvency law is often cited as the quintessential ex7 There is little to no comprehensive treatment of the Japanese insolvency
system in English, though there is an assortment of articles of varying quality
that address specific insolvency issues. For bibliographic purposes, I add the
following English-language works on Japanese insolvency to the helpful list
compiled in HARALD BAUM & LUKE R. NOTTAGE, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW
IN WESTERN LANGUAGES: AN ANNOTATED SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY 200-02
(1998); BHALA, supra note 16; Mokichi Hasebe, Problems in Implementing the
CorporateReorganizationLaw, in 2 LAW IN JAPAN 164 (Shin Motoki trans.,
1968); Yukiko Hasebe, The Position of Creditors in the Distributionof Insolvent
Estates: ConsensualSecured Creditorsin Japan, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 403 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994); LAW AND JUSTICE N TOKUGAWA JAPAN ch. 7 (ohn
Henry Wigmore ed., pt. 2 1968); TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO

HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN % 9.06-9.09 (1986); Tasuku Matsuo, Bankruptcy and CorporateReorganization,in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN

chs. 7-8 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1999); Tasuku Matsuo & Richard Vliet, Creditor's Rights Under Japanese Law, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA (John Owen Haley ed., 1978); FRANK
PACKER & MARK RYSER, THE GOVERNANCE OF FAILURE: AN ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN JAPAN, (Ctr. on Japanese Econ. and Bus., Work-

ing Paper No. 62, 1992); Arnold M. Quittner, Cross-BorderInsolvencies: Concurrent Japanese and United States Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL STRATEGIES 33 (PLI No. 628, 1992);
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 71-74

(Neil Cooper & Rebecca Jarvis

eds., 1996); Koji Takeuchi, Treatment ofInternationalInsolvency Issues in Japan,
in CURRENT ISSUES IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY AND REORGANIZATIONS

(E. Bruce Leonard & Christopher W. Besant eds., 1994); Koji Takeuchi, Japa-

nese Insolvency Law, in MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY M-1
(American Bar Ass'n ed., 1993); PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY ch. 11 (1995); Stephen Baister, The Origins and
Operation ofJapaneseInsolvency Law, 7/6 INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 181 (1992);
Mary E. Hiscock & Kazuaki Sono, Security Interests andInsolvency in Japan, 44
RABEL ZEITSCHRIFT 757 (1980); Tatsuo Ikeda, Bankruptcy Law in Japan and Its
Recent Development, 46 OSAKA U. L. REV. 9 (1999); Junichi Matsushita, Present
and Future Status ofJapaneseInternationalInsolvency Law, 33 TEx. INT'L LJ. 71
(1998); Junichi Matsushita, On CurrentInternationalInsolvency Law in Japan, 6
INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 210 (1997); Arnold M. Quittner, Cross-Border Insolvencies- Ancillary and Full Cases: The ConcurrentJapanese and United States
Cases ofMaruko Inc., 6 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. S33 (Supp. 1997).
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ample of the territorial approach to cross-border insolvency.80
Presumably, commentators draw such a conclusion from reading

Japan's bare insolvency statute, which includes a section entitled

the "Principle of Territoriality [in Japan]." 8 Such a supposition is

at best an oversimplification; at worst, it is flatly wrong. To understand Japan's present approach to cross-border insolvencies, it

is beneficial to have an understanding of the divergent nature of
Japan's modern approach to the subject, and it is essential to be
aware of the courts' treatment of cross-border insolvency issues
over the past twenty years.
In order to address the actual status of Japan's living law on

cross-border insolvencies, this Section first outlines the various insolvency statutes and procedures.82 Next, the Section discusses
the statutes that created the territorial approach to cross-border
insolvency and the early case law that developed around those
provisions. The heart of the Section reviews how modern Japanese courts have deviated from the territorial laws to create a
more universal approach. The Section then concludes by summa-

rizing the current status of Japanese cross-border insolvency law
in practice.
80

See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE

LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 886

(3d ed. 1996); Bebchuk & Guzman,

supra note 25, at 787 ("Although some small efforts have been made to allow
some limited degree of universalism, the laws of Japan remain very territorialist as the above legislation indicates."); Kim & Smith, supra note 5, at 3 ("An
example of a strict territorial approach can be found in Japanese bankruptcy
law .... ."); Cross-BorderInsolvency Steps Slated to Meet Times, supra note 17, at 9
(reporting based on a statement from the Japanese Ministry of Justice that, "Japan's existing legal system for corporate bankruptcy and rehabilitation does
not cover overseas assets left in domestic business failures because it adopts the
so-called principle of territorial jurisdiction, which leaves assets outside Japan
off-limits to bankruptcy procedures."); Kokusai t6san hisei seibi e, supra note 17,
at 3 (same report in Japanese).
s1Bankruptcy Act, art. 3 (1922) (Japan).
82 Due to space limitations, this Article does not review the historical
foundations of Japanese insolvency law. For the best works in English on this
important and fascinating area, see LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
ch. 7 (John Henry Wigmore ed., pt. 2 1968), at 101-114 and Stephen Baister,
The Origins and Operation ofJapanese Insolvency Law, 7/6 INSOLVENCY L. &
PRAC. 181 (1992). Wigmore's collection is the important translation of, inter

alia, the Collection of Civil Customs (Minjikanrei ruishit), which compiled the
formal and customary rules for all regions of Japan as a "Restatement" of Japanese indigenous law prior to the reception of Western codes. See id. apps. A-B
at 115-17.
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3.2. Structure ofJapaneseInsolvency System
Modern Japanese insolvency law is scattered throughout the
statutory landscape. It is found in no less than three independent
acts and various portions of the Commercial Code. Considered
positively, one may argue that such a menu-like approach is beneficial because it adds flexibility to the system allowing debtors,
creditors, and courts to find the most efficient system for the specific facts in the case.83 Traditionally, however, commentators
have cynically viewed the dispersed nature of Japanese insolvency
law and explained it as a failure of legislators to amend, abandon,
or consolidate the existing laws as conditions changed and required new variations and solutions. 4
Whatever the reasons for the disjointed approach, Japan's insolvency law requires filers to make a number of determinations
before seeking the court's protection." First, one must decide
11 See, e.g., FRANK PACKER & MARK RYSER, THE GOVERNANCE OF
FAILURE: AN ANATOMY OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN JAPAN, (Ctr. on
Japanese Econ. and Bus., Working Paper No. 62, 1992), at 31. See also Robert
K. Rasmussen, A Debtor's Choice:A Menu Approach to CorporateBankruptcy, 71

TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992) (discussing in the American context aproposal where
debtors and creditors may select insolvency rules from various alternatives).
84 See, e.g., Junichi Matsushita, PresentandFuture Status offapanese International Insolvency Law, 33 TEX. INT'L L. J. 71, 72-73 (1998) ("The reason for the
existence of the five types is that each time a new type of proceeding was enacted, none of the previous laws governing insolvency proceedings were repealed or consolidated."); Curtis I. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of

Private Ordering:An Institutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of Organized Crime,
67 U. CHI. L. REv. 41, 54 (2000) ("The multiplicity of legal regimes is the result
of a process of continuous borrowing from other countries, without any attempt to eliminate or streamline existing procedures."); Patrick Shea & Kaori

Miyake, Insolvency Related Reorganization Procedures in Japan: The Four Cornerstones, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 243, 245 (1996) ("Because old reorganization regimes were not eliminated when new ones were adopted and no attempt
to integrate the four regimes was ever made, there are four separate reorganization regimes in Japan.").
This cynical view also seems to fail in the face of present revision efforts.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Even though the entire insolvency
system is being overhauled, there has been no movement to unify the system.
In fact, additional alternatives are being created for financial institution failures, see infra Section 3.2.2.4., and consumer rehabilitation. See Kojin saimu
sha no minji saisei tetsuduki ni kan suru y~amian [Draft Proposal Regarding

Civil Rehabilitation Procedure for Individual Debtors], Ministry of Justice,
http://www.moj.gu.jp/public/minji05/pub minji05-1.htm (last visited Nov.
15, 2000); Hasansezu seikatsu saiken OK [Riforming Life Without Going Bankrupt OK], ASAH SHIMBUN, July 15, 2000, at 1.
8" See Honorable Shinjiro Takagi, Japanese Insolvency Proceedings in Gen-
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whether to file for liquidation or reorganization.86 Following this
choice, one's options will be narrowed because a number of the
proceedings are only available to certain entities, such as corporations (kabushikigaisha)."8 If the filer selects liquidation, there are
two primary alternatives- bankruptcy (hasan) or corporate special liquidation (tokebetsu seisan).88 For reorganizations, the options include composition (wagi), corporate reorganization (kaisha
kosei), corporate arrangement (kaishaseiri), and a new proceeding
for the reorganization of financial institutions such as banks and
credit unions (kin'yg kikan no kisei).89 Added to all of these formal legal options, many debtors opt for private arrangements
(shiteki seiri, nai- or uchi-seiri, and nin'i seiri).9 As discussed below, the final decision of which proceeding to pursue will depend
upon a balancing of the substantive and procedural advantages
and disadvantages in light of the specific goals of the filer and the
facts of the case. As background to the discussion of Japan's experience with international insolvencies, this Section extends the
comparative methodology internally and briefly reviews the following aspects of Japan's various insolvency regimes: sources of
law, commencement procedures, administration method, stays or
preservation mechanisms, treatment of secured and priority
claims, discharge and reorganization plan confirmation, and priority of distribution.

eral, at 904-05 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No.
A4-4474, 1995).
86 As in the United States, see 11 U.S.C. S 706, 1112, 1307 (1999), a case
may slide between categories after filing. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act, art. 290 Gapan) (providing
conversion from bankruptcy to composition); Kaisha k6sei
h6 [Corporate Reorganization Law], Law No. 172, 1952, arts. 23-26 (providing
for conversation from reorganization to bankruptcy), 27-28 (providing for
conversion from reorganization to composition).
87 See, e.g., Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 6 (extending jurisdiction
only to corporationis); SHOHO, arts. 431 (providing for the institution of Corporate Special Liquidations only for corporations), 381 (providing for the institution of Corporate Special Arrangements only for corporations); Financial
Institutions Reorganization Act, in/ra note 192, art. 2 (ioting application to
banks and cooperative financial institutions only).
88 See Takagi, supra note 85, at 904.
89 See id.
0 See Milhaupt & West, supra note 84, at 54-55.
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LiquidationProceedings

3.2.1.1.

Bankruptcy

The Bankruptcy Act serves as the backbone of the entire
Japanese insolvency system and all of the various Japanese insolvency proceedings follow the basic substantive and procedural
structure created by the Act.9 Bankruptcy is the rough equivalent to Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and creates a general liquidation.proceeding that may be used by both
natural persons and corporations.' Enacted in 1922, the Bankruptcy Act was modeled largely on the German Bankruptcy Law
of 1877. 9' Since that time, however, it has been extensively,
though not completely, revised though amendments, particularly
during the Allied Occupation. 94
Unlike the automatic commencement of proceedings upon
the filing of an application in the United States, a Japanese insolvency case does not officially commence until a court makes a
declaration of bankruptcy (hasansenkoku). 9' Thus, a bankruptcy
proceeding is initiated when a debtor or creditor applies for bankruptcy, but it has no effect until two weeks to six months later,
when the court finds that the debtor has met the indicia of bankruptcy (hasangen'in).96 Indicia of bankruptcy include both equi-

9' See, e.g., Wagi ha [Composition Act], Law No. 72, art. 11 (1992) [hereinafter Composition Act] (applying Bankruptcy Act provisions mutatis mutandis
to compositions); Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 4 (copying language of
Bankruptcy Act, art. 3, nearly verbatim).
92 See Bankruptcy Act, art. 105 (providing bankruptcy jurisdiction over
natural and judicial persons).
For a slightly dated and rudimentary comparison of the United States and
Japanese insolvency systems, see Brooke Schumm Il, Comparison ofJapanese

andAmericanBankruptcy Law, 1988 MIcH. Y.B. INTt, LEGAL STUD. 291 (1988)
" Hasan ha [Bankruptcy Act], Law No. 71, 1922.
94 See Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 451. Amendments include: Law No. 70,
1926; Law No. 68, 1939; Law No. 61, 1947; Law No. 223, 1947; Law No. 173,
1952; Law No. 106, 1958; Law No. 161, 1962; Law No. 111, 1966; Law No. 36,
1967; Law No. 88, 1967; Law No. 48, 1970; Law No. 100, 1971; Law No. 94,
1975; Law No. 5, 1983; Law No. 43, 1985; Law No. 79, 1992; Law No. 110,
1996; Law No. 83, 1998; Law No. 87, 1999.
95 Bankruptcy Act, art. 1.
96 See Takeuchi, supra note 35, at 71; Schumm, supra note 92, at 298.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss4/1

2000]

CROSS-BORDER INSOL VENCYPARADIGM

table and balance sheet insolvency as well as a suspension of payments.97

Upon the ruling of commencement, a number of events occur
that parallel practice in the United States. Automatically upon
commencement, an estate (hasan zaidan) is created consisting of
all of the debtor's assets and a trustee (kanzainin)is appointed to
administer that estate. 98 The trustee, almost invariably a lawyer
(bengosbi), takes control of the assets and seeks to liquidate them
for the benefit of the creditors. 9 The trustee also has the right or
duty to avoid or set aside fraudulent transfers and preferences
(hi'nin ken)." ° Also at this time, the date for a meeting of the
creditors is set and arrangements are made for publication and notice of the bankruptcy.0 1 Following this, creditors must submit
proofs of claims, which are subject to the approval of the trustee
and confirmation by the court."
Notably though, unlike the United States, no automatic stay
is issued at commencement. Instead, debtor's assets are only protected upon application for and granting of a "preservation measure" (hozen shobun).13 Preservation measures are generally directed at specific assets or proceedings rather than blanket
protection, and in a bankruptcy, they are usually granted "provisionally" prior to official commencement.1 "' Related to the lack
of an automatic stay, all secured creditors have the right to proceed against assets outside of the insolvency proceedings (betsujyj
ken)." s Further, those with rights of setoff (sjsai ken) and title
97
98

See Bankruptcy Act, arts. 126, 127.
Ia arts. 6, 142.

99I arts. 157-69.
Id.art. 72. In addition to rules against transfers done with the intent to
defraud, the law provides for two types of preferences. Id. art. 72(1). First, acts
100

done after and within thirty days of filing may be avoided if, regardless of
debtor's intentions, the beneficiary was an inside creditor, or the creditor had
knowledge of the insolvency. Id. arts. 72(1)-(4). Second, acts done after or
within six months of filing may be avoided if they were purely gratuitous and
art. 72(5).
not based on a prior debt. Id.
101 Id arts.

143, 177.

Id. arts. 228, 229.
103 Id.art. 155.
102

14

Id; Tasuku Matsuo, Bankruptcy, in DOING BUSINESS INJAPAN S 7.03[3]

(Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 2000).
105See Bankruptcy Act, arts. 92-97. Some argue that such a right produces
a difference in Japanese and United States practice. See Milhaupt & West, supra
note 84, at 54. However, insolvency practitioners with experience in both Ja-
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ownership of property held by the debtor (torimodoshi ken) are
similarly free to control106the relevant assets without specific permission from the court.
In further contrast to the United States, the Bankruptcy Act
does not provide for an automatic discharge at the conclusion of
the bankruptcy proceeding, though it is widely granted in the accepted cases. 0 In fact, the discharge provision was only introduced to the Bankruptcy Act in 1952 at the insistence of the U.S.
Occupation reformers.0 8
In contrast to the strict nondiscrimination features of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Japanese
law imposes limits on bankrupts' future capacity in a number of
areas, such as prohibiting them from acting as lawyers.0 9
Finally, Japan's general approach to priorities of distribution
is consistent with the United States, though there are some differences in the details.1 For example, Japan does not give priority
to claims by commercial fishermen but does give priority to funeral expenses.' Japan's basic priority ordering is as follows: sepan and the United States suggest that in practice this difference is at most
ormal, not substantive. See Interview with Kenji Nakashima, Japanese Attorney with Kitahama Law Office and Frequently Official Insolvency Trustee, in
Osaka, Japan (Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Nakashima Interview].
106 See Bankruptcy Act, arts. 87-98.
107 See id,art. 366(2)-(20). In 1992, a typical year, approximately eighty-five
percent of the total number of accepted bahkruptcy cases resulted in discharge.
See
Tanaka,
Saikin niand
okeiu
hasan wagi liken
no dJkJ [Recent
Trends
in
the Yasuhiki
Occurrences
of Bankruptcy
Composition],
830 HANREI
TAIMUZU
17, 20
tbl. 1 (1994). The figure is in fact higher, though, since five percent of accepted
bankruptcy cases are of juristic persons, who have no need of discharge and
merely dissolve. See id; Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 454 n.19.
108 See Law No. 173, 1952.
109 Compare 11 U.S.C. S 525 (1999) (providing, in part, "a governmental
unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew [or grant] a license,
permit, charter, franchise, or similar grant.., solely because such bankrupt or
debtor is or has been a debtor [in formal bankruptcy]") with Bengoshi h6
[Lawyers Law], Law No. 205, 1949, art. 6(5). See also MiNpO, arts. 846(4)
(guardian of a minor), 847 (custodian), 852 (supervisor of a guardian), 1009 (executor of a will); Shintaku h6 [Trust Act], Law No. 102, 1992, art. 5 (trustee);
K6sh5nin h6 [Notary Public Law], Law No. 53, 1908, art. 14(2) (notary public); Benrishi ha [Patent Agent Law], Law No. 100, 1921, art. 5 (patent agent);
Kanin kaikeishi h6 [Certified public accountant law], Law No. 103, 1948, art. 4
(certified public accountant); Mizutani v. Kansai kin'ya K.K., 21 MINSHO 274
(Sup. Ct. Mar. 9, 1967) (corporate director).
110

See In re Kojima, 177 B.R. 696, 702 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (holding

Japanese priorities are substantially in accordance with those of the U.S. Banl-

ruptcy Code).

1 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5)(B) (providing priority for U.S. fishermen un-
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cured creditors to the extent of their security;" 2 administrative
claims (zaidan saiken), e.g., debtor's exemptions, administrative
costs, and taxes;.. 3 priority claims (ylsen hasan saiken), e.g., employees' wages and funeral expenses;" general unsecured claims
(hasan saiken);"5 and deferred claims (retsugoteki hasan saiken)." 6
In 1998, approximately fifty-two percent of unsecured creditors
were paid five percent or less of their claims while twenty percent
of unsecured creditors were paid between twenty-five and fifty
percent of their claims."'
3.2.1.2.

CorporateSpecial Liquidation

The second insolvency proceeding in Japan is known as Corporate Special Liquidation and is only available to corporations."'
Unlike the other Japanese insolvency regimes, the special liquidation provisions were not predominately based on any foreign law
and are not found in an independent act but in the Commercial
Code." 9 Just as in the United States, companies in Japan may
der the U.S. Bankruptcy code); MINPO, art. 306(3), 309.

Bankruptcy Act, arts. 92-97.
Ia: art. 47.
114 I
art. 39; MINPO, arts. 306-28.
112

113

116

Bankruptcy Act, arts. 15-16, 256-89.
1d art. 46.

11

1 GENERAL SECRETARIAT, (JAPAN) SUPREME COURT, SHIHO TOKEI

15

NENPO, MINJI GYOSEI HEN [ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS, CIVIL

AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES VOLUME] 268-69 (1999) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT]. Hiscock and Sono note, based on dated statistics, however, that
only sixty percent of known creditors even bother to file proof of claim forms
after notification. See Mary E. Hiscock & Kazuaki Sono, Security Interests and
Insolvency inJapan, 44 RABEL ZEIFSCHRIFT 757, 772 (1980).
t See SHOHO, arts. 431-55.
119 See id Specifically, these provisions are found in sub-section 9(2) of
chapter IV on corporations in boo H on companies of the Commercial Code.
In other nations as well, insolvency provisions for corporations are found in
corporate law rather than independent substantive insolvency statutes. See, eg., Corporations Act, div. IV (Austl.) (1989) (providing Australia's corporate reorganization
provisions as part of its corporate law).
Regarding the indigenous source of special liquidation, see Takeuchi, supra note
35, at 69 n.3; 2 SHINZO TAKAYANAGI, NIHON HOSEI SHI [HISTORY OF JAPAN'S
LEGAL SYSTEM] 257-60 (1965) (by implication). But see PACKER & RYSER, supra note
83, at 33 (stating it "drew somewhat on contemporaneous U.K. corporate law");
Yoshimitsu Aoyama, Tokuktsu seisan [Specid Liquidaon], in SHIMAN CHOKAI
KAISHA HO [NEW EDITION INTERPRETATION OF CORPORATE LAW] 379 (Katsuro
Uvratani et al. eds., 1990).
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formally liquidate without relying on insolvency statutes.120 For a
company undergoing this type of self-liquidation, the Commercial Code provides these special liquidation rules when it becomes
apparent
that a corporation's liabilities are greater than its as2
sets.1

1

Corporate Special Liquidation proceeds in the same general
manner as bankruptcy.1 " For example, a case does not officially
commence until after the court confirms the application and stays
or preservation measures are only granted by specific request.
Further, secured creditors are not hindered by the proceeding,
which eventually results in a pro rata distribution of limited funds
among unsecured creditors.12 The proceeding, however, also has
a number of special features. Most often noted is the fact that
rather than an outside trustee, a former corporate director is usually appointed as liquidator. 12 Unlike the other liquidation and
reorganization proceedings, there are no rights of avoidance or

120 See SHOHO, arts. 404-16, 417-30 (providing dissolution provisions and
liquidation provisions respectively). In the United States, see, for example,
Model Business Corporation Act %75-98, which provides for non-formal insolvency dissolution.
121 SHOHO, art.

431, as translated, provides:

When it is deemed that circumstances exist which would seriously impede the carrying out of the liquidation, the Court may, upon the application of any creditor, liquidator, auditor, shareholder, or of its
own motion, order the company to institute a process of special liquidation; the same shall apply in cases where the Court deems it suspicious that the liabilities of a company are in excess of its assets.
If there are grounds to suspect that the liabilities of a company are in
excess of its assets, the liquidator shall file the application mentioned
in the preceding paragraph.
Where it is deemed that the grounds mentioned in the first paragraph
exist in respect of any company, the competent authorities to supervise the airs of companies may give notice thereof to the Court; in
such case, the Court may, of its own motion, order the institution of a
process of special liquidation.
IaL (incorporating SHOHO, art. 381(2), which is applied mutates mutandis, as
paragraph (3)).
112 See YASUHEI
TANIGUCHI, GENDAI TOSAN HO
[INTRODUCTION TO MODERN INSOLVENCY LAW] 18 (2d ed. 1999).
123

See SHOHO, arts. 431, 433, 383.

124 See id.
125 See id. art. 417(1).
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setoff." 6 In contrast to bankruptcy liquidation, and more similar
to reorganization in composition, the creditors in a special liquidation may form a creditors' committee authorized to approve
the proposed plan for liquidation and distribution of the debtor's
remaining assets."
The chief benefit of this approach is that it provides for a fair
and orderly distribution of a company's limited assets through a
process that is simpler and less involved than bankruptcy." 8
Moreover, some argue that tax gains may be obtained in a special
liquidation proceeding." 9 Further, one interesting aspect of the
special liquidation system concerning cross-border insolvencies is
that it specifically extends to foreign companies.13 Thus, it has
been particularly useful for foreign corporations seeking simply
to close failing Japanese offices.'
In fact, both Bank of Credit,
Commerce International ('BCCI"), and Barrings Bank relied on
these provisions to wrap up their Japanese operations.132 Given
126

127

See TANIGUCHI, supra note 122, at 18.
See SHOHO, arts. 43944, 445-51.

128 See Matsushita, supra note 84, at 74. In contrast to the over 390 articles
of the Bankruptcy Act, Corporate Special Liquidation covers only 24 articles.
See SHOHO, arts. 431-55. The procedure is colloquially known as "mini bank-

ruptcy." See 21 KAISHA SOSHO, KAISHA HISO, KAISHA SEIRI, TOKUBETSU
SEISAN [CORPORATE LITIGATION, Ex PARTE LITIGATION, ADMINISTRATION,
AND SPECIAL LIQUIIDATION] 397 (Katsuo Yamaguchi ed., 1992).
129 See HASAN TOKUBETSU SEISAN [BANKRUPTCY AND SPECIAL
LIQUIDATION] 239 (KenNakatori ed., 1989); PACKER & RYSER, supra note 83,
at 44 n.29.; Tatsuo Ikeda, Bankruptcy Law in Japanand Its Recent Development,
46 OSAKA U. L. REv. 9, 14 (1999).
130 See SHOHO, art. 485(2).
131 See Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 453-54.
132 Neither filing resulted in reported cases; however, the unreported opinions are noted in Miyake, supra note 17, at 238 n.2, and Takeuchi, supra note
35, at 83-84. Some of the unique features of the BCCI case have fueled domestic debate on a number of matters. For example, in a precursor to the Financial Institutions Reorganization Act, see infra note 192, the Minister of Finance
instigated the case as an interested party (bank regulator), though it held no direct relationship (e.g., as creditor, iqcuidator, auditor, or shareholder) with the
debtor. See Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International, No. (Hi) 2012
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., 1991). One of the judges in the Barrings case stated the same
was true in that case as well. See Interview with Unnamed Japanese High
Court Judge in Sapporo, Japan (Feb. 18, 2000). See also Takeuchi, supra note
35, at 83 n.62, 84 n.63; Toshikatsu Tomizawa, BCCI t6san jiken ni omou [My
Thougbts on the BCCIInsolvency], 9 SAIKEN KANRI [DEBT ADMINISTRATION] 3
(1991) (noting the extent of Japanese financial involvement); BCCIliken no
sono ato [BCCI andIts Aftermath], 499 NBL 4 (1992) (discussing the BCCI case
and the issues it raised).
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these benefits, the use of Corporate Special Liquidation has
gradually increased over the past few years and is now resorted to
more frequently than any of the reorganization options."'
3.2.2.

ReorganizationProceedings

3.2.2.1.

13 4

Composition

In 1922, along with the Bankruptcy Act the Japanese Diet also
passed its predominate reorganization law- the Composition
Act.'35 The Composition Act provides a judicial procedure resulting in a collective agreement between the debtor and its unsecured creditors upon agreement by a majority of them.136 The act

was based on the Austrian Composition Act of 1914 and may
only be initiated by a debtor. 3

Composition proceedings are

"I As seen at Table I, infra, the number of Corporate Special Liquidations
has increased by approximately 300% in the 1990s.
134 As the first part of the revision of Japan's insolvency law discussed
above, see supra note 17, the Composition Act was superseded by the Civil Rehabilitation Act on April 1, 2000. See Minji saisei h6 [Civil Rehabilitation
Law], Law No. 225 of 1999, Supplementary Provisions (fusoku), arts. 1-2. Because the purpose of this Article is to consider how a territorial system actually
performs within the modern global environment and given that it is unclear
how the new law will be applied, it is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
discussion of the new law, see, e.g., Stacey Steele, Evaluating the New Japanese
Civil RehabilitationLaw, 2 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 54 (2000); Symposium, Minji
saisei h6 no rippa [Enactment of the Civil Reformation Act], 1171 JURISUTO 6
(2000). Within the symposium, particulary with regard to the new act's relationship to cross-border insolvencies, see Munehide Nishizawa, Kokusai tdsan
[InternationalInsolvency], 1171 JURISUTO 64 (2000).
135 Composition Act, Law No. 72 of 1922. For an excellent review of the
Composition Act in practice, see Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira,
Should We Abolisb Chapter11: The Evidence from Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111

(1994), reprinted in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND

(acob S. Ziegel ed., 1994).
Some debtors also use the Composition Act for liquidation. See Composition
Act, art. 1 (providing no requirement that a debtor must reorganize). -The advantage of liquidating in composition, rather than bankruptcy, is that it avoids
compulsory and expedited dismantling of a business that has a greater value as
a going-concern. See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra, at 219 n.14.
136 See, e.g., TANIGUCHI, supra note 122, at 16-17. The law actually provides that its primary purpose is the "prevention of bankruptcy." Composition Act, art. 1.
13 See Composition Act, art. 12; Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 453. Interestingly, the United States also briefly had a similar "composition" proceeding between 1874 and 1898. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 550 (2d ed. 1985) (providing citations).
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 259
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available to both natural persons and corporations, but they are
most often used by small and medium-sized businesses.138 One of
the main attractions of composition proceedings is that they are
considered simpler and less expensive than corporate reorganizations, which are discussed below.39
Along with the other insolvency proceedings, a composition
case does not begin at filing but rather upon acceptance of the
case by the court.' 4 This is significant in a reorganization because
See Composition Act, art. 12; Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 135, at
220. Japan does not have a proceeding specifically aimed at reorganization of
consumer debtors such as Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See 11
U.S.C. § 1301-1330 (1994). Because natural persons are eligible to file composition cases, the provision might be used in a manner similar to Chapter 13.
This is not common usage, however. See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note
135, at 220 n.18. The Ministry of Justice has proposed legislation to create a
Chapter 13-like proceeding. See Shea & Miyake, supra note 84.
139 See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 135, at 220. In contrast to the
Corporate Reorganization Law's nearly 300 articles, the Composition Act contains only seventy. See Composition Act, arts. 1-70.
10 A composition may also be initiated after a bankruptcy is already underway- a so-called Compulsory Composition (kytsei wagi). See Bankruptcy
Act, Law No. 71 of 1922, arts. 290-346. Compulsory Composition is a procedural mechanism similar to the U.S. provision allowing the conversion of a
case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 or 13 under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See
11 U.S.C. 5 706, 1112, 1307 (1994) (permitting the conversion of a case from
chapters 7, 11, and 13). One commentator, however, has classified Compulsory Composition as a separate and independent reorganization proceeiung.
See Shea & Miyake, supra note 84, at 264-68. That perspective, which tends to
over-emphasize the procedural nature of Compulsory Composition, is not followed in this Article. Other commentators, in both Japanese and English,
have declined to take that perspective. See, e.g., TANIGUCH, supra note 122, at
16 ("There are two forms of composition, the composition law regulated by
the Composition Act and compulsory composition regulated by the Bankruptcy Act, however, in actual substance they are the same."); see also Matsushita, supra note 84, at 73 (excluding Compulsory Composition as one of the
five types of insolvency in Japan).
With regard to Compulsory Composition, it is worth noting that there is
no evidence of debtors converting or making duplicative filings in Japan
merely for dilatory purposes. See, e.g., Shea & Miyake, supra note 84, at 264
(speculating that there are no more than two Compulsory Composition conversions a year). See also PACKER & RYSER, supra note 83, at 13 ("Especially
since 1967, when applicants were no longer allowed to withdraw from the proceedings without court permission and provisions made for the immediate appointment of outside trustee to assume control of the firm, the opportunistic
abuse of the Corporate Reorganization became rare if not impossible."). This
is in stark contrast to one version of the notorious "Chapter 20" in the United
States. See Lex A. Coleman, Individual Consumer "Chapter 20" Cases After
Johnson: An Introduction to Nonbusiness Serial Filings Under Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 9 BANK. DEV. J. 357 (discussing U.S. chap138
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it gives the creditors a chance to oppose, and the court a chance to
consider, the benefits of rehabilitation in the specific case.14' To
assist with the determination of whether to allow a debtor to proceed under the Composition Act, the court provisionally appoints an examiner (seiri i'n)at a preliminary hearing." The examiner is charged with reviewing the debtor's records and
advising the court as to whether reorganization is feasible." It is
important to remember, however, that this initial determination
by the court, regarding whether to allow a debtor to initiate the
reorganization process, is separate from the later decision to confirm or reject the reorganization plan.
Once the court determines that the debtor is eligible, it appoints a trustee," who, unlike other Japanese insolvency trustees,
has no authority to control the debtor.'
Instead, the composition trustee performs a number of supervisory jobs such as reviewing the debtor's operations, approving transactions made out
of the ordinary course of business, and reviewing and approving
creditors' claims. " 6 Given that management is otherwise left in
control, like a debtor-in-possession in the United States, composition 47is a particularly attractive alternative to corporate managers. 1
Upon commencement, a stay against all unsecured creditors is
automatically issued, but there are no preservation measures
ter 20 filings, i.e., serial or multiple filings of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcies by consumer debtors). Japanese judicia officers state off-the-record
that they suspect certain debtors oTtrying to make serial filings, but the tenyear exclusion of issuing a second bankruptcy discharge, see Bankruptcy Act,
art. 366-9(4), and the fact that compositions do not extend to voluntary secured
creditors, see Composition Act, arts. 42-43, make a simple serial chapter 20
scenario in Japan uilikely.
Further, because many aspects of a bankruptcy have already taken effect
by the time of a conversion to compulsory composition takes place, proceeding in this manner almost guarantees failure of the reorganization. See Shea &
Miyake, supra note 84, at 264-65.
141 See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 135, at 221.
1
Composition Act, art. 21.
143 Id. Examiners may in turn hire experts to assist with their review. See
id.art. 21(2)
144 Id. art. 27.
145 Id. art. 32. The trustee, however, retains the right to manage receipts
and disbursements of money. Id. art. 34.
146 Id. arts. 31-38.
147 See Ikeda, supra note 129, at 13.
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available'against secured interests."' Similarly, composition does
not directly involve secured creditors, and thus they may otherwise freely execute on security.149 As discussed below, this system
puts pressure on the debtor to keep secured obligations in good
standing, or otherwise come to some informal restructuring with
Further, neither the debtor nor the trusits secured creditors.'
tee has a right to avoid preferential transfers.'
A reorganization plan is eventually adopted if those holding
seventy-five percent of the unsecured claims and a majority of
those attending the creditors' meeting approve the plan)52 If the
plan fails to gain approval, a second creditors meeting may be
held to accommodate further negotiations and revisions to the
plan, or the court may directly order liquidation."' Once the
creditors approve the plan, the court almost always confirms it."5 4
At this point, the composition is concluded, the debtor resumes
unfettered control of its affairs, and the relationship between
debtor and creditors is modified in accordance with the plan. If
the debtor later cannot execute the plan, the creditors may revoke
it partially or wholly but must initiate new proceedings to enforce it.' An empirical study has shown that the mean payment
level under composition reorganization plans is 46.9%, over 6
years, following a grace period of 1.2 years, with a 42% successful
completion rate.5 6

148

Composition Act, arts. 40, 43.

149

Ia art. 43.

"' As discussed in Section 3.2.3., because composition does not involve
secured creditors, debtors seeking to reorganize must make private arrangements with those creditors.
.51
See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 135, at 221 n.23. Cf Composition Act, arts. 31, 33 (providing avoidance of acts done post-filing out of the
normal course of business).
15 Composition Act, art. 49.
153
154

Id. arts. 9, 59.

See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 135, at 240-41. The Act does allow a court to deny a plan where it finds fraud, unequal treatment, or other
problems. See Composition Act, art. 51.
tss See Composition Act, arts. 62, 64; Bankruptcy Act, arts. 329-32.
u See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 135, at 225, 246 (summarizing
and analyzing data from Japan).
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CorporateReorganization

The most formal rescue proceeding is corporate reorganization."7 The Diet passed the Corporate Reorganization Act in
1952, basing it on the existing Japanese insolvency statutes and
chapter X of the old U.S. Bankruptcy Act."5 8 The law aims at reorganization of the debtor's business including both composition
of debts and adjustment of the corporation's equity ownership.' 59
Only corporations may rely on its provisions, and unlike the
other formal insolvency mechanisms, a debtor does not have to
meet any specific conditions, such as equitable or balance sheet
insolvency, to file. 60 Corporate reorganization is an expensive
proceeding that requires large sums for administrative expensesvarying from Y 3,500,000 ($35,000) to Y 10,000,000 ($100,000)- to
157

See Corporate Reorganization Law, Law No. 172 of 1952.

As with

compositions, a debtor may use the Corporate Reorganization Law to liqui-

date, see i. art. 191, or it may initiate the reorganization by converting an already filed liquidation proceeding, see id.art. 29. The most detailed discussion
of an actual Corporate Reorganization proceeding in English appears in Shin
Ushijima, The Internationalizationof the JapaneseEconomy and CorporateReorganizationProcedures:The Iwazawa Group andSapporo Toyopet Failures, in LAW
IN JAPAN 27, 36-54 (Scott Earnshaw trans., 18th ed. 1986).
The Corporate Reorganization Law consists of 295 articles, making it substantially longer than any of the other reorganization proceedings. Composition Act, arts. 1-70; SHOHO, arts. 381-403 (Corporate Arrangement). See also
WOOD, supra note 3, at 209 ("The provisions in the Japanese Corporate Rehabilitation Law governing the reorganization plan are extremely elaborate, even
more so than the U.S. version.").
15' See Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 454. The U.S. occupation forces proposed the Act in 1949. Id.
159 See Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 1.
16o See id art. 6 (providing jurisdiction only over corporations). Article 30
of the Corporate Reorganization Law provides:
(1) In the case where a company is unable to pay its obligations that
are due without exceedingly impeding continuation of its business, the
company may file with the Court an application of reorganization
proceedings. The same shall also apply in the case where the facts
compromising causes of bankruptcy are likely to take place with respect to the company.
(2) In the case mentioned in the latter clause of the preceding paragraph, the creditors having claims corresponding to one-tenth or more
of the amount of the capital, or the shareholders have schemes corresponding to one-tenth or more of the total number of shares issued,
may also file the application.
Id. art. 30.
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be placed in the court's control upon filing;161 thus, it is only used
by large public corporations- and even rarely by them.162

A corporate reorganization proceeding follows the same basic
pattern as the rest of Japan's insolvency options: the case is filed,

the court approves the application, a trustee is appointed, the
creditors' meeting is set, and notice is published. 63 A number of
elements are notable, however. First, in contrast to Chapter 11 in

the United States, but consistent with practice in many other nations that have reorganization schemes, the appointed trustee
takes over management of the debtor.'" Second, secured creditors are included in reorganization proceedings. 6 That scheme is

in contrast with Japan's other insolvency regimes, where secured
creditors are free to execute on security.'66 Stated differently, it
means the court may issue stays or preservation measures against

secured property and creditors, as well as unsecured property and
creditors.

Stays are only issued provisionally upon application

at filing, though they automatically issue upon formal commencement.'
Third, like Chapter 11 in the United States, but
different from the other reorganization proceedings in Japan, the

161 See id. art. 34. The amount paid in at filing is not part of the act but
depends on local rules. See DOING BUsINESS IN JAPAN, S 8.02(2)(c) (Zentaro

Kitagawa ed., 1999) (explaining that Osaka courts determine the amount on a
case-by-case basis depending upon the complexity and size of the case, but in all
cases a minimum deposit of Y5,000,000 (approximately $50,000) applies, while
Tokyo courts require amounts tied to the debtor's registered amount of paid-in
capital); see also TANIGUCHI, supra note 122, at 252 (noting that deposits may
vary from Y3,500,000 ($35,000) for companies with less than Y50,000,000
($500,000) in paid-in capital to Y10,000,000 ($100,000) for companies with more
than 41,000,000,000 ($10,000,000)). These amounts are held by the court for
administrative fees such as examiner's costs. See, e.g., Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 101(2)(1).
162 See Ikeda, supra note 129, at 12. See infra Table I (providing that on average less than thirty cases were filed per year in the 1990s).
163 See Corporate Reorganization Law, arts. 30, 4647.
164 See id art. 174. The trustee also has various other investigating and reporting duties. See idl arts. 98-98(4), 175-88. Cf. 11 U.S.C. 1107 (1994) (providing powers of a U.S. debtor-in-possession); Insolvency Act 1986 c.45 5 14,
Sche6ule 1 (providing administrator's powers to manage a corporation in administration reorganization in the United Kingdom).
165 See Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 123.
16 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act, arts. 92-97; Composition Act, art. 43.
167 See Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 37.
168 See id. arts. 37, 67.
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Corporate Reorganization Act allows for restructuring of a

debtor's equity composition."'
The trustee, once appointed by the court, is given an opportunity to review and investigate the corporation and the claims,
after which he submits a reorganization plan to the court and
subsequently to its creditors and shareholders."' The statute divides all of the interested parties into six categories, which may be
consolidated, increased, or modified."' The categories, in order
of priority, include secured creditors, priority creditors, general
creditors, creditors with deferred claims, preferred shareholders,
and general shareholders."
The plan must be approved by each
of these groups, but the margin of approval varies by group and
the specific facts of the case." 3 In general, to meet approval the
plan must pass anywhere from a two-thirds majority of the general shareholders to a four-fifths majority of secured creditors if
the plan alters their security rights." Following approval by the
various interested groups, the court must confirm the plan before
a debtor can begin to implement it."75 Corporate reorganization
is still a rare measure in Japan; therefore, specific statistics are not
available and it is hard to generalize about the typical types of
plans approved or their rate of success. 6
3.2.2.3.

CorporateArrangement

The third form of reorganization in Japan is corporate arrangement. Legislators created the corporate arrangement system
along with the corporate special liquidation proceedings as part of
the second wave of modern insolvency law reform in 1938.17
169

See id. arts. 129 to 131-2 (providing shareholders may participate in re-

organization proceedings), arts. 211-12 (providing rights of shareholders may
be modified by the reorganization plan), art. 221 (allowing a reduction of
debtor's paid in capital), art. 222 (allowing issuance of new shares).
170 Id. art. 189.
171
172

Id art. 159.

d

Id' art. 205.
174 Id. art. 205.
175 Id. arts. 232-33.
176 See infra Table I, providing number of annual reorganizations varied
from nine to eighty-eight in the 1990s. See also PACKER & RYSER, supra note
83, at 39 (noting estimates that general unsecured creditors get approximately
twenty to thirty percent of their approved claims).
177 See Shah6 chia kaisei h6ritsu [Law for the Revision Within the Coin173
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Like corporate special liquidation, corporate arrangement is predominately a homegrown proceeding limited to corporations and
found within the Commercial Code rather than in separate, independent legislation."' Created to respond to the limitations of
the Composition Act, the Corporate Arrangement Act provisions
aim at reorganization of a debtor under the most minimal degree
of court control." 9
Consistent with its streamlined approach to judicial involvement, the Corporate Arrangement Act takes up only one section,
twenty-two articles, in the Commercial Code.'
The process is
simplified substantively as well. For example, after the standard
commencement procedure, the court is not required to, and generally does not, appoint a trustee; thus, control remains with the
debtor.18 ' The proceeding does, however, allow a debtor to apply
for a stay against secured and unsecured creditors, thereby buying
time to construct an orderly reorganization plan.'
After a
debtor or its creditors' committee submits a plan for reorganizamercial Code], Law No. 72, 1938, amending SHOHO.
178 See SHOHO, arts. 381-403; Hiso jiken tetuduki ho [Non-Contentious
Matter (ex parte) Procedure Act], arts. 135(24)-135(46) [hereinafter NonContentious Procedure Act]. Specifically, these provisions are found in section
7 of chapter IV on corporations in book II on companies of the Commercial
Code. See also SHOHO, art. 381 (providing Corporate Arrangement may only
be instituted regarding a corporation).
Regarding the origins of the legislation, see TAKAYANAGI, supra note 119,
at 257-60 (by 'mplication). See also Takeuchi, supra note 35, at 69 n.3 ("Neither
arrangement nor special liquidation were modeled after foreign legal systems.");
cf PACKER & RYSER, supra note 83, at 36 (stating, with citations, that the legislation "was drafted with slight reference to the rules in U.K. corporate law or
arrangements and reconstructions under the supervision as well as procedures
in Swiss Debtor Law"); SHNJIMO TAKAGI, SHOHO JO NO KAISHA SEIRI
TETStJDUKI 28-31 (1983) (suggesting that the legislation was based on American
and English equity receivers p ideas); Shea & Miyake, supra note 84, at 245
(stating, without citation, that the arrangement provisions were borrowed
from England).
179 See Ikeda, supra note 129, at 13-14. Reflecting its minimal nature, the
procedure is colloquially referred to as "mini reorganization." KAISHA KOSEI
KAISHA
SEIRI
[CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION AND
CORPORATE
ADMINISTRATION] 225 (Ken Nakatori ed., 1989).
1"0 SHOHO, arts. 381-403.

181See SHOHO, art. 386; Shea & Mikake, supra note 84, at 257-58.

SHOHO, arts. 383(1) (providing for an interim stay from time of filing
where necessary and upon application), 383(2) (providing for an automatic stay
on enforcement actions from the court's acceptance of the case for arrangement).
182
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tion of the corporation, all creditors whose interests are affected
This requirement of 100% apby the plan must approve it.'
proval limits the number of corporations relying on the proceeding, but it also makes final court confirmation of the plan unnecessary. 84 The other limitation on corporate arrangements is that
the amount that must be paid into the court for costs at the initial
filing is the same extravagant amount as in a corporate reorganization proceeding."' In net effect, and to contrast with a purely
private workout, corporate arrangement procedures may be
viewed as providing debtors with a limited protective stay from
creditors in exchange for (1) filing fees and (2) limited court scrutiny and supervision. Because the proceeding requires full creditor support, its use is limited to cases where the debtor is in a relatively strong position and only a small number of creditors are
majority of filings are by small to medium
affected. Thus, 1the
86
sized businesses.
3.2.2.4.

FinancialInstitutionsInsolvencies

The final formal insolvency system in Japan is the one being
developed for the liquidation and reorganization of financial institutions such as banks and credit unions. Historically, Japanese
government regulators did not allow financial institutions to fail
See Ikeda, supra note 129, at 14. The Commercial Code does not provide specific requirements for the approval of a reorganization plan by the
creditors or the court. See Shea & Mfikatke, supra note 84, at 269. Thus, there is
no mechanism to give the court or a majority of the creditors the right to force
a plan on holdout creditors. Cf Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 205. The
183

result is that, just as with a private refinancing agreement, any plan must be
approved by all creditors whose rights are affected and correspondingly no
court approval is necessary. See Shea & Mikake, supra note 84, at 269.
184 See Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 205. A debtor, however, may
leverage the fact that it may convert to a corporate reorganization, where
complete creditor agreement is not required, to persuade holdout creditors to
support the proposed reorganization plan. See KOKUSAI TOsAN HO
[INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW] 64 (Morio Takeshita ed., 1991) (discussing an unreported composition case where the debtor applied such leverage).
185 See Non-Contentious Procedure Act, art. 135-27; TANIGUCHI, supra
note 122, at 252 n.'" Yamamoto reports that as of late 1999 the amount that
was required to be deposited with tie court was between Y6,000,000 ($60,000)
and Y20,000,000 ($200,000).

AKIO YAMAMOTO, TOSAN HO NYOMON

[INTRODUCTION TO INSOLVENCY LAW] 54 n." (1999).

186 See PACKER & RYSER, supra note 83, at 12 (noting based on filing statistics that large company corporate arrangements were "even so limited as to be
non-existent"); Tagashira, supra note 16, at 6.
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or otherwise fall into insolvency proceedings."' Instead, Japanese
regulators generally orchestrated the purchase and acquisition
This ap('P&A") of weaker banks by stronger competitors.'
proach, however, ended in the 1990s, when due to the continuing
economic recession, the government was unable to find willing
and sufficiently stable buyers of weak banks.189 To address this
new state of affairs, beginning in the mid-1990s, the legislature began enacting and revising a number of laws to deal specifically
with the insolvency of financial institutions.' 9 Until these legislative efforts, financial institutions theoretically were to liquidate or
under the general statutory regimes just as any other
reorganize
19 1
firm.

The main plank of the new regime is the Financial Institutions Reorganization Act ("FIRA"). 92 The long-term purpose of
this act is to provide a systematic and organized procedure for
both the reorganization and liquidation of insolvent financial in187 See Curtis Milhaupt, Japan's Experience witb Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks: Implicationsfor FinancialRegulatoy Design?,77 WASH. U. L.Q. 399,
410 (1999) ("[N]o member of the banking industry was allowed to exit (fail),
other than through merger with a stronger member.").

188 See
189 See

id

id. at 418-19; Bhala, supra note 16, at 63-68 (reviewing the banking
insolvency regime).
190 See, e.g., Yokin hoken h5 no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6ritsu [Act to Revise a Portion of the Depository Insurance Act], Law No. 96, 1996, amending
Depository Insurance Act (Yokin hoken ho), Law No. 34, 1971.
191 See Milhaupt, supra note 187, at 409. The limitations of this approach
were further complicated by the fact that many financial institutions, such as
credit unions, were not corporations that couldtake advantage of proceedings
such as corporate reorganization. See Corporate Reorganization Law, Law No.
172 of 1952, art. 1 (limiting application to corporations).
The U.S. approach, of course, differs. In the United States, financial institutions (as well as insurance companies) are excluded from the bankruptcy
code, see 11 U.S.C. 109(b)(2) (1994 ,and dealt with in separate legislation. See
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, codified as title 12 of the United States Code
(providing insolvency regime for financial institutions).
192 Kin'yu- kikan no k6sei tetsuduki no tokureita ni kansuru h6ritsu [Special Procedures for Reorganization of Financial Institutions Act], Law No. 95,
1996 [hereinafter Financial Institutions Reorganization Act or FIRA], art. 2
(noting application to banks (ginko), including regular banks (futsi ginko), longterm trust banks (chtki shin'y6 ginko), and foreign exchange banks (gaikoku kawaseginko) and to cooperative financial institutions (ky&1 sosbiki kin yi kikan),
including credit associations (shiny6 kyM&kumiat), trust depositories (shin'y6
kinko), and labor depositories (ridikinko)). The law took effect on April 1,
1997. FIRA app., art. 1.
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stitutions. 93 FIRA most notably differs from the standard regimes by giving bank regulators special standing both to place a

bank into bankruptcy or reorganization and to represent the interests of depositors in the insolvency."' The Act also expands
the reorganization options available to non-corporate banks, such
as savings and loans and credit unions, by making the provisions

of the Corporate Reorganization Act available to them.19 Further, a short-term supplement to the law allows the government
to temporarily control troubled banks and act as a bridge until

appropriate resolutions can be devised.196
Otherwise, the law follows the general procedures established

by the bankruptcy and corporate reorganization statutes."7 In
fact, rather than being seen as creating a totally separate new re-

gime, the Act may best be understood as providing certain exceptions and rules for special debtors (financial institutions) and special creditors (depositors) within the frameworks created by the
standard liquidation and reorganization statutes.'98 To date, only
a handful of financial institutions have been subject to the new
special framework. 9 At present, the shape of the special system
for financial institutions is unclear and still developing." °

193 See FIRA, art. 1. See also Atsushi Kitamura, Kiny5i kikan no kdsei
tetsuduki no tokureitjni kansuruhdritsu no gaiy6 [General Thoughts on the Special
Proceduresfr Reorganizationof FinancialInstitutionsAct], 598 NBL 41(1996)
(reviewing the FIRA); Kotatsu Uchibori & Masafumi Kawabata, Kin' fl kikan
no k6sei tetsudukit6 no gaisetsu [General Comments on the Procedure or Reorganization of FinancialInstitutions] (pts. 1 & 2), 612 NBL 22, 613 NBL 19

(1997) (same).

194 See FIRA, arts. 161 (providing regulators with the power to file reorgnation), arts. 167 (providing regulators shall create the list of depositors'
claims in reorganization), 178 (providing regulators with the power to file
bankruptcy), 184-185 (providing regulators shall create the list of depositors'
claims in bankruptcy).

Id. art. 20.
See Kin'yii ki'n6 no saisei no tame kinkya socchi ni kansuru h6ritsu
[Act Concerning Emergency Measures for the Rehabilitation of Financial
Functions], Law No. 132, (1998); id arts. 8-26 (providing that the government
may take control by appointing an administrator), arts. 36-52 (providing that
the government may take control by temporarily nationalizing the bank);
Bhala, supra note 16, at 66 (describing the temporary measures).
19' See Uchibori & Kawabata, supra note 193, at 25.
198 Financial Institutions Reorganization Act, art. 20 (incorporating use of
Corporate Reorganization Law's provisions to apply to credit unions that are
not corporations, art. 2(3) (defining 'financial institutions' (kinyti kikan)), art.
2(5) (defining 'depository credits' (yokintrisaiken)).
199 The most notable examples of the new system are the insolvencies of
19
196
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3.2.3.

PrivateLiquidations,Refinancings,and Workouts

All legal systems accommodate private liquidations and reorganizations as well as those pursued through the legal frameworks. 1 Such insolvencies may include entities that simply cease
to exist, entities that liquidate outside of the formal bankruptcy
proceedings, entities that refinance (kin'yii shien or kin y7 enjo)
their debts individually, in groups, or in their entirety, and entities that go through extensive and quasi-formal workouts and restructuring of all of their financial areas, including their capital
structure. 2 Reviewing these private arrangements in Japan is beNippon Credit Bank and the Long Term Credit Bank, both of which were
placed under special public receivership (tokubetsu kiteki kanri) in 1998. See

Chjkin: kiteki shikin 6,951,100,000,000 en [LTCB: Public Financingof Y6.951
Trillion], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 17, 2000, at 7 (noting public receivership); Nippon CreditPlaced Under Government Control, THE PRESS (Christchurch, N.Z.),
Dec. 14, 1998, at 24.
200 The situation with failing banks is further complicated because the
Japanese government might end its guaranty of all deposits on Mar. 31, 2001.
See Depository Insurance Act, Supplementary Provisions (fusoku), arts. 16-17,
as amended by Law No. 133, 1998. This issue, known in Japan as "payoff,"
will likely continue to be a major issue of deliberation in the coming years.
Nonetheless, the indications are that Japan will continue to pursue a special
insolvency system for financial institutions. Participants in various advisory
discussion groups on the revision of Japanese insolvency statutes have stated
that they are not reviewing or revising the insolvency statutes considering financial institutions, because they expect these will continue to be treated in a
separate, specific statute. Comments from members of the Insolvency Study
Committee of the Hokkaido District Court in Sapporo, Japan (Dec. 3, 1999).
201

LAW,

See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
POSSIBLE

FuTuRE

WORK

ON

INSOLVENCY,

U.N.

DOC.

A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.50
157-160 (1999) [hereinafter UN REPORT]; WOOD,
supra note 3, at chs. 18-20; Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Economic Anal sis of CorporateBankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
85, 115 (1995) (discussing private insolvency measures in the United States and
arguing that private insolvency may be preferable to formal insolvency proceedings); Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1079
(1998) (speculating that "the increasing sophistication of [U.S.] parties to craft
out-of-court workouts" has been a factor in keeping down the number of formal business insolvencies).
202 See AOYAMA ET AL., supra note 2, at 18-23; PACKER & RYSER, supra
note 83, at 20-30 (reviewing the option and arguing that in Japan informal insolvency is more prevalent than formal). Aoyama also suggests that a large
number of formal insolvency cases are eventually resolved by private arrangements facilitated through mechanisms associated with formal proceedings, such
as creditors' meetings. Yd.at 20. Arrangements achieved in this way, however,
only have binding effect on the creditors who attended the creditors' meeting
and agreed to the private arrangement. See Showa Kenzai K.K. v. Endo K.K.,
312 HANREI TAIMUZU 233 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., May 31, 1974). Thus, a holdout
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yond the scope of this Article; however, a few points concerning
informal insolvencies are worth mentioning.
First, many of the arguments that commentators have made
regarding Japan's relatively low rate of general litigation may also
apply to its relatively small number of filed insolvencies. 03 In
other words, inefficient legal systems, predictable legal resolutions, and unique cultural views on public legal resolutions may
all contribute to a comparatively high number of private workout
solutions in Japan.' ° Similarly, there are a number of insolvencyspecific provisions, both substantive and procedural, that tend to
encourage private resolution rather than formal insolvency.0 '
could still partially derail such a private settlement. Obviously natural debtors
cannot cease to exist, but the equivalent- "fleeing into the night" (yonige)- is

prevalent enough in Japan to warrant a common phrase. See AOYAMA ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 18 (using the term); 13 KAZUO YAMADA, NEW CROWN
JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1115 (1988) (defining yonige).

In a similar vein, private liquidation or settlement can also occur within
the formal reorganization due to the efforts of "gangster-like 'professional'
creditor managers" (iken ya, seiri ya, sarubegi ya, panariya, or toritate ya) who
specialize in manipulating creditors committee and insolvency administration
tor their private advantage. See Tasuku Matsuo & Richard Vliet, Creditor's
Rights UnderJapaneseLaw, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS
IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 208, 208 n.42 (ohn 0. Haley ed., 1978). Viewed

from one perspective this might be seen as an additional private insolvency
"system." See PACKER & RYSER, supra note 83, at 26-29; Milhaupt & West, su-

pra note 84, at 67-68.

However, most Japanese insolvency practitioners

strongly dispute such a characterization and suggest seiri-ya is not relied on as
an insolvency "option." See, e.g., Nakashima Interview, supra note 105; Interview with Ayumu ijima, Japanese Attorney at Kitahama Law Office, Osaka,

Japan (Mar. 16, 2000).

See Schumm, supra note 92, at 291 ("Japan has many fewer courtsupervised insolvency proceedings than the United States.").
204 See Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in ContemporaryJapan,
203

in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (Arthur T.

von Mehren ed., 1963) (discussing unique cultural views); John 0. Haley, The
Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 21 LAW INJAPAN 18 (1988) (discussing inefficient legal systems); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The RationalLiti.
gan'" Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263
(1989) (discussing predictable legal resolutions).

205 Insolvency-specific arguments for the other rationalesi.e., predictable
legal resolutions an culture- may also be made. See Ramseyer & Nakazato,
supra note 204. Nonetheless, no empirical studies exist that suggest the particu-

lar predictability of insolvency distributions in Japan. On the other hand, a
number of commentators have argued that a unique cultural aversion to insolvency reduces Japanese insolvency filings. Harmer, for instance, suggests:
The first reason [for a large number of informal private insolvencies] has to
do with Japanese society and culture. The values of that society generally
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Procedural provisions include the need for a large filing deposit,
the requirement of finding indicia of insolvency, and the lack of
an automatic stay and discharge. All of these contribute to the
time, cost, and burden of an insolvency proceeding and thereby
create incentives to resort to private arrangement.0 6 More substantive aspects of Japanese insolvency law that may encourage
informal settlements include the replacement of management in a
reorganizing firm, the failure of most formal proceedings to extend to secured creditors, and, as discussed below, the failure of
Japanese insolvency jurisdiction to directly cover foreign assets.
lead to constructive, informal discussion and negotiation of commercial

and other issues through which solutions may be found and a settlement
reached. This acts as a disincentive to use legal proceedings to determine
issues.
Ron W. Harmer, Bankruptcy in the Global Village: Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 139, 156 (1997). Other
commentators have made similar claims. See Hiscock & Sono, supra note 117,
at 772-73 (Bankruptcy is still socially condemned as a moral wrong [in Japan]."); Matsuo, sura note 104, 5 7.04 (1IM]any Japanese still consider... [a
bankrupt] to be a dgraced person n Ionger worthy of the usual social considsupra note 92, at 291 ("The
erations due a member of society."); Schu,
Ilapanese martial and samurai traditions, and the consequent concern for family
onor and pride, cause the Japanese to feel great shame and disgrace upon a
failure such as a bankruptcy."). Apart from noting the debate in supra note
200, this Article does not adress the accuracy or usefulness of such cultural
assertions or whether such aversion to insolvency is comparatively unique to

Japan.

206 See PACKER & RYSER, supra note 83, at 3, 17, 19; Matsuo & Vliet, supra
note 202, at 208 (Q[O]ut of court settlement is often resorted to in Japanese
business practice in that most Japanese businessmen fear the waste of time and
money involved in pursuing debtors into bankruptcy or rehabilitation.").
Aoyama provides three reasons why a debtor might select private arrangement over formal insolvency: (1)due to the rigid procedure involved in a
formal insolven, private arrangements are quicker than legal proceedings; (2)
informal proceedings may be less expensive than formal ones because no unnecessary administrative expenses, such as employing a trustee, are needed; and
(3) the arrangements and compromises to which debtors and creditors may
agree in a private setting are more flexible. AOYAMA ET AL., supra note 2, at
19. Notably, almost a[ of the same arguments may be made, to varying degrees, regarding any country's insolvency system. In addition, I do not specu[ate on whether the number of formal insolvencies would increase if lawyers
and other similar professionals were allowed to file without loss of their professional licenses. For a host of examples, see supra note 109 and accompanying
text.
207 Because secured creditors are not specifically caught in most of the formal proceedings, Japanese debtors often must make private arrangements with
their secured creditors even if they pursue a formal reorganization with their
unsecured creditors. See Nakashima Interview, supra note 105. Interestingly,

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.j. Intl Econ. L.

[21:4

Second, certain private insolvency systems have developed in
Japan outside of the formal statute-based framework. The first
and best known of these is the "main bank" system under which
one bank serves as the debtor's primary lender as well as principal
shareholder." 8 Under this arrangement, that bank traditionally
takes an active part in monitoring the debtor and assisting if financial difficulty arises. 9 It is unclear to what extent the system
has survived past the early 1990s, but in the classical model, it was
assumed by the debtor, its creditors, and even regulators, that the
main bank would assist and administer a private insolvency solution, such
as a restructuring or orchestrated merger, if the need
210
arose.

Japan's second private insolvency regime that results in diminished formal insolvencies is the bank clearinghouse system.2 1
The clearinghouse system is somewhat like the system developed
by private credit agencies in the United States. Both systems developed in response to creditors' needs for a central organization
to collect, monitor, and disperse information about debtors by
which the creditors can make decisions regarding future transactions.212 Under tthe clearinghouse system in Japan, banks agree to:
but not surprisingly, this also seems to be true of U.S. debtors in U.S. proceedings who seek to include Japanese property secured by Japanese creditors not
subject to U.S. in personam jurisdiction. See In re Vessel Charters, Inc., No.
190-15866-260 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1991) (noted in Tagashira, supra note
16, at 22) (allowing a U.S. debtor-in-possession to settle outside of debtor's plan
with a Japanese creditor who had arrested debtor's ship in Japan). See also infra
notes 352-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Japanese trustee's reasons
for filing a full plenary case in the United States in the Maruko reorganization).
208 See THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR
DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORIMING ECONOMIES xxi-xxii (Masahiko Aoki &
Hugh Patrick eds., 1994) (defining the main bank system).
209 See Paul Sheard, Main Banks and the Governance ofFinancialDistress, in
THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 188 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds.,
1994).
210 See id at 190. Interestingly, some firms specifically avoided main bank
relationships and instead relied on financing from a wide number of sources,
for the express purpose of eluding main bank monitoring. See Interview with
Michiaki Nakano, Attorney and Deputy Trustee of Nikko Electric, Inc., in
Tokyo, Japan (July 24, 2000) [hereinafter Nakano Interview] (stating this was
Nikko Electric's pre-insolvency strategy).
211 For an extensive discussion of the system, see Toshihiro Matsumura &
Marc Ryser, Revelation of PrivateInformation About Unpaid Notes in the Trade
Credit Bill System in Japan, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1995).
212 Japan's Ministry of Justice is responsible for designating the clearinghouse, thus it has a quasi-official sanction. See Tegata h6 [Notes Act], Law No.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss4/1

20001

CROSS-BORDER INSOL VENCYPARADIGM

(1) report to the clearinghouse any debtor who fails to honor a
promissory note; and (2) suspend for two years all transactions
with a debtor who dishonors two notes in a six-month period. 13
Given the modern need for banking services, blackballing pursu-

ant to the clearinghouse rules is the "guillotine" for a shaky busi-

ness. 2 4 Thus, debtors will do whatever is necessary to prevent the
fall of the clearinghouse penalties and generally will rollover dead
are unable to find the means to commute or stay its efif they
2 15
fect.
A third non-formal insolvency system is created by the Civil
Conciliation Act.2 6 The Civil Conciliation Act provides a media-

tion service through the court system as an alternative to formal
litigation.17

Approximately three-quarters of the annual civil

cases resolved through the conciliation process (182,978 cases in

1998) relate to the restructuring of financial arrangements.2"' The
mediation option is an elective process run by the court system; it
encourages voluntary settlement through the use of a three-party

panel of lay and professional conciliators.219 The process gener-

20 of 1932, art. 83 providingthe Ministry of Justice shall designate the clearinghouse to be used for check clearing); Kogitte h6 [Checks Act], Law No. 57
of 1933, art. 69 (stipulating the same process for note clearing).
213 See Hiscock & Sono, supra note 117, at 771 (discussing how a debtor's
inability to make timely payments is regarded as a financial breakdown within
business circles); Matsumura & Ryser, supra note 211, at 167-68, 173. Banks are
required to present all notes and checks to the clearinghouse for payment. See
Tegata ha [Notes Act]; Law No. 20 of 1933, art. 38(2); Kogitte h6 [Checks
Act], Law No. 57 of 1933, art. 31.
214 Matsumura & Ryser, supra note 211, at 167, 172. Ramseyer has similarly characterized the rule as "quick, hard, and fatal." J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal
Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan, 20 J.
LEGALSTUD. 91, 110 (1991).
215 See Matsumura & Ryser, supra note 211, at 167 n.9 (noting that approximately 88% of large business failures are preceded by suspension of banking transactions under the clearinghouse rules).
216 Minji ch6tei ha [Civil Conciliation Act], Law No. 222 of 1951. See also
AOYAMA ET AL., supra note 2, at 22-23 (suggesting conciliation resolves many
situations that would otherwise be formal insolvencies).
217 See Andrew M. Pardieck, Virtuous Ways and Beautiful Customs: The Role
ofAlternative D'.qute Resolution in Japan, 11 TEMP. INT'L & CoMip. Lj.31, 4144 (1997) (describing the procedures or conciliation under the Act).
218 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 117, at 198. In 1998, the year for which
the most recent statistics are available, there were 240,692 civil cases resolved in
conciliation of which 76% were regarding loans or sales on credit. See id.
219 See Civil Conciliation Act, arts. 6, 7. The court may order conciliation
sua sponte; the parties may agree to seek conciliation on their own initiative; or
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ally works like a private arrangement in that all parties must agree
to a compromise in order for any binding restructuring to go into
effect." A recent supplement to the Act, however, allows arrangements to be made with less than complete agreement in a
few limited situations." In effect, the Civil Conciliation Act creates a quasi-formal procedural mechanism to facilitate private arrangements and thereby avoid the need to resort to formal insolvency proceedings.
Despite the large number of private insolvencies in Japan,
formal proceedings are still important for a number of reasons.
First, informal proceedings occur under the shadow of the law
cast by the formal insolvency statutes.' That is, decisions made
by actors in private arrangements will reflect the options available
in, and the likely results of, formal proceedings.' Second, a large
and increasing number of debtors are relying on the legal forms of
insolvency. 4 Thus, for the reasons that have led these entities to
choose formal proceedings over informal proceedings and for
these filings themselves, a review of the laws as written and interpreted is valuable. Third, the formal legal system is important for
for disputes in certain industries, the parties are required to try the conciliation
process before formal litigation. See id. arts. 20, 24, 31, 32, 33.
220

See id. art. 16.

See Tokutei saimu nado no chatei no sokushin no tame no tokutei ch6tei ni kan suru h~ritsu [Act Concerning Special Conciliation for the Promotion of Conciliation of Certain Debts], Law No. 158 of 1999, art. 2(1) (providing that a debtor must be a corporation and otherwise unable to pay its debts
to qualify for a special building restructuring); id art. 2(4) (stating that relevant
related parties are those who may make claims on debtor's property or have
secured interest in debtor's property); id.art. 17(1) (providing that the Board of
Conciliators, i.e., not the creditors themselves, may approve appropriate terms
where application to conciliation has been made joIntIy).
221

222 See PACKER & RYSER, supra note 83, at 3. See generally Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing the impact of a legal system on
negotiations and bargaining outside judicial proceedings).
2
See Frank Bennett, Jr., Preference Rules in Japanese Bankruptcy Law, in
JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 217,

222 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994) (arguing generally that understanding the written
insolvency law explains, to a degree, the informal insolvency actions taken by
creditors).
224 See infra Table I (showing an increase of 1067% in insolvency filings in
the 1990s and noting 111,798 formal insolvency filings in 1998). See also
Harmer, supra note 205, at 158 (arguing that a trend among managers and
creditors is to resist informal procedures, such as the main bank system, for
formal proceedings).
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actors who do not have the connections, size, or reputation to resort to the informal proceedings. 5 In this vein, the formal options are particularly important in international insolvencies, because foreign debtors might be excluded from or limited in the
informal options available to domestic debtors.
3.3. Incidences ofInsolvency

226

Much of the recent commentary has been devoted to the rise
in Japanese insolvencies, which have increased by 1067% in the
last ten years.' However, as Table I below shows, the vast majority (over 93% on a ten-year average) of Japanese insolvencies

are individual bankruptcies."

Taken together, all forms of busi-

ness reorganization comprise only 0.60% of the annual number of
cases and have averaged only 287 filings per year for the past ten
years. ' 9 The infrequency of business insolvencies reinforces the
' See Ramseyer, supra note 214, at 96-97 (discussing parties who do not
have the size or reputation to rely on informal resolution mechanisms); Sheard,
supra note 209, at 194 (noting that debtors with weak or non-existing ties to
Japanese main banks as creditors are more likely to use formal insolvency
measures rather than private, informal measures).
226 All of the filing data and statistics used in this Section come from infra
Table I, which compifes ten years of data published annually by the Japanese
court administrators in the annual 1 GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ([APAN)
SUPREME COURT, SHIHO TOKEI NENPO, MINJI GYOSEI HEN [ANNUAL REPORT
OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS, CIVIL AND ADMnmSTRATIvE CASES VOLUME] (19891998). Statistics from 1952 to the present regarding only large insolvencies are
available at Tokyo Shoko Research, http://www.tsr-net.co.jp/topics/zenkoku
/level_4/kensu.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2000).
See, e.g., Bankruptcies Surge 40%; 1,400 Firms Fail in January, JAPAN
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2000, at 11; Ichigatsu no tisan 1441 jiken, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Feb.
16, 2000, at 9 (discussing 1441 cases of insolvency in January); see also supra
note 17 (discussing how one aspect of the government's response to the increase in insolvencies involves raising the entire insolvency system itself).
228 From a comparative perspective, this might not be as surprising as it
first appears: Warren reports that only four percent of U.S. insolvency filings
are done by businesses. See Warren, supra note 201, at 1079-80. Interestingly,
Hiscock and Sono concluded, based on mid-1970s data, that "[c]onsumer bankruptcy is almost non-existent, because neither consumers nor their creditors
pursue bankruptcy proceedings in those cases." See Hiscock & Sono, supra
note 117, at 773, 782.
229 The data below assumes all compositions are of business entities, even
though the regime is available to individuals. See Composition Act, art. 12
(showing that the data available does not differentiate between natural and juristic person debtors for compositions, perhaps reflecting the practical rarity of
consumer or individual compositions). See also Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra
note 135, at 220 n.18 (treating all compositions as business reorganizations and
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importance of private resolutions, though such agreements undoubtedly occur in the shadow of the formal proceedings. Therefore, even though the data show an increase in the 1990s of 463%
in corporate reorganizations and 631% in business liquidations,
the alleged problem of exploding insolvencies is largely a matter
of individual bankruptcies, which increased 1118% in the 1990s,
and private workouts.
Table 1: Insolvency Cases Filedin JapanBetween 1989 and 1998
Total All
Insolvencies
Grand Total
Individual
Grand Total
Corporate
Total
Bankruptcies
Bankruptcies
Individual
Bankruptcy
Corporate
Corp. Special
Liquidation

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

10,481

12,638

25,405

46,097

46,693

43,595

46,944

60,751

76,532 111,789

9,433

11,480

23,491

43,394

43,816

40,614

43,649

56,802

71,683

105,468

1,048

1,158

1,914

2,703

2,877

2,981

3,295

3,949

4,849

6,321

10,319

12,478

25,091

45,658

46,216

43,161

46,487

60,291

76,032

111,067

9,433

11,480

23,491

43,394

43,816

40,614

43,649

56,802

71,683

105,468

886

998

1,600

2,264

2,400

2,547

2,838

3,489

4,349

5,599

60

58

70

89

80

132

163

178

172

Total

1998

249

11W,319

Lquidations

10,379

12,536

25,161

45,747

46,296

43,293

46,650

60,469

76,204

111,316

Compositions
Corporate
Reorganizations
Corporate
Arrangement
Financial Inst.
Insolvencies
Total Reorganizations

88

77

203

292

323

250

225

244

279

361

10

9

14

32

44

17

36

18

31

88

4

16

27

26

30

35

33

20

18

24

-

-

-

-

350

397

302

294

102

102

244

2
282

328

475

3.4. Japan'sTerritorialFrameworkandApproach Through 1980
Cross-border insolvencies, defined broadly, and a system's response to the problems they raise may be reduced to three basic
issues. 3 First, how does a system treat foreigners in domestic
stating, "almost all composition debtors are business entities"); Junichi Matsushita, On CurrentInternationalInsolvency Law in Japan, 6 INTL INSOLVENCY
REV. 210, 212 (1997) ("Almost all composition cases are corporate cases.").
230 In contrast to some commentators who define cross-border insolvencies
based on procedural filings in more than one country, I use a broad definition
that encompasses any insolvency filed in one country by a party with assets or
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proceedings? Second, does the system at issue recognize the effect
and determinations of a foreign insolvency- i.e., how does the
system deal with insolvency importation? Third, does the system
seek to have an effect beyond its territorial borders- i.e., to what
degree does the system seek to export its insolvency? In response
to these issues, Japan's experience may be divided into two periods: (1) the strict territorial framework and approach that extended until the early 1980s; and (2) the modified universal period
that has since then developed.
The foundation for the first phase in Japan's cross-border insolvency experience was set by the strict territorial provisions
adopted in the Bankruptcy and Composition Acts of 1922. 2 Unlike many insolvency systems that did not, or do not, address the
issues raised by the failure of international entities, Japan consciously considered the problem and drafted for it as early as
1902. 23 Its resolution of the issue reflected the global situation in
the early twentieth century. The drafters rejected a universal approach, because: (1) jurisprudence of the day held that insolvency
proceedings were merely an organized execution mechanism and
therefore limited to the reach of a country's sovereign power; (2)
a universal system would be inconvenient and impractical for
creditors trying to pursue their claims given the limitations of
transportation and communication in the early 1900s; and (3)
recognition of a Japanese universal system by foreign courts was
unlikely where most, if not all, other states followed a territorial
approach. 3 Since that decision was codified in the provisions of
interests in another country. Thus, pursuant to this definition, some crossborder insolvencies may not appear locally as insolvencies since no local insolvency proceedings are initiated.
23 See Bankruptcy Act, Law No. 71 of 1922, art. 3; Composition Act, Law
No. 72 of 1922, art. 11 (applying Bankruptcy Act, art. 3, mutatis mutandis).
232

See 5 MASAHARU KATO, HASAN HO KENKYO [BANKRUPTCY LAW

STUDY] 408-10 (1924) (noting that the adoption of the universal approach was
discussed and recommended by the International Law Society prior to adoption of the Bankruptcy Act in 1922); Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 451 (describing
the legislative movement behind the drafting of a new bankruptcy law). The
United States did not adopt a resolute approach to cross-border insolvencies
until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See Booth, supra note 5, at 1-4, 37.
Canada did not legislate for cross-border insolvencies until the 1997 amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. See Jacob S. Ziegel, The Modernization of Canada'sBankruptcy Law in a Comparative Context, 33 TEx. INTL
L.J. 1, 16-22 (1997).
2"' See 1 MASAHARU KATO, HASAN HO KENKYI0 [BANKRUPTCY LAW
STUDY] 330-331 (1912). Thus, quite contrary to the assertions of some com-
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the 1922 Bankruptcy Act, all subsequent legislation- both the
creation of new regimes and amendments to old statutes- have
stuck to the model. 4 On paper, Japan remains the strictest of
territorial nations.
3.4.1.

Treatment ofForeignersin Domestic Proceedings

The most fundamental question in the field of comparative
and cross-border insolvency is the treatment of non-nationals in
domestic proceedings, i.e., whether foreigners suffer any per se
discrimination in otherwise purely domestic insolvency cases." 5
There are two aspects to this issue: (1) whether foreign creditors
and other interested parties are treated without discrimination in
a domestic insolvency; and (2) whether foreign debtors have
standing to file, and the local courts jurisdiction to hear, an insolvency of a non-national. Japan addresses the first issue directly.
Article 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, which is adopted mutatis mutandis in the Composition Act, provides, "[A]n alien or foreign
corporation shall have the same status as a Japanese national or
Japanese corporation in regard to bankruptcy, provided however,
that this shall apply only when Japanese nationals or Japanese
corporations have the same status under the native laws of the
alien or the foreign corporation." 6 This is the embodiment of
the reciprocity principle common at the turn of the twentieth
century. The obvious purpose of this section was to protect
mentators, the territorial principle was copied from the German model, not
the indigenous insolvency regime. See Bhala, supra note 16, at 50 ("It is as if the
insolvency regime were written in and for the most inward-looking days of the
Tokugawa Period and never updated to account for changing reality of globalization.").
' See, e.g., Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 4 (enacted in 1952 and
providing for the territorial approach). But see Minji saisei h6 [Civil Rehabilitation Law], Law No. 225 of 1999 (reviewing civil rehabilitation).
'35 Discriminatory treatment used in this sense refers to situations where a
foreign national would be treated differently than a domestic citizen or other
national. See Tagashira, supra note 16, at 6 (describing the conflicting views regarding the availability of Japanese insolvency proceedings to foreigners). Discriminatory treatment does not refer to substantive provisions that are inher-

ently discriminatory such as the priority for domestic tax claims. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. S 507(a)(8) (1999) (providig priority status for U.S. tax claims); Bankruptcy Act, art. 47(2) (providing priority status for Japanese tax claims). This
does not refer to the non-enforcement of foreign claims that are directly or indirectly based on revenue or punitive laws. For a list of cases involving foreign
revenue and punitive claims, see infra note 341.
236

Bankruptcy Act, art. 2 (emphasis added); Composition Act, art. 11.
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Japanese citizens (both natural and corporate) from discrimina-

tion by foreign countries- an issue the Japanese were particularly
sensitive to considering the so-called "Unequal Treaties" of the

immediately proceeding period.37

If strictly applied, the reciprocity statute requires insolvency

courts to treat foreigners no differently than nationals only as
long as Japanese receive such treatment in the foreigner's country.
This is not a problem for nationals of most of the major devel-

oped nations today, because almost all systems treat foreigners
and nationals alike.38 Nonetheless, the potential for discriminatory treatment exists under the reciprocity rule. This reciprocity

provision was not, however, copied or included by reference in
any of the later insolvency regimes. In fact, the Corporate Reorganization Act expressly deleted the 39reciprocity proviso, leaving

only the non-discrimination portion.2
Following the spirit of the Corporate Reorganization Act's
provision, commentators widely believe that even where a strict
application of the reciprocity provision might otherwise require
it, a Japanese court today would not restrict foreigners from use
of its insolvency statutes.' 4 Japanese authorities explain the rationale of this interpretation as follows: "[S]ince insolvency pro117 See MIKIO HANE, MODERN JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 68-69 (2d
ed. 1992); Matsushita, supra note 84, at 73 (discussing Japan's treaties with England, France, Russia, the Netherlands, and the UnitedStates that opened Japan
to trade and gave the foreign nations extraterritorial rights in Japa); Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 452-53 (describing the reciprocity requirement as anachronistic and noting that it is generally condemned today).
23 See DEV. FOR PROF'L EDUC., MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL
INSOLVENCY (Daniel M. Glosband & E. Bruce Leonard eds., 1993) (providing
reports from countries that claimed not to discriminate against foreigners in
insolvency proceedings except for recognition of revenue or penal clims, including: Argentina (after the "hotchpot" rule), Australia, Bermuda, Canada,
England, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Scotland,
Sweden, United States, and Venezuela).
2" Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 3 ("Status of Aliens. Aliens of foreign companies shall have the same status as Japanese nationals or Japanese
companies in regard to corporate reorganization.").
240 See, e.g., TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN S 9.06[9] n.139 (1986); Tagashira, supra note 16, at 6-7;
Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 455-56; see also INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW,
supra note 184, at 67-68, 70-71 (discussing four unreported cases concerning a
Chinese, North Korean, Italian, and u nown national where the Japanese
court did not strictly require reciprocity). Interestingly, Bebchuk and Guzman
recently made an argument in favor of applying a reciprocity requirement in
international insolvencies. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 25, at 806.
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ceedings form a part of a nation's economic system, they should
be available to all foreigners engaged in economic activity in Japan."241 Either reflecting the dominance of this theory or the rarity of discriminatory insolvency laws globally, no reported examples of a Japanese court requiring reciprocity in insolvency exist.
The second issue regarding a foreigner's treatment in a domestic insolvency is whether a non-Japanese may be a debtor in a
domestic Japanese insolvency. Japan does not answer this issue
directly. There is no provision specifically granting standing to a
foreign debtor or giving jurisdiction over such person's insolvency to Japanese courts. There is little question that the power
exists, however, as it is implicit in the insolvency venue rules that
specifically provide in which district court a foreign debtor must
file in the event of insolvency in Japan.242 In giving foreign debtors standing to file any kind of insolvency in local courts, Japan is
similar to the United States, but notably different from those
countries, such as England, that limit the proceedings available to
a foreign debtor.243 This seemingly universal aspect of the Japa241

242

Tagashira, supra note 16, at 7.
For example, Bankruptcy Act article 105 provides, with emphasis

added:
Bankruptcy cases shall come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
district court having jurisdiction over the location of the principal

place of business, or of the principalplace of business in Japan i the principalplace of business is in a foreign country, in the case the debtor is a
person engaged in business, and in the case he is not a person engaged
in business, or in the case he has no place of business, of the district
court having jurisdiction over the locality wherein exists his ordinary
court jurisdiction.
See Bankruptcy Act, art. 105; see also art. 107 (providing that if venue is not
provided pursuant to article 105, the court with jurisdiction over the location
of any property shall have exclusive jurisdiction). See also Composition Act,
art. 3 (ippying Bankruptcy Act, arts. 105, 107 mutatis mutandis); Corporate
Reorganization Law, art. 6 ("Cases of reorganization shall come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court having jurisdiction over the location of

the head office of the company, or, ifthe head office is abroad, the location of its
principalplace of business in Japan.") (emphasis added). But see HATrORI &
HENDERSON, supra note 240, § 9.06[9] (noting earlier debate on this issue).
243 See 11 U.S.C. S 109 (1999) (providing any person that resides in, has a
place of domicile or business in, orhas property in the United States may be a
debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code). Foreign companies in England may
not pursue voluntary winding up proceedings there. Insolvenc Act 1986
221(4). Further, English administration is only available to English companies.
Re Dallhold Estates (U.K.) Pty. Ltd., [1992] B.C.L.C. 621, 623, [1992] B.C.C.
394 (Ch.). But see GOODE, supra note 2, at 501 (stating that an administrative
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nese regime is not surprising, however, and is a necessary outgrowth of its otherwise territorial approach described below.
That is, because Japan's territorial statutes presume that foreign
proceedings will have no effect in Japan and insolvent debtors
must file separate proceedings in each country where they have
assets or interests, it is necessary to allow all foreign debtors the
power to file proceedings in Japan.
In summary, since before the Bankruptcy Act's enactment,
Japanese law has provided the basic foundation for an open insolvency system. Interested foreign parties are protected from discrimination in domestic proceedings by an affirmative reciprocity
statute. Even though a strict application of this rule would itself
cause discrimination, both practice and theory have long foreclosed that possibility. Further, non-nationals are indirectly protected by those rules and theories which intimate that Japanese
courts have the jurisdiction to hear the cases of foreign debtors.
In this way, Japan has been able to mollify and modernize insolvency rules that were drafted to reflect a different and stricter inlegal environment at the turn of the twentieth centernational
244
tury.
3.4.2.

Non-Recognition of ForeignInsolvencies

In contrast to the generally open nature of Japanese insolvency law to foreigners seeking to participate in a domestic insolvency, the statutory rules regarding recognizing foreign insolvencies are as restrictive as possible. Though the stage was already set
by the case law under earlier statutes, the Bankruptcy Act codified the approach in 1922 with article 3(2) which provides: "A
bankruptcy adjudged in a foreign country shall not be effective with
24 This provision was incorrespect to propertiesexisting in Japan."
porated by cross-reference in the Composition Act, and the Corporate Reorganization Act copied it nearly verbatim.246 None of
the other insolvency statutes contains similar provisions, but
order can be made against a foreign company where requested by a foreign

court under section 426 of the Insolvency Act).
244 All five of the cross-border insolvency models begin from this nondiscriminatory base. See also GOODE, supra note 2, at 496-97 (reviewing the issue and noting, with citations, that England and the United States follow the
nondiscriminatory approach).
245 Bankruptcy Act, art. 3(2) (emphasis added).
246 See Composition Act, art. 11; Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 4(2).
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there is no doubt that the various drafters intended to create a
strictly territorial regime.'
Until the 1980s, the courts consistently found that the effect
of foreign insolvencies was limited to the plain meaning of Article
3. In a decision under the old bankruptcy act of 1872, Japan's
highest court, the Great Court of Judicature, held that a bankruptcy in Hawaii had absolutely no effect in Japan and, therefore,
the debtor was still liable to a Japanese creditor."' The court
summarized, "[A]bsent an international treaty or special statute,
the bankruptcy declared in another country has no effect in this
country, because the effect of a bankruptcy declaration is limited
to the territory within which the local court has the power to enforce its judgments." 49
Courts have followed this precedent as recently as 1983, when
the Osaka district court held that a debtor's bankruptcy in Hong
Kong had no effect on proceedings taking place in Japan. 5 ° In
this case, the debtor was an Indian national involved in litigation
in Japan with his Indian bank regarding overdrafts in both Hong
Kong and Japan. In the midst of the Japanese suit, a Hong Kong
court declared the debtor bankrupt under Hong Kong law.5 In
response to the Hong Kong declaration, however, the Japanese
court found that the foreign bankruptcy did not stay or otherwise
impact the Japanese litigation in any way.52 Leaving little room
for future doubt and following closely the Hawaii judgment in
language and reasoning, the court stated:

As a matter of textual interpretation, the words bankruptcy (hasan) and
reorganization (k6sei) used in the respective territorial provisions may be read
broadly to incorporate all forms of foreign liquidation and reorganization pro247

ceedings. See Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 4(2); Bankruptcy Act, art.
3(2). As a matter of the spirit of the law, Japanese courts and commentators
have consistently stated that the territorial approach covers even those laws
where it is not specified. See, e.g., Matsushita, supra note 84, at 74-75 (discussing
territoriality and noting its application to the Financial Institutions Reorganization Act even though not explicitly provided therein).
248 Chimura v. Kasamatsu, 8-6 TAIHAN MNROKU 85 (Great Court of Judicature, June 17, 1903).
249

Id. at 85.

" Bank of India v. Clips Corp., 516 HANREI TAIMUZU 139 (Osaka Dist.
Ct., Sept. 30, 1983).
251
212

Id
Id at 141.
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According to the evidence, we recognize that the debtor

received a declaration of bankruptcy in Hong Kong and
that debtor's property in Hong Kong was included in

those bankruptcy proceedings. However, absent an international treaty or special statute, the bankruptcy declared

in Hong Kong has no effect in Japan, because the effect of
a bankruptcy declaration is limited to the territory within

which the local court has the power to enforce its judgments. Thus, the debtor's declaration of bankruptcy in
Hong Kong has no impact on the debtor's standing in the

present suit."'
In short, by statute and court interpretation as recent as 1983, Ja-

pan has followed the strictest interpretation of the territorial rule
and given no effect to foreign insolvencies in Japan.
3.4.3.

Restriction of Domestic Insolvencies'ForeignEffect

Japanese statutes similarly take the narrowest territorial view
of the effect of a domestic insolvency abroad. Article 3(1) of the
Bankruptcy Act, which was extended to reorganizations by incorporation in the Composition Act and the Corporate Reorganization Act, provides: "A bankruptcy adjudged in Japanshall be
effective with respect to only the bankruptsproperties existing in Japan.)25 4 The courts have traditionally given this statute a plain
reading. For example, in 1959, the Tokyo High Court found that
despite its salvage value, debtor's ship, which had sunk off the
coast of Okinawa, was not part of the debtor's insolvency estate,
because Okinawa was at that time under United States control.55
The court reasoned:
253

Id.

254 Bankruptcy Act, Law No. 71 of 1922, art. 3(1) (emphasis added). See
also Composition Act, Law No. 72 of 1922, art. 11; Corporate Reorganization
Law, Law No. 172 of 1952, art. 4(1).
25 Mitomo Salvage v. (5hara Industries, K.K., 180 HANREI JIHO 39, 40
(Tokyo High Ct., Jan. 12, 1959). Regarding the United States control of Okinawa, see Treat of Peace with Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3169,
art. 2-3 (providing that Okinawa was under U.S. jurisdiction). For additional
discussion of the interesting issue of Okinawa's legal status between 1945 and
1972, see YOSHIo NAKANO, SENGO SHIRYO: OKINAWA [POST-WAR DATA:
OKINAWA] (1967); NICK SARANTAKES, KEYSTONE: THE AMERICAN
OCCUPATION OF OKINAWA AND U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1945-1972

(2000).
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[Okinawa] is Japanese territory, but according to article 3
of the [United States-Japan] Peace Treaty it is excluded
from exercise of Japanese sovereignty. Thus, Japan cannot
order compulsory execution on tangible movables located
there. It must follow then that this area is a foreign country for the purposes of article 3(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Therefore, tangible movables located there remain as such
and are not
incorporated into a bankruptcy estate declared
25 6
Japan.
in
The court went on to hold that because it could not control the
foreign property, it could not uphold the lower court's preliminary stay for preservation of the property pending resolution of
the bankruptcy issues.
The discussion by the court in the Okinawa case highlights
the fact that foreign courts- rather than Japanese courts- will
more often address the effect of a Japanese insolvency on overseas
property. In other words, because a Japanese court cannot directly control property located abroad, it is more likely that the
interested parties will call upon a foreign court with in rem jurisdiction over debtor's assets to decide their status. One example of

this was Orient Leasing Co. Ltd. v. The Kosei Maru ("Kosei
Maru")218 where a Canadian court was asked to determine the effect of a Japanese reorganization on a ship seized in Ontario. The
debtor, a Japanese shipping company with numerous cargo vessels, had filed for corporate reorganization in Japan and had received a stay against execution that protected its ships from seizure. Ignoring this stay, the creditor, also a Japanese company,
initiated arrest proceedings in Canada where one of debtor's ships
was temporarily docked and sought to foreclose the mortgage it
had on this vessel.
The Canadian court began its analysis by noting that the sole
issue was the effect of the Japanese insolvency and its accompany;
ing stay on property outside of a Japanese court's direct control.'
To answer this question, the court in Canada was required to determine the meaning of the reorganization law's equivalent of ar256

Mitomo, 180 HANREIJIHO, at 39-40.

157
258

Id. at 40.
94 D.L.R. 3d 658 (Fed. Ct. 1978).

259

Id.
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ticle 3(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. As a preliminary and procedural
matter, the court first stated that because foreign law was a matter
of fact, it could only determine the state of Japanese law as it
stood presently based on the statutes and cases. 60 In other words,
it could not rule based on what Japanese insolvency law might
become "under the possible creative influence of the Japanese jurisprudence."261 This determination effectively preempted the
Japanese trustee's arguments because it had relied on Japanese legal experts to show where Japanese insolvency law might go, as a
matter of law, through creative interpretation of the territorial
provisions. 62 The court concluded, however, that the territorial
statutes meant what they said- a Japanese insolvency was effective "with respect to only the bankrupt's properties existing in Japan., 263 Applying this approach, the ship was in Canada, not Japan, and thus, the Japanese insolvency and stay did not prohibit
the creditors from executing on the vessel. 2 "
In dicta, the Canadian court did, however, review the Japanese trustee's arguments in favor of the broadest legal interpretation of the territorial statutes. The trustee's experts argued that
the territorial statutes had an inherent ambiguity in their language
that allowed the court to find that property outside of Japan in
fact existed in Japan for the purpose of insolvency.2 6 This ambiguity allegedly arose because a Japanese court was always "potentially" in control of foreign property since the asset might be returned to Japan on its own or be repatriated at the direction of
the insolvency trustee. In response to these arguments, the Canadian judge found:

Id. at 677. As in England, courts in Canada decide questions of foreign
law as matters of fact. See, e.g., Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. Gulf Products
260

Co., 35 A.C.W.S. 272,

38-39 (Alta. Q.B., 1992); C.M.V. CLAKON &

JONATHAN HILL, JAFFEY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 10, 16-17 (1997). But
see DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN S 5.03[3], supra note 161 (providing that as a civil

law country, issues of foreign law are a matter of law in Japan); SCOLES &

HAY, supra note 59, at S 12.15-12.18 (providing that issues of foreign law are
predominately a matter of law in the United States).
261 Orient Leasin&94 D.L.R. at 677.
262 See id at 677-78, 682-83.
263 Id. at 18-19, citing Reorganization Act, art. 4(1) and Bankrutpcy Act,

art. 3(1).
214Id. at 19.
265 See id. at 23-24.
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Such a reasoning appears to me difficult to accept as it
shows obvious weaknesses. On the one hand, the new interpretation suggested seems to me to go so far beyond the
express statutory language of the enactment that I doubt
whether any court could accept it, however wide the power
of that court might be to construe the law.266
As discussed below, the Canadian court failed to predict where
the Japanese courts would soon be heading.
The drafters of Japan's insolvency statutes consciously rejected
the theoretical benefits of a more universal approach to crossborder insolvencies for the pragmatic solutions of territoriality.
As one of the original draftsmen perceptively explained:
Put briefly, as transportation gets better the world will get
accordingly smaller. Therefore, because something like
the accumulation and organization of assets in only one
place would be convenient for creditors too, as an ideal,
universalism is good and in the future something like this
might become the standard. However, in the present
situation where that has not yet occurred, and considering
Japan's position, we cannot jump to that stage.268
Despite the realization of the drafter's predictions regarding
improvements in technology and the changing international standard for cross-border insolvencies, Japanese legislators have refrained from amending the approach of Japan's insolvency statutes.26
Further, with the possible exception of the gradual

267

Id (emphasis added).
1 KATO, supra note 233, at 330-31.

26

5 KATO, supra note 233, at 409-10. Professor Kat5 assisted in drafting

266

the Bankruptcy Act. See Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 451-52
269 The legislators passively affirmed the territorial approach as recently as
1996 when they enacted the Financial Institutions Reorganization Act without
limiting the territorial default structure. See Financial Institutions Reorganiza-

tion Act, Law No. 95, 1996; Matsushita, supra note 84, at 75. As noted above,
revision of the cross-border portions of Japan's insolvency regime is presently

being debated and legislation will likely be introduced in late 2000 or 2001. See
Kokusai tisan hesei ni lean suru yoamian [Draft Proposal Regarding the Legal
Frameworkfor Cross-BorderInsolvencies], 689 NBL 52 (2000). Because the pur-

pose of this Article is to study the effects of a territorial regime in a global
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erosion of the reciprocity requirement, Japanese courts for most
of the past century have read the statutes strictly. They have
both refused to recognize any domestic effect of foreign insolvencies and, to the extent called upon, denied any foreign impact of a
Japanese insolvency. In short, Japan deserved its reputation for
having the quintessential territorial insolvency scheme from the
beginning of the twentieth century until the early 1980s.
3.5. Deviatingfrom TerritorialityandDabbling with Modified
UniversalismSince 1980
With the rise of Japan's involvement in the international marketplace in the 1970s, Japanese academics began to advocate a
more universal approach to cross-border insolvency issues.17 ' After little initial effect, this movement began to take hold in the
early 1980s, and since then, deviation from the strict territorial
approach has become the general, but not universal, rule in Japanese courtsY In effect, the practical incentives and obligations
created by the modern interconnected global economy pressured
the courts to follow the advice of the theorists and the requests of
the practitioners for a more universal stance. As a result, a partial, though arguably haphazard, modified universal regime has
developed and can be seen in the four primary aspects of both insolvency importations and exportations, namely: (1) recognition
of foreign insolvencies; (2) preservation of foreign assets; (3) conciliation of preference and avoidance rules; and (4) turnover of
foreign property.

world, as noted above with regard to the new Civil Rehabilitation Law, the
new proposals are beyond its scope. See supra note 17.
210 See Makoto Ito, Report for Japan, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY:
NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES 178, 180 (lan F. Fletcher ed., 1992),
reprintedin JAPANESE REPORTS FOR THE XIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 136, 145 (1991) ("Recently the academic authorities

have been asserting this criticism almost unanimously, and the bankruptcy
court practice tends to accept this criticism."). In the West, this movement is
best summarized and seen by the arguments in Orient Leasing, 94 D.L.R. 3d at
17-19. In addition, theoretical subtleties of the theory are best explained in
English by the lead expert'in the Orient Leasing case, Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi, in his 1987 article, supra note 5, at 460 n.34, 462-69. For a summary in

English of the various academic opinions advocating this strain, see Takeuchi,
supra note 35, at 74-76.
"n See, e.g., Matsushita, supra note 229, at 210, 214 (discussing cases).
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ForeignInsolvencies in Japan- Insolvency Importation

3.5.1.1.

Recognition ofForeignInsolvencies in Japan

The statutory command is simple- foreign insolvencies shall
have no effect on Japanese property.' 2 This has never meant,
however, that Japanese courts are blind, deaf, and dumb to a foreign insolvency. Even the Bankruptcy Act as originally enacted
acknowledged foreign insolvencies. Article 137 provides, "[I]n
cases where there has already been an adjudication of bankruptcy
in a foreign country at the time of filing a petition for bankruptcy
[in Japan], the person filing the petition for bankruptcy need not
give prima facie proof of the facts comprising the causes of bankruptcy."T2 3 This simple rule is meaningful in Japan where the filing party initially holds the burden of proving one of the indicia
of insolvency before a court will accept a case. 4 The rule has
been applied in at least one case where a Japanese court held that a
German declaration of bankruptcy satisfied the prima facie requirements for initiating bankruptcy protection in Japan. 5
Furthermore, foreign insolvencies often have de facto effect
on Japanese property, given that a foreign trustee can always control a debtor's unencumbered Japanese assets, regardless of any
Japanese territorial statutes. For example, in In re International
Horizons, Inc., an American trustee (in fact, a debtor-inpossession) was able to administer the debtor's Japanese assets and
otherwise continue the debtor's business in Japan with no involvement of the Japanese courts and only occasional approval of
a U.S. bankruptcy court." InternationalHorizons concerned the
See Bankruptcy Act, art. 3(2).
Id. art. 137. The same rule applies by analogy to the other forms of insolvency. See YUKIO KAISE, KOKUSAI TOSAN HO JOSETSU [INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW] 15, 44 n.36 (1989).
rn See Bankruptcy Act, arts. 126, 127.
275 Deutsche Asia Tierke Bank v. Christian Holstein, 3707 SHIMBUN 7
2

27

(Kobe Dist. Ct., Apr. 26, 1934).
276 See In re Int'l Horizons, Inc., 11 B.R. 366, 369 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981)
(authorizing the trustee to "transfer cash collateral held in Japan by affiliates of
the debtor... and thereafter transfer, if necessary, the 'sequestered funds' up to
the remaining balance of cash collateral which the debtors are hereby authorized to use," thereby extending the U.S. bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over
Japanese assets). The insolvency of International Horizons produced a number
of reported opinions. Collectively, this Article refers to this insolvency and
these cases as "InternationalHorizons." Citations are provided to the specific

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss4/1

2000]

CROSS-BORDER INSOL VENCYPARADIGM

reorganization attempt by a U.S. parent corporation and its Japanese, Netherlands Antilles, and Bahaman subsidiaries.' The case
was complicated by Bank of America's efforts to thwart the reorganization and directly collect on $60 million in credit it had ex-

tended to the debtor group.

8

The case raises a number of inter-

esting cross-border insolvency questions, but is notable here for

the fact that the U.S. bankruptcy court and trustee assumed control over the debtor's assets in Japan without any attempt to receive local recognition of this foreign insolvency, let alone give
effect to Japan's territorial commands. 9 To the extent that no
relevant case where possible. The relevant cases include: Bank of Am., N.T.
& S.A. v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Int'l Horizons, Inc., 751 F.2d 1213 (11th Cir. 1985); Int'l Horizons Inc. v.
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 689 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1982); Bank of Am.,
N.T. & S.A. v. Touche Ross & Co., 603 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Bank of
Am., N.T. & S.A. v. World of English, 23 B.R. 1015 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Int'l
Horizons, Inc. v. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 16 B.R. 484 (N.D. Ga.
1981); In re Int'l Horizons, Inc., 51 B.R. 747 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985); In re Int'l
Horizons, Inc., 31 B.R. 723 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); American-Amicable Life
Ins. Co. v. Int'l Horizons, Inc., 28 B.R. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); In re World
of English, N.V., 16 B.R. 817 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); World of English, N.V.
v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 21 B.R. 524 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); In re Int'l
Horizons, Inc., 11 B.R. 366 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Int'l Horizons, Inc.,
14 B.R. 199 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); Int'l Horizons, Inc. v. W. Pub. Co., Inc.,
15 B.R. 798 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
277 See World ofEnglisb, 16 B.R. at 821.
718

See Bank ofAm., 782 F.2d at 968.

See Int'l Horizons, 11 B.R. at 369. The same U.S. bankruptcy court
elaborated on this point in a separate opinion when it held that a Japanese
court's non-recognition of a U.S. court's determinations and control over assets
in Japan does not limit the U.S. court's power to control such property. In re
World of English, 16 B.R. at 820. The court stated:
[A Japanese legal expert testified] that if the payments at issue "were
made in Japan to Japanese creditors, the claims for such payments are
deemed [by Japanese law] to have existed in Japan." It therefore app ears that a determination by this Court that under title 11 of the
United States Code [i.e., the Bankruptcy Code] apreferential transfer
an of
order
The country
danger that
notbebeenforceable
binding in Japan.
willnot
beenCourt
mademay
hasthis
of
in a foreign
is one
the
major problems which arises in legal proceedings dealing with multian order
to domesticate
the inability
However,
corporations.
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of
the or]
Court
in Japan
not [prevent
this part
court
issuing
order
indicate
a lackdoes
of good
faith on the
of from
the debtors
insuch
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that
they would
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assistance is needed from a Japanese court, a foreign trustee's
power over a debtor's assets is, as a practical matter, only limited
by the foreign law.2"'

The Japanese courts acknowledged this indirect power and
even extended its impact as early as 1903.281 In 1903, a Japanese

court of appeals allowed the bankruptcy trustee of an insolvent
German decedent to pursue the debtor's rights in a Japanese lawsuit over a failed sale. 282 The assistance of the Japanese court was
only required because the debtor had died, leaving the trustee incapable of proceeding directly in the debtor's name. By recognizing the foreign trustee's standing to proceed in the name of the
decedent, the appeals court indirectly allowed the foreign insolvency to affect Japanese property through the German trustee's
eventual de facto control of the asset." 3

Beginning in the 1980s, the Japanese courts took this approach
a step further and began interpreting the territorial statutes as

narrowly as possible. The first and leading case in this movement
was InternationalManagement Business K.K. v. Fincamera S.A.
("1MB') in 1981.284 In !MB, the trustee of a corporation involved
in bankruptcy proceedings in Switzerland sought to gain control
over a Japanese trademark of the debtor corporation. A Japanese
creditor had already provisionally attached the trademark; thus,
the Swiss trustee needed the recognition of the Japanese court in
Id.
280

See, e.g., Ito, supra note 270, at 183 ("In conclusion a foreign trustee may

administer the debtor's assets located in Japan, if there are not attaching creditors on them.").
281 See, e.g., Gottfried v. Kobayashi, 660 SHIMBUN 12, 13 (Tokyo Ct. App.
1906). This decision was under the old Bankruptcy Act, but, as noted above,

the court interpreted that code consistently with the territorial provisions
found in the later Bankruptcy Act. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying
text.

282 Gotfred, 660 SHmBuN at 13. Decedents' estates may be subject to
bankruptcy in Japan as well as in Germany. See Bankruptcy Act, art. 136. In

the United States, decedents' estates are not eligible for bankruptcy. GEORGE
M. TRIESTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY S 3.01 (1986) (citing 11
U.S.C. S 101(33), 109). However, foreign bankruptcies based on deceased
debtors may be recognized pursuant to S 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
See Goerg v. Parungao (In re Goerg), 844 F.2d 1562, 1568 (11th Cir. 1988) (recognizing and assisting the German bankruptcy of a deceased debtor).
283 See id. The court determined that a person's capacity was a matter of
his national law; therefore, German rules applied, allowing the German trustee
to act on behalf of the deceased's estate. Id.
284

994 HANREIJiHo 53 (Tokyo High Ct. Jan. 30, 1981).
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order to have the standing to try to set aside the attachment. In
Japan, the trustee filed the case under the court's regular jurisdiction rather than pursuing a second bankruptcy, whether plenary
or ancillary.28 This case differs from the 1903 case in that the
Swiss trustee did not merely seek recognition of his standing, but
also sought to use the power of the court to displace the attachment on the trademark. The Japanese creditor argued that the
Swiss trustee had no standing to pursue any claims over the
debtor's property in Japan, because article 3 of the Bankruptcy
Act provided that a foreign bankruptcy had no effect on Japanese
property.2" 6 The Tokyo District Court disagreed, and the Tokyo
High Court affirmed."'
The high court's opinion began by holding that article 3(2)
prevented a Japanese court from recognizing or giving full effect
to a foreign bankruptcy. 288 By this, it appears the court intended

that a foreign trustee in Japan could not apply any of the affirmative powers provided by either the foreign insolvency law or
Japanese law, such as the rights of execution, avoidance, and preservation. However, the court held that the foreign trustee retained the right to act in the name of and on behalf of the debtor
to the extent that he was given such power under the foreign
law.2 9 Thus, because Swiss law provided that the debtor's Japanese property was part of the estate and within the trustee's control, the Japanese court allowed the trustee to administer the
debtor's Japanese property to the extent that the debtor was otherwise entitled to do so. 290 In effect, this means that not only can

a foreign trustee exert de facto control over unencumbered Japanese property, but he is also able to enlist the assistance of the
Japanese courts to a certain degree. Because the trustee is simply
acting in the stead of the debtor, this holding is not necessarily ir285 The court had in rem jurisdiction over the trademark and in personam
jurisdiction over the creditor. Further, the court would have had bankruptcy
jurisdiction over the matter even if the debtor had no corporate presence in Japan since the property was located in Japan. See Bankruptcy Act, arts. 105,
107.
286 IMB, 994 HANREIJIHO at 53.
287

Id.

288

Jd

289

See id.

See id. The Swiss bankruptcy statute provided that debtor's property
no matter where located was included in the bankruptcy estate. See Bankruptcy and Debt Collection Act, arts. 197, 240 (Switz.).
290
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rational or even unexpected. However, it does go beyond the
strict version of territorialism- which does not recognize a foreign trustee's status or standing to collect local assets- that was
previously employed in Japan and is still arguably followed in
Argentina, Austria, Denmark, and Norway, among others.291 As
a result, in practice a foreign trustee in Japan can now largely
avoid the territorial rules and can administer Japanese property as
part of a foreign insolvency proceeding.
Later courts have not universally followed IMB's more lax version of territorialism. 2 2 In 1983, the Osaka district court chose
not to apply an IMB approach in the Hong Kong and India case
discussed above and instead interpreted the territorial rule

strictly.293 In 1991, though, the Tokyo District Court rejected the

Osaka court's traditional stance and applied the liberal interpretation advocated in 1MB.294 In this case, the court recognized a
Norwegian trustee's right to file a lawsuit on behalf of the debtor
in order to undo corporate resolutions adopted in Japan. 2 1 By

doing so, the court both acknowledged the trustee's standing to
act in Japan on behalf of the debtor and affirmatively provided
the apparatus for the trustee to exercise his powers. The end result is that the combination of the strict territorial statute with
the pragmatic desire and theoretical support for a more universal
approach leaves the judicial approach unpredictable. Based on recent academic commentary 29 and the few available cases, it appears the courts are inclined to support a universal approach
where possible, but this is not yet a steadfast rule.

291

See WOOD, supra note 3, at 243-44.

As a civil law nation, Japan does not strictly follow the stare decisis rule
and courts are not required to closely follow precedent. Nonetheless, cases are
important in Japan and, to the extent possible, courts will try to rule consistently with earlier decisions. See MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM:
TEXT AND MATERIALS 154-56 (1997) (reviewing the available English language
sources); THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 147-62 (Hideo Tanaka & Malcolm
D.H. Smith eds., 1976) (reviewing the Japanese cases and literature).
293 Bank oflndia, 516 HANREI TAIMUZU at 139-40.
294 Jens Christian Tune v. Japan Pusunesu, K.K. (In re A.S. Pusunesu Marine and Offshore Services), 897 KIN'YO SHOJI 30, 34 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Sept. 26,
1991).
295 Id
296 Others have noted that academic commentary in Japan, while not a
source of law, may be equally or more influential than prior case law. See
DEAN, supra note 292, at 155-56 (collecting sources).
292
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745"

Using the facts of the 1MB case as a hypothetical, it is interesting and educational to consider how these cases would have been
handled if the courts had not been willing to move to a more universal approach. For example, under a strict territorial regime,
where the foreign trustee could not directly collect against the assets, the case would likely begin with the trustee filing a bankNext, a Japanese
ruptcy application on behalf of the debtor.
court would almost certainly grant the application based on the
prima facie proof of the foreign insolvency proceeding. 298 Following this, the court would appoint a Japanese trustee to collect
and administer debtor's Japanese property, including such assets
as the encumbered trademark in 1MB.299 After liquidating those
assets, presumably with coordination of the foreign trustee, the
Japanese trustee would distribute the proceeds pursuant to Japanese priority rules to all debtors with filed claims."° Because of
the foreign trustee's involvement in the case, distributions would
undoubtedly include all of the Swiss claims as well as any additional Japanese claims not already filed there. Thus, the same
creditors benefit from the Japanese asset, whether it is pursued
territorially by the Japanese trustee or universally by the foreign
trustee. The main difference in the simple case, however, is that
under the territorial approach the distributions are reduced by the
added administrative expenses of the Japanese proceeding.3" 1
Therefore, for a simple case where there are no secured or priority creditors in the local venue, the end result is more or less the
See Bankruptcy Act, arts. 132-34. The foreign trustee could file as the
debtor itself, as in the 1903 German case, or as a creditor of the Japanese
debtor. Id. Further, recent cases suggest interested persons, such as foreign insolvency trustees and officials with supervisory duties regarding the debtor,
may file as well. See Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International, No. (Hi)
2012 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., 1991) (allowing Japanese regulator to initiate a Japanese
insolvency of a foreign debtor ; Re United States Lines, No. (Hu) 216 (Tokyo
Dist. Ct., 1987) (allowing a U.S. debtor in possession to initiate a Japanese insolvency of a foreign debtor). See also Takeuchi, supra note 35, at 83-85 nn.6162 (noting these cases and stating, "iIt is abundantly clear that a petition for
insolvency proceedings against a foreign debtor filed by representative of the
foreign insolvency proceeding in Japan will be recognized.").
298 Bankruptcy Act, art. 137 (providing foreign bankruptcy is prima facie
proof of bankruptcy).
299 Id. art. 142 (requiring appointment of trustee).
100 Id art. 256.
301 See id arts. 47(1), (3)-(7) (providing that a proceeding's administrative
expenses are super priority claims to be paid before general distributions).
297

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

[21:4

same, with the exception of the added expense and corresponding
decrease in distributions due to the inefficient doubling of insolvency proceedings. 2 Japanese courts are seeking to avoid such
inefficiency and waste by giving these statutes the most universal
interpretation possible.
3.5.1.2.

PreservationofjapaneseAssets

The second key element in a cross-border insolvency is the

ability to preserve assets from other collection proceedings. In
the case of a foreign insolvency importation into Japan, the issue
is simply whether Japanese courts will assist foreign proceedings
by ordering local stays of execution. There are no reported Japanese cases regarding a direct request of a foreign insolvency for a
stay or protection order concerning Japanese property of a foreign debtor. Further, in most situations foreign courts' attempts
at preserving or controlling assets in Japan, through such measures as worldwide stays, have had no practical effect in Japan." 3
302

Of course, in a more complex case, such as where there are a variety of

Japanese assets and secured and involuntar.y creditors, the end result might differ significantly. See infra Section 4.3.3. (discussing assumptions for the default
mode).

See, e.g., In re Vessel Charters, Inc., No. 190-15866-260 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1991) (noting that a Japanese creditor arrested a U.S. debtor's
ship in Japan post-petition despite the automatic stay and without leave from
the stay).
It is arguable that foreign orders for worldwide stays of execution have an
undetectab[e de facto effect in lapan. The argument goes as follows: Creditors,
both foreign and Japanese, refrain from executing or pursuing Japanese assets
and proceedings following the issuance of a foreign worldwide stay due to their
altruistic respect for the foreign declaration or, more realistically, their in personam subjection to the foreign court's jurisdiction. Because honoring a stay
ipso facto means not taking any action, such decisions are nearly impossible to
confirm. Notably though, none of the creditors in the InternationalHorizons
cases, whether secured, such as Bank of America, or unsecured, such as Western Publishing Company, pursued the debtor's Japanese assets in violation of
the automatic U.S. stay. See, e.g., Bank ofAm., 23 B.R., at 1015-16; Int'l Horizons, 15 B.R., at 798. Further, though not concerning Japanese property, this
is the theory and power that the Maruko trustees relied on when they filed a
plenary Chapter 11 case in the United States to avoid an Australian foreclosure. See infra notes 359-60 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for
filing in the United States). Finally, the inverse situation concerning the foreign recognition of a Japanese preservation order is discussed below. See infra
notes 340-41 and accompanying text. Relevant to the argument here, Taniguchi notes:
[In earlier cross-border cases], the [Japanese] administrators succeeded
in obtaining the agreement of creditors not to attach [foreign] ships
303
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For example, in Kino v. United States InternationalUniversity, in
which the debtor raised its pending reorganization in the United
States in an effort to stall proceedings against it in Japan, the court
stated:
The court recognizes the fact that Chapter 11 proceedings
have begun; however, because these proceedings in the
United States have no effect in Japan (see Bankruptcy Act,
art. 3(2); Corporate Reorganization Act, art. 4(2)), the defendant
1 [debtor] has not lost his status as a party in this
suit. 30
Interestingly, the debtors made the pragmatic decision not to aggressively pursue this point or a general defense of the Japanese
suit, because they had limited Japanese assets and it was clear any
judgment would not be enforceable in the United States since it
was obtained in violation of the U.S. stay."'
On another recent occasion, however, a Japanese court recognized the effect of a foreign insolvency's stay on an action in Japan. In Bank Uoremu v. EM International,the Tokyo district
court recognized the effect of a French automatic stay on accrual
of post-insolvency interest." 6 The facts of the case are somewhat
complicated. A debtor had a loan with the plaintiff, a French
bank, that was guaranteed pursuant to a separate agreement with
the defendant, a Japanese corporation.0 7 The debtor was unable
to repay the loan and sought liquidation in France. Under the
French Civil Code, this triggered a stay on the accrual of addi-

abroad [i.e., a worldwide stay against executing on foreign assets].
Such an amicable solution, based on the Japanese inclination to avoid
confrontation, had long kept the problem [of violations of such Japanese stays] under the suiface.
Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 461-62 n.36.
"' Kano v. United States Int'l Univ., 1554 HANREI JIHO 91, 100 (Osaka
Dist. Ct. May 23, 1995).
30 See Interview with Thomas Flippen and Koji Yamaguchi, Debtors'
American and Japanese Counsel of Yamaguchi International Law Offices, in
Osaka, Japan (Mar. 15, 2000).
" Bank Uoremu v. EAI Int'l, 1589 HANREI jIiO 86 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.,
Feb. 7, 1996).
307

Id at 87.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.j. Intl Econ. L.

tional interest due directly under the loan.3"'

[21:4

Because the debt

was not satisfied directly by the debtor or indirectly by its liquidation, the bank sought to collect the loan's outstanding balance,
as well as accrued interest to date, from the guarantor in Japan.
The Japanese court recognized the debt and the guarantor's responsibility for it, but only granted interest to the date of the
debtor's filing for bankruptcy in France." 9 In short, the Japanese
court recognized and upheld the substantive effect of the stay of
proceedings triggered by the French insolvency. Thus again,
though somewhat haphazardly, the Japanese courts appear to be
recognizing the effect of foreign insolvencies more widely than
required under a strict reading of the Japanese statutes.
3.5.1.3.

Conciliationof PriorityandAvoidance Rules

The most difficult issue for any of the cross-border insolvency
models to address is the coordination of conflicting priority and
avoidance rules. 10 Japanese priorities and avoidance terms are
substantially similar to those of the United States and other countries;31 ' therefore, it is not unreasonable to suspect a Japanese
court might assist a foreign insolvency with an avoidance problem or despite a difference in priority rankings. However, no reported cases deal with a Japanese court denying a foreign request
308 Id. at 88 (citing article 5 of the French Civil Code, CODE CIVIL [C. civ.
art. 5 (Fr.)], which provides that no interest may be claimed from the date of
the opening of a judicial recovery proceeding).
Bank Uoremu, 1589 HANREIJIHO 86, at 91.
"
310 See, e.g., Bang-Pedersen, supra note 15, at 386 (discussing coordinating
priority rules in a universal regime); LoPucki, supra note 10, at 758-60 (discussing a territorial approach to avoidance rules), 759-60 (discussing coordination
ofpriority rules in a territorial system).
311 One U.S. court has found that Japanese priorities are "consonant with
and complementary to" the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In re Kojima, 177 B.R. 696

at 702. See also Yukiko Hasebe, The Position of Creditors in the Distributionof
Insolvent Estates: Consensual Secured Creditors in Japan, in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS

IN

INTERNATIONAL

AND

COMPARATIVE

CORPORATE

INSOLVENCY LAW 403 Gacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994) (discussing Japanese priori-

ties).

U.S. courts have also found Japanese avoidance rules consistent with those
in the United States. See Kojima, 177 B.R. at 701-02 n.25 (referring to 11 U.S.C.
S 304(c)(3) and finding that Japanese insolvency law sufficiently prevents preferential and fraudulent dispositions of property). See also Frank Bennett, Jr.,
Preference Rules in JapaneseBankruptcy Law, in JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW
IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 217 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994) (reviewing avoidance powers in Japan).
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for assistance based on a divergence from Japan in the rankings of
the foreign insolvency law's priorities. Further, there are no reported cases dealing with a Japanese court ordering or denying
repatriation of Japanese property to a foreign insolvency proceeding based on the avoidance rules of either Japan or the foreign
country."2 The lack of precedent is not surprising given the restrictive environment created by the territorial rules. As a consequence, there is simply not enough evidence to speculate under
what circumstances a Japanese court might consider turning over
property based on foreign or Japanese avoidance rules or otherwise deny assistance based on differences in foreign priorities.
3.5.1.4.

Turnover offapanese Property

As the Swiss 1MB case above shows, by recognizing the standing of foreign insolvency trustees and foreign statutes' inclusion of
Japanese property in the foreign insolvency estates, Japan's courts
indirectly allow the turnover of Japanese property for the benefit
of foreign insolvencies in a large number of cases. Even where local creditors have already provisionally attached an asset, Japanese
courts have assisted foreign trustees' efforts to defeat or satisfy
such attachments and, thereby, facilitate the liquidation and repatriation of the proceeds for the benefit of the foreign insolvency.313
Two significant obstacles, however, remain to proceed with
the turnover of Japanese property for the benefit of a foreign proceeding. First, even the broadest interpretation of article 3 of the
Bankruptcy Act cannot wholly defeat the plain language of the
territorial command. For example, the court's liberal approach is
of no assistance where a creditor has attached a local asset that
does not fully satisfy its claims. Because the foreign trustee, at
best, can only assume the standing of the debtor, he has no
312 Some argue that foreign trustees are barred from using Japanese avoid-

ance powers since those provisions may only be exercised by trustees appointed in Japanese proceedings. See Ito, supra note 270, at 184 "The avoiding
power of such [fraudulent or preferential] transaction[s] can be exercised only
by the trustee appointed in the Japanese insolvency proceeding."). This seems
to be a rational conclusion; it is, in fact, the one made in the United States. See
infra note 344 and accompanying text. However, the statutes' text is silent regarding who may exercise the power. See Bankruptcy Act, art. 72; Corporate
Reorganization Law, art. 74. Thus, at a minimum, the argument seems to be
open.
313 See IMB, 994 HANREIJIHO at 53.
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authority based on an earlier filed bankruptcy or the avoidance
powers of either the foreign law or Japanese law to avoid an attachment on debtor's property."4 Thus, diligent creditors who
learn of a foreign insolvency can still circumvent the pari passu

distribution rule by being the first to attach unencumbered Japanese property, a result other creditors can only avoid by instituting a local insolvency proceeding.
Second, the plain language of the statutes ensures that courts
will continue to be inconsistent in their treatment of international insolvencies. Thus, even though the academics and practitioners assert that the universal rule of the IMB case is the pre-

ferred and predominate approach, the courts are applying neither
Further, there
universalism nor territorialism consistently."1
or
factors to asdoes not seem to be any unifying characteristics
sist predicting when the court will or will not recognize the foreign insolvency. In short, Japan's cross-border insolvency rules
are unpredictable because of the conflict between the statutory

commands and pragmatic demands.
3.5.2.

JapaneseInsolvenciesAbroad- Insolvency Exportation

3.5.2.1.

Recognition ofJapaneseInsolvencies Abroad

The second aspect of an international insolvency system is extending domestic cases abroad. The effect of a domestic insolvency abroad, beginning with its recognition, is chiefly a matter
for the foreign courts and statutes to determine. However, as the
Kosei Maru case shows, the status of the national law can be an
important element in the foreign court's adjudication.316 In Kosei
Maru, the Canadian court rejected the argument that Japanese insolvency statutes allowed the Japanese court and trustee to control assets outside of Japan. Recently, however, Japanese insolvency trustees have unhesitatingly acted abroad, collecting and
314 As long as equity in the Japanese property remains, the foreign trustee
may resolve the attaching party's claims in order to assume the residual value
of the asset for the generl benefit of the foreign proceeding.
315 See, e.g., Takeuchi, supra note 35, at 72-85 (arguing in favor of the IMB
approach). Compare Bank of India, 516 HANRE TAIMUZU, at 139 with Tune,
897 KIN'YO SHOJI, at 30; compare Kdno, 1554 HANREI J.O, at 100 with Bank
Uoremu, 1589 HANREIJIIO, at 86.

316 Kosei Maru, 1 F.C. at 670.
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administering debtors' foreign property independently and with
the indirect and direct assistance of foreign courts.31 In turn,
Japanese courts have affirmed this practice and even appointed
special administrators solely for the purpose of collecting foreign
property.31 Thus, although Japanese insolvency law does not
provide for extraterritorial effect, this has been achieved through
the initiative of Japan's trustees and the willingness of foreign
court's to assist.
Japanese trustees have sought foreign recognition of domestic
insolvencies in two ways- indirectly and directly. Contemporaneously with the Japanese courts' first affirmatively nonFor a discussion of a situation in which a trustee acted independently,
see Nakashima Interview, supra note 105 (noting the Japanese trustee privately
317

liquidated assets in Australia and Korea with the agreement of secured Japanese

creditors and the approval of the Japanese court). For an example of where a
trustee acted indirectly with the assistance of a foreign court, see infra notes

318-21 and accompanying text (reviewing the Kowloon Containercase). For an
illustration of where a trustee acted directly with the assistance of a foreign
court, see Kojima et al., infra note 324 (discussing the author's activities in the

United States as trustee of a Japanese bankruptcy). See also Abe et al., infra
note 355 (discussing the authors' activities in the United States as trustee of a
Japanese reorganization); Satoru Murase, Bankruptcy Attorneys: Modern-Day
Samurai, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 1998, at C1 ("[Japanese insolvency trustees] oversee sales of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of assets located throughout
the world, many of which are remnants of the global Japanese investment
flurry of the 1980s.").
Perhaps the most interesting and convoluted case of a Japanese trustee acting abroad indirectly and directly with the assistance of a foreign court was in
the Maruko case. finfra note 355. In Maruko, the Japanese trustee, acting as
debtor-in-possession of the concurrent U.S. Chapter 11 case, received ancillary
recognition of the U.S. case by a Canadian court that approved the liquidation
of Canadian assets pursuant to the U.S. trustee powers in 11 U.S.C. § 363(h)
despite creditors' objections. See Nakashima Interview, supra note 105.
318 The best example of appointing separate trustees specifically to administer foreign assets is Maruko, dscussed below, where the court appointed three
lawyers (bengoshi) to act in this capacity. See infra note 355 (naming the lawaul Dist. Ct. 1991) (appointing an
91 (Nagya
yers). See also In re SAS, No.
additional trustee to deal exclusively with t e debtor's foreign assets and supervising reorganization of debtor's French subsidiary); In re Urban, No. (Fu) 87
(Nagoya Dist. Ct. 1991) (appointing a separate trustee to administer debtor's
foreign assets); RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CROSs-BORDER
INSOLVENCY: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 73-74 (Neil Cooper &
Rebecca Jarvis eds., 1996) [hereinafter RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT];

Takeuchi, supra note 35, at 77 n.45 (commenting on the practice); Ito, supra
note 270, at 180 ("Concretely speaking, courts admit that the trustee may administer the debtor's assets located abroad."); Nakano Interview, supra note 210
(referring to Nakano, who was appointed to administer Nikko Electric's Indonesian assets).
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territorial decisions such as IMB, Japanese trustees began extending the impact of local insolvencies indirectly by seeking recognition and assistance from foreign courts. This indirect approach is
best seen in the Hong Kong case Re Kowloon Container Warehouse Co. Ltd.319 In Kowloon, the trustee of a bankrupt Japanese
company traveled to Hong Kong and initiated a separate and independent liquidation of the debtor under Hong Kong law. 2 ' In
these concurrent plenary proceedings, a Hong Kong trustee was
appointed, but it was the Japanese trustee who actively pursued
the Hong Kong assets.321 For unrelated reasons the Japanese trustee was unsuccessful in realizing any assets, but no objections or
other obstacles appear to have limited the trustee in his indirect
approach.sn"
Two points are notable regarding this methodology. First,
just as in the hypothetical IMB situation discussed above, any assets the Japanese trustee realized in this manner would be diminished by the administrative costs and other claims incurred in the
Hong Kong proceeding. Second, the trustee's indirect approach
would have failed the test for de facto control used by the Tokyo
High Court in 1MB, because when the court examined the trustee's empowering law it would have been evident that he did not
have direct authority to control foreign property. 3
Because of these limitations, beginning in the 1990s, Japanese
trustees adopted a more direct approach to extending the effect of
domestic proceedings abroad when the foreign statutes and courts
allowed it. One example from the United States is In re Kojima.324
Kojima dealt with a Japanese trustee's request to the U.S. bank319

Re Kowloon Container Warehouse Co. Ltd. [1981] H.K.C. 222 (High

Ct. 1981).
320 This case might alternatively be addressed in Section 3.5.3. below,
which reviews concurrent plenary cases. It is covered here because I submit
that the Japanese proceeding was dominant and the Hong Kong insolvency was
only filed to assist and serve the objectives of the Japanese case.
321 Re Kowloon, at *10 (noting that the Hong Kong trustee did not appear
in the case, but that the Japanese trustee did).
322Id.
323

See supra notes 284-87 and accompan

text (discussing the IMB re-

quirement of authority under the trustee's home aw).
324 Kojima, 177 B.R. 696 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995). The Japanese trustee has
written on his experiences in this case. See Hideki Kojima et al., Gaikoku shi.
san kakuho to nichibei tisanhd katsuyd no keiken [Experience with PreservingForeign Assets and the PracticalUses of U.S. andJapaneseInsolvency Law], 616 NBL

27 (1997).
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ruptcy court for ancillary assistance pursuant to section 304 of the

U.S. Bankruptcy Code.3" The trustee sought the U.S. court's
help in confirming its right to a golf course owned by the debtor
and subject to claims by U.S. creditors. In deciding to grant the
trustee's request, the U.S. court reviewed the Japanese insolvency
system and found, "[Cilearly, the Japanese bankruptcy law is neither contradictory nor 'repugnant' to the laws and policies of this
the
country. Indeed it is consonant with and complementary to 326
principles which govern the United States' Bankruptcy Code."
The decision, however, is strangely silent regarding the territorial provisions of Japan's insolvency statutes.3" The opinion
suggests that the U.S. creditors in fact argued, "[T]he Japanese
Trustee has no right or authority to proceed in the United States
Bankruptcy Court."328 However, the court only addressed this

issue in determining whether the Japanese trustee was a "foreign
representative" for the purposes of U.S. bankruptcy law.329 In response to this issue, it was undisputed that the Japanese trustee
and insolvency were within the meaning of "foreign representative" and "foreign proceeding" under U.S. law.33 It is unclear,
32sThe

Japanese trustee stated that he believed this was only the second

time that a Japanese insolvency had requested assistance under S 304 of the

U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the other instance occurring in connection with the

Sanko Steamship insolvency discussed infra note 333). See Kojima et al., supra

note 324, at 28.
326 Kojima, 177 B.R. at 702.

' The court did note the reciprocity provision of the Japanese Bankruptcy Act, which it cited favorably for the finding that "[i]mplicit and explicit
in the Bankruptcy Law of Japan is the fair and equal treatment for foreign parties in a Japanese case." 1L at 701 (citing and quoting article 2 of the Bankruptcy Law of Japan (1991)).
328 Id. at 697.
329 Id. at 698-99 nn.10-12. The Japanese trustee clearly recognized both aspects of the problem regarding his authority. See Kojima et al., supra note 324,
at 28. The trustee stated:
According to the territorial principle of Japanese law (Bankruptcy
Act, art. 3(1)), my trustee authority did not extend to foreign assets.
Further, according to U.S. law, it was necessary for my standing as
bankruptcy trustee to be recognized in America.... As the bankruptcy trustee, I [realized that I needed to figure out] the procedure in
America to clear these hurdles.

Id

330 The court provided in a footnote that the U.S. creditors did not chal-

lenge that the Japanese trustee and bankruptcy were a foreign representative
and a foreign proceeding under U.S. bankruptcy law. Kojima, 177 B.R. 699, at
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however, whether the court misinterpreted, or whether the creditor failed to raise, the argument that the trustee lacked the power
to act in the United States as a matter of the territorial commands
of Japaneselaw.331 Whatever the reasons for the court's failure to
address this issue, Kojima is important because it suggests that: (1)
by trustees acting personally, Japanese insolvencies can be directly
extended to cover foreign assets; and (2) foreign courts are willing
to assist duly appointed Japanese trustees without an inquiry into
their powers under Japanese law. Allowing Japanese trustees to
act abroad either directly or indirectly has become the rule in Japan;332 therefore, for the vast majority of cases, the only limitation on the extraterritorial impact of a Japanese insolvency is that
which is occasionally imposed by the foreign courts.
3.5.2.2.

Preservationof the ForeignAssets

Kojima also shows how a Japanese insolvency can benefit
from a foreign stay. In Kojima, the trustee received a stay from a
U.S. bankruptcy court against a U.S. creditor who sought to control property that was arguably owned by the debtor.333 State
n.12, citing 11 U.S.C. % 101(23) to 101(24) (defining a foreign proceeding and a
foreign representative respectively).
331

This is not to suggest or advocate that a U.S. court should ignore mod-

ern Japanese case law and practice and find, based on the bare statutes, that the
Japanese trustee is acting beyond his powers under Japanese law by seeking to
control foreign assets. Rather, I raise the point merely to note that it was
available and that the court left the issue unanswered. Cf Kosei Maru, 1 F.C. at
670 (raising and answering the issue of the effect of Japan's territorial statutes
on recognition under a modified universal regime). It is also unclear whether
the issue was raised or addressed in the other Japanese case that fell under
304- Sanko Steamship, discussed infra note 333. See Taniguchi, supra note 5, at
467.
332 See Takeuchi, supra note 35, at 76-78 (citing cases); RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 318, at 72.
331 Kojima, 177 B.R. at 704. The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York also granted a stay for the benefit of a Japanese insolvency
pursuant to 5 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the factually similar case of
In re Tsuboi (In re Sanko Steamship Co., Ltd.), No. 86-B-10291 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
July 30, 1986). This decision is reproduced at K6ji Takeuchi, Jitsureikara mita
kokusai t6san no bdteki shomondai [Various Legal Problems in InternationalInsolvency as Seen from Actual Cases], 7 SAIKEN KANRI [DEBT ADMINISTRATION]

4, 10 n.8 (1986). The Sanko insolvency, Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Eacom
Timber Sales Ltd., 32 D.L.R. 4th 269 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1986), highlighted one representative problem of the global insolvency, namely, the worldwide arrest of
25 of the debtor's 264 ships. The case is further discussed in BRIAN STEWART,
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY IN JAPAN: SANKO STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. (1986);
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courts have also been willing to grant stays for Japanese insolvencies based on comity under state law.334 Nonetheless, whether the
Japanese trustee is able to preserve assets abroad will largely be a
matter for the foreign court and foreign law to determine, though
Japanese law may be a factor.33
A foreign injunction is not the only way to preserve assets
abroad though. Foreign assets may also be protected by a worldwide preservation order issued by a Japanese court and binding
on all those within the personal jurisdiction of the court.336 There
are no reported cases dealing with this approach, and it is not
clear to what extent Japanese courts have been asked or have isHenry Lewis Goodman et al., Use of United States Bankruptcy Law in MultinationalInsolvencies: The Axona Litigation- Issues, Tactics, andImplicationsfor the
Future,9 BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 23 n.18, 24 n.20 (1992); Ito, supra note 270, at 18081; Takeuchi, supra note 35, at 77 n.43.
114 See Japanese Company Has Suit Stayed Pending Foreign Bankruptcy
Action; Nunez v. Arbelo, Supreme Court,IA Part 18, Justice Dowd, N.Y.LJ., May
20, 1993, at 25 (granting a stay in New York state court in favor of Japanese
reorganization proceeding pursuant to comity theory under New York state
law and without reviewing territorial principals of Japanese insolvency laws).
331 Similar to the discussion below regarding a U.S. bankruptcy court's
power to order turnover of property to a Japanese insolvency, see infra notes
346-48 and accompanying text, it is arguable that a U.S. bankruptcy court does
not have the authority to issue a stay on property allegedly involved in a Japanese insolvency pursuant to S 304. As a matter of U.S. law, a bankruptcy
court may issue a stay on "property involved in [a] foreign proceeding." 11
U.S.C. 5 304(b)(1). Courts have broadly interpreted this lan a e and do not
require a definite finding that the U.S. property is part of the foreign estate.
See, e.g., Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. (In re
Koreag), 961 F.2d 341, 34849 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the scope of 5
304(b)1)). Thus, one might argue that because the Japanese trustee may indirectly control the debtor's U.S. property and thereby repatriate it, it is "involved" in the Japanese proceeding for the purpose of S 304(b)(1). On the
other hand, one might counter that because the property, pursuant to article
3(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, cannot be controlled directly by the Japanese court
and is not considered part of the estate while situs is still abroad, it is not "involved" with the Japanese proceedings. As noted above, see supra notes 326329 and accompanying text, it is unclear whether these Japanese law issues
were argued in any of he Japanese cases brought under § 304.
3 Arguably a third method would be to seek a worldwide protective or-

der from a third nation's courts. This was essentially what the Maruko trustees
did to protect Australian property, albeit through a full concurrent proceeding
rather than an ancillary application. See infra notes 355-61 and accompanying
text (reviewing the reasons for Maruko applying for a full Chapter 11 reorganization in the United States). Cf Hugies v. Hannover RuckversicherungsAktiengesellschaft [1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 497 (C.A.) (denying a Bahaman insolvency court's ancillary request to the English courts for a worldwide stay to
protect the Bahaman insolvency estate from proceedings in the United States).
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sued injunctions for the preservation of a debtor's foreign assets.
However, the issue was indirectly raised in Kosei Maru. In that
case, the attaching creditor was a Japanese company involved in
the debtor's Japanese reorganization and subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the reorganizing court."' Thus, when the
creditor seized the ship in Canada, it arguably violated the Japanese preservation order and was subject to sanctions.33 The Japanese trustee considered pursuing a claim against the creditor, but
instead eventually settled comprehensively with it.339 Nonetheless, this example suggests that a general preservation order issued
by a Japanese court- that does not specifically limit its scopemay arguably be considered a worldwide stay against those within
the court's control. This rule is far from settled though and, as
discussed below with regard to the Maruko case, the strict territorial statutes make its application circumspect at best.34
3.5.2.3.

ConciliationofPriorityandAvoidanceRules

Just as with inbound cases, conciliating conflicting priority
and avoidance rules is one of the most difficult areas in crossborder insolvency. Further, although differences are ipso facto
fifty percent attributable to Japanese law, whether the foreign
country honors the Japanese rules, follows its own rules, creates a
case-specific compromise rule, or denies all cooperation outright
will be a matter for the foreign law and court. Nonetheless,
broadly speaking, Japanese priorities are consistent with most major systems; thus, differing priority rankings will generally only
pose a problem for government claims and in a few other specific
situations.34
Kosei Maru, 1 F.C. at 671-72.
338 See Taniguchi, supra note 5, at 469 n.48 (noting that the trustee considered pursuing a claim against the creditor in Japan).
339See id.
340 See infra notes 355-62 and accompanying text (noting that in Maruko,
the Japanese trustee sought a U.S. worldwide stay rather than an express Japanese preservation order,-because he was concerned that a Japanese court would
not expressly extend the scope of its preservation measures to restrict a Japanese lender from foreclosing on the foreign real property of a Japanese debtoi).
341 The court in Kojima found that Japanese priorities were "substantially
in accordance with" the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Kojima, 177 B.R. at 701-02
n.30 (quoting S 304(c)(4)). However, the Japanese priority for funeral expenses, for example, could conceivably cause a foreign court concern if unique
facts made those expenses so great as to deny all unsecured claims of the foreign
117
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Similarly, the general avoidance rules in Japan will be familiar
to insolvency practitioners in many other systems, though the
specifics of how they operate will differ. 42 But again, how the
foreign court deals with this conflict of laws issue (i.e., whether to
apply the Japanese avoidance rules, the local avoidance rules, or
deny cooperation completely) can only be determined by that
court and its law. As for America's answer to this question, the
bankruptcy court in Kojima held that a Japanese trustee could not
apply the American avoidance rules.343 Kojima and other cases,
however, suggest somewhat inconclusively that a U.S. bankruptcy court might recognize and enforce a foreign trustee's use
of the foreign system's avoidance powers to disgorge U.S. assets. 3"
In the end, it may be said that the Japanese rules for priorities and
creditors. See MINPO, arts. 306(3), 309.
Most countries do not enforce foreign revenue or punitive claims. See, e.g.,
Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964) (U.S.); United States v.
Harden, [1963] 41 D.L.R.2d 721 (Can.); Government of India v. Taylor, App.
Gas. 491 (H.L. 1955) (Eng.); Peter Buchanan, Ltd. v. McVey, [1955] App. Gas.

516, [19541 I.R. 89 (Jr. S.C. 1951)

.). See also, Uniform Foreign Money-

Judgments Recognition Act § 1(2 adopted by thirty U.S. states as of May
1999); DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 60, at 97 (Rule 3(1)); SCOLES & HAY, supra
note 59, at S 24.43; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 120

(1971) (by implication). Recently, however, this rule has been relaxed in certain cases. See, e.g., Bullen v. United Kingdom, 553 So.2d 1344 (Fla. App. 1990)

(U.S.); Re Ayers, (1981) 34 A.L.R. 582, 591 (Fed. Ct.), affid en banc sub noma.,
Ayers v. Evans (1981) 39 A.L.R. 129, 145 (Austl.); Re Tucker [1988] L.R.C.
(Comm.) 955 (Isle of Man.); Connor v. Connor, [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 632 (N.Z.);
Priestly v. Clegg, (1985) (3) S.A. 955 (T.P.D.) (S.A.).
342 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
13 Kojima, 177 B.R. at 703 n.35.
34

See ida at 703.

This Court determines that, at least, a colorable claim for fraudulent
transfer, an unauthorized post-petition transfer, or an otherwise improper and avoidable transfer, Has been shown by a preponderance of
the evidence, under either Japanese bankruptcy law or Colorado state

law, and that the dispute should be resolved by a court in the United
States.
Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added). See also Maxwell Communications
Corp. v. Societe Genrale (In re Maxwell Communications Corp.), 93 F.3d
England's
comity, insovency
the doctrine
(applying,
1996)
1055 rules
(2d Cir.
1036,
fullofplenary
concurrent
a on
of Inc.
portionbased
the U.S.
674, 676avoidance
(In re Metzeler),78B.R.
Co.
Transp.
v.inBouchard
case); Metzeler
1987) (holding that in the United States a foreign trustee
77
may(Bankr.
exerciseS.D.N.Y.
the avoidance powers available pursuant to the foreign insolvency
law, but that such exercise might be constrained as necessary by the balancing
h
of the factors in 304(c)).
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avoidances do n6t inhibit the foreign extension of a Japanese insolvency any more than (and arguably less than)34 those of the
more statutorily universal systems.
3.5.3.4.

Turnover of ForeignProperty

The most fundamental issue for a Japanese insolvency extending abroad is whether the trustee will be able to repatriate foreign
assets. Just as a foreign trustee may indirectly control unencumbered Japanese property with little obstacle and no help from the
local court, Japanese trustees can and do repatriate unencumbered
foreign property for the benefit of the Japanese estate.34 This
rule even extends to encumbered property where the Japanese
trustee is willing to settle with the foreign claimant.3" For all
other foreign property though, the trustee can only bring back
the assets with the assistance of the court that has actual in rem
control of the assets. Therefore, once again, the extent of a Japanese insolvency's reach overseas will largely be a matter for the
foreign court and law.
The content of Japanese law, however, will arguably be an obstacle in some cases including those in the United States. Pursuant to section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy
court can only order turnover of U.S. property if it is "property
of [the foreign proceeding's] estate."34 Whether U.S. property is
part of a Japanese estate is a matter for Japanese insolvency law. 49
Given that article 3(1) of the Japanese Bankruptcy Act provides,
"A bankruptcy adjudged in Japan shall be effective only with respect to the bankrupt's properties which exist in Japan," U.S.
34s

For example, the United States preference for U.S. fishermen's claims,

see 11 U.S.C. S 507(a)(5)(B), seems more likely to cause difficulties than Japan's
preference claims for funeral expenses. See MINPO, arts. 306(3), 309.
346 For example, in Maruko, discussed below, the trustees liquidated assets
in Canada for the benefit of the concurrent insolvencies without initiating
formal insolvency proceedings there. See Quittner, Supplement, infra note
355, at S44.
...The court in Kowloon left this possibility open to the Japanese trustee.
Kowloon, [1981] H.K.C. at '157. Cf In re Vessel Charters, Inc., No. 190-15866260 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1991) (allowing a U.S. debtor-in-possession to
settle outside of the debtor's plan with a Japanese creditor who had arrested
debtor's ship in Japan).
348 See 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(2) (1994).
311 See 2 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
304.06 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th
ed., rev. 1999) (citing sources).
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property of a Japanese debtor is simply not part of the Japanese
estate."' Therefore, it cannot be turned over pursuant to section
304. Nonetheless, the trustee might repatriate property where it
does not need the court's assistance and may receive other assistance in the United States pursuant to section 304, such as the
stay in Kojima.3 s' Still, a turnover of U.S. assets appears to directly contravene the combined effect of the United States and
Japanese statutory commands. In this way, even the broadest interpretation of Japan's territorial statutes falls short of creating a
comprehensive modified universal system to replace its historically territorial approach.
3.5.3.

Coordinationof Cross-FiledInsolvencies

The Japanese cases also suggest a third category that is neither
strictly an exportation of a Japanese insolvency nor the importation of a foreign one. 52 In Japan as elsewhere, this type of "center-less" case that leads to independent cross-filed plenary proceedings has so far been less common than those cases that are clearly
export or import directed.35 3 To a degree, the cross-filed plenary
Bankruptcy Act, Law no. 71 of 1922, art. 3(1).
110
See supra note 334 and accompanying text; see also supra note 335 (noting that a U.S. court's authority to issue even a stay is also at least questionable).
352 1 define these cases as cross-filed plenary cases, a definition that includes
those cases where full insolvency measures are initiated in more than one forum; thus, it does not include cases where an insolvency is not filed in the second forum or where an ancillary or secondary insolvency proceeding is filed in
the second forum. This Article treats those concurrent plenary cases where
one forum significantly dominates the objectives and operations of the joint
case as indirect importation or exportation. See supra Section 3.5.2.
...No statistics are available to test this claim. However, I make this assertion based on my broad definition of cross-border insolvency, supra note
230, and my narrow definition of cross-filed plenary cases, supra note 352.
Also, I believe this is a rational conclusion because: (1) it is generally not in the
interest of debtors or their trustees to file full cases in the secondary forum
since to do so would preempt their de facto control of the case in that jurisdiction; (2) it is not in the interest of local secured, priorit, or diligent debtors
because they will do better outside of insolvency; and (3) if the second forum
allows for some form of ancillary or secondary proceeding, as many now do,
supra note 8, this type of proceeding will peel away a portion of those cases
that would otherwise be filed as cross-filed plenary cases. Despite all of these
reasons, some large asset cases warrant plenary cross-filings. Outside of Japan,
recent and notable large cross-filed plenary insolvencies include, among others:
Maxwell Communications in England and America, Olympia & York in Canada and America, and BCCI in the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg. See
31
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cases are quintessential examples of the territorial rule in action
(i.e., each country deals only with those aspects within its direct
control) with the added dimension of coordination between the
primary proceedings.354
The most notable proceeding of this type in Japan was the
Maruko insolvency.3"' Maruko was a Japanese real estate devel69,
83-84 (E. Bruce Leonard & Christopher W. Besant eds., 1994) (providing a collection of articles reviewing these insolvencies); Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 36
n.2.
...The Maruko insolvency, see infra note 355, operated very similarly to
LoPucki's proposed cooperative territorialism. Cf LoPucki, supra note 10, at
151-71.
115 This Article refers to this insolvency and the related articles and cases as
the "Maruko case." It has produced a number of reported opinions. See In re
Maruko Inc., 219 B.R. 567 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1998); In re Maruko Inc., 206 B.R.
225 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997); Aino v. Maruko, Inc. (In re Maruko Inc.), 200 B.R.
876 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996); In re Maruko Inc., 160 B.R. 633 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1993). However, the best accounts of the case are by the Japanese court appointed trustees of Maruko and their lead U.S. counsel. See Arnold M.
Quittner, Cross-BorderInsolvencies: ConcurrentJapaneseand United States Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL
STRATAGIES 33 (PLI No. 628, 1992) [hereinafter, Quittner, PLI] (Quittner was
the lead U.S. counsel for the debtor-in-possession, i.e., the Japanese trustees);
Sh6go Abe et al., Heik,5 t6san no iitsumu: Kjsei kaisha maruk6 noj itsumu ni miru
bekoku t6san tetsuduki [PracticalExperiences with InternationalConcurrent Insolvencies: American Insolvency Procedure Considering the Actual Case of the ReorganizationofMaruko] (pts. 1-7), 556 NBL 6 (1994), 558 NBL 13 (1994), 559
NBL 38 (1994), 563 NBL 50 (1995), 565 NBL 50 (1995), 568 NBL 59 (1995), 569
NBL 64 (1995) (Abe was the head trustee and the other three authors were
trustees appointed to manage foreign property.); Arnold M. Quittner, CrossBorder Insolvencies- Ancillary and-Full Zses: The Concurrent Japanese and
United States Cases of Maruko Inc., 2 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 171 (1995), reprinted in Supplement, INT' INSOLVENCY REV. S33 (1997) [hereinafter
Quittner, Supplement].
A similar concurrent filing in the United States and Japan also occurred in
the insolvency of Ken International, though the legal questions in that case
largely dealt with public law issues, such as racketeering claims and fraud. Regarding this case in Japan, see In re Ken International, No. (Fu) 1594 (Tokyo
Dist. Ct. 1991). Regarding this case in the United States, see Mizuno v. Salisbury (In re Mizuno), No. 97-56689 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8566 (9th Cir. Apr.
30, 1999); Mizuno Bankr. Estate v. Mizuno (In re Mizuno), No. 96-55077 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 25314 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1997); United States v. Ken Int'l
Co., no. 95-10225, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10474 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 1997);
United States v. Ken Int'l Co., 113 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1997), affig 897 F.Supp.
462 (D. Nev. 1995); United States v. Ken Int'l, Co., Ltd., 184 B.R. 102 (Bankr.
D. Nev. 1995). The debtor challenged the Japanese trustee's standing to file a
concurrent insolvency in the United States and otherwise control L.S. assets,
but the court denied the motion on procedural grounds without addressing an
substantive arguments based on Japanese or U.S. insolvency law. See Ken Int'l,
CURRENT ISSUES IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY AND REORGANIZATION

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss4/1

20001

CROSS-BORDER INSOL VENCYPARADIGM

opment company with significant assets in Japan, the United
States, Australia, Canada, Korea, as well as a number of other
countries." 6 In August 1991, Maruko filed for reorganization in
Japan."' A trustee was appointed and after consultation with
U.S. counsel, the trustee filed for full Chapter 11 protection in
the United States in addition to and concurrent with the Japanese
proceeding.358
The reasons for pursuing a full reorganization in the United
States were varied, but three stood primary."5 9 First, as the Japanese trustees put it, "The number one reason [we chose to file a
concurrent plenary case in the United States] was that it was unclear what the actual situation [in Japan] was regarding the socalled territorial principle codified in article 4 of the Japanese
Corporate Reorganization Act. "3"° Broken down, this concern of
the trustees had two parts. First; they did not want to proceed
under the strictly territorial rules embodied by the Japanese statutes, because that would foreclose pursuing a large portion of the
intertwined assets of the debtor. Second, the trustees did not have
confidence in the stability of the few universal-leaning precedents.
Thus, they sought to avoid both the limitations and ambiguity of
Japan's cross-border insolvency law by filing a concurrent case in
the United States. The joint filing resulted in an interesting situation where the trustees became debtors-in-possession in the
United States and thereby added all of the powers of the United
States Bankruptcy Code to those powers they already possessed
under the Japanese Corporate Reorganization Act. The resulting
situation appears to have been the best pragmatic arrangement for

1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10474, at *3-.*6.
356 See Abe et al., supra note 355, at pt. 1, 7 (adding Korea and noting Maruko's U.S. property was in Hawaii, California, New Jersey, New York, Ne-

vada, and Guam); Quittner, Supplement, supranote 355, at S34.
357 In re Maruko K.K., No. (Mi) 1 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 29, 1991).
358 See Aino, 200 B.R. at 878.
311 For an in-depth discussion of the various factors in deciding to file a full
Chapter 11 case, see Abe et al., supra note 355, at pt. 1, 6-9; Quittner, Supplement, supra note 355. This was actually the most controversial issue in the
Japanese portion of the case. Eventually it was resolved under the theory that
the Japanese trustee was not acting as trustee for filing in the United States;
rather, he was acting as manager-in-fact of the debtor. See Nakashima Interview, supra note 105.
360 Abe et al., supra note 355, pt. 1 at 7.
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an extremely complex case, but the maneuverings seem, at best,
complex and, at worst, over-reaching.
The American lawyer for the trustees stated the second reason
for the concurrent plenary filing as follows: "[T]he compelling
considerations in the analysis of an ancillary case versus a full
Chapter 11 concerned primarily the need for an immediate
world-wide stay of all creditor actions, with the exception of actions in Japan which were within the jurisdictional power of the
Tokyo district court and interim trustee."361 Surrounding this
prioritization was the fact that a major resort Maruko was developing in Australia was in danger of immediate foreclosure by
Japanese creditors, and a number of U.S. properties were similarly threatened. Given the territorial statutes in Japan and difficulties in getting a comprehensive stay in Australia, the trustee
elected to pursue a full case in the United States where a worldwide stay would issue automatically on filing and sufficiently control all those creditors- Australian, Canadian, Korean, Japanese,
American, or otherwise- who were subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States. In this way, the Japanese trustees were
able to get a preservation order on foreign property without relying on the authority of the Japanese court or each local court
where assets were located. Ironically, the U.S. and Japanese
courts eventually agreed that the Australian property would be
administered by and included in the Japanese reorganization.362
The Japanese court confirmed this approach. Thus, in effect, it
assisted the trustee in circumventing the restrictive aspects of the
territorial rule.363
The third major reason for pursuing a concurrent full case in
America was that such a division significantly simplified an almost overwhelmingly complex situation. Maruko had Y39 billion
($390 million) in non-Japanese assets, of which the U.S. portion
alone qualified the case as a "mega-case" according to the bankruptcy judge handling the matter.3 " Further, the Japanese por361 Quittner, Supplement, supra note 355, at S42. See also Abe et al., supra
note 355, pt. 1 at 8 (providing same reasoning).
362 See Nakashima Interview, supra note 105.
311 See Abe et al., supra note 355, pt. 1 at 10.
364 I. pt. 1 at 7. See also In re Maruko, 160 B.R. at 637 n.1 (noting that
"mega-cases" are those with over $100 million in assets). Quittner notes in his
article that as of his writing, the reorganization had realizef $130 million in the
United States. See Quittner, Supplement, supra note 355, at S45.
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tion of the reorganization had a significant number of assets in its
own right and was complicated by involving numerous unsecured
consumer creditors.365 Added to all of this, any universal approach would have had to resolve numerous logistical obstacles
such as the added time and language barriers that would accompany notifying a large group of creditors in various countries.366
In response to these obstacles, the trustees persuaded the United

States and Japanese courts to sever the case and the jurisdiction of
the courts largely, but not exclusively, along territorial lines."'
For the Japanese court, this divided jurisdiction was significantly
consistent with the territorial statutes, but it also required small
universal steps beyond a purely territorial approach, such as requiring a group of Swiss creditors to file their claims in Japan. 6
In the end, the Maruko reorganization was able to manage efficiently a number of multimillion-dollar assets and thousands of
claims and, thereby, has generally been viewed as a success and
model for further international insolvency cooperation.
Maruko is the exception that proves the rule as to the rarity of
center-less mega insolvencies involving Japan. As of its filing it
was the largest insolvency in the history of Japan and involved
over $130 million of assets in the United States.37 ' Nonetheless, it
shows the flexibility necessary to best address large and complex
insolvencies. The Maruko case also highlights the problems created by the ambiguity in modern Japanese insolvency law resulting from strictly territorial statutes and universal application.
The courts are willing to stretch the territorial rules when they
need to- such as with the 1MB Swiss trademark case- but exactly
when they will do this is unpredictable.

365 See Quittner, Supplement, supra note 355, at $42-$45 (noting that Maruko had over 30,000 Japanese creditors).
I" id at S45.
3
See Quittner, PLI, supra note 355, apps. 2-3 (providing that the order
granted by the U.S. bankruptcy court dividing the jurisdiction of the case).
368 See id at S41-42.
369 See Abe et al., supra note 355, pt. 1 at 6. Tagashira, supra note 16, at 18,
34-35; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, CreatingInternationalInsolvency Law, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 563, 563 n.2 (1996).
370 See Abe et al., supra note 355, pt. 1 at 7; Quittner, Supplement, supra
note 355, at S45.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. Int'l Econ. L.

[21:4

3.6. Summary ofJapan'sExperience with Cross-BorderInsolvencies
Japan's approach to cross-border insolvencies was relatively
sophisticated when it was drafted at the beginning of the twentieth century. Unlike the United States, which did not specifically
deal with the problems of international failures until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Japan considered, debated, and decided to follow the dominate approach to the vexing problem in
1922. As a result, Japanese statutes created a strictly territorial regime. The legislature has continued to endorse this framework,
affirmatively as late as 1952 and passively and recently as late as
1996. 37'
Beginning in the 1980s, however, Japanese courts began to
chip away at the strict territorial approach by allowing creative
avoidance of the statutes' plain meaning. Academics and practitioners have encouraged these efforts, because they believe the
territorial rule unnecessarily limits a cross-border insolvency from
achieving the best results possible for all the parties involved.
Further, they argue that rigid territoriality is no longer demanded
by international conditions that now in fact allow for and favor a
more universal approach.
As a result of this conflict between the liberal objectives of the
practitioners and theorists and the strict rules of the statutes, the
courts' decisions have been inconsistent." The deviations from
the more universal approach do not appear to reflect a true debate
regarding the merits of territoriality or a desire to protect local interests or public policy. Rather, they suggest an uncertainty as to
how far theory should allow practice to be pulled away from the
statutes' plain meaning. The result is the courts' decisions have
deviated from a purely territorial approach for a generally modified universal leaning, but they do so haphazardly, leaving other
371 The Diet enacted article 4 of the Corporate Reorganization Law on
June 7, 1952. See Corporate Reorganization Law, Law No. 172, 1952. The
Diet did not deviate from, and otherwise incorporated, the territorial approach
when it created the newest insolvency system- the Financial Institutions Reorganization Act--on July 18, 1996. See FIRA, art. 20 (extending Corporate
Reorganization Law to apply to credit unions that are not corporations). Further, the legislature has passively consented to the regime by failing to amend
the territorial statutes. This may change in the coming years. See supra note 17
and accompanying text (discussing the revision efforts).
37
Compare Bank of India, 516 HANREI TAIMUZU 139 with Tune, 897
KIN'YO SHOJI 30; compare Kfno, 1554 HANREI JIHO at 100 with Bank Uoremu,

1589 HANREIJIHO 86.
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areas ambiguous or undeniably territorial. Given this situation,
the Japanese government's present efforts at revision are welcomed whether they eventually affirm the territorial rule or suggest a new direction.
4. A DEFENSE OF MODIFIED UNIVERSALISM CONSIDERING THE
JAPANESE EXPERIENCE

Japan's experience, both good and bad, with international insolvencies demonstrates why the modified universal framework
should be the paradigm of cross-border insolvency. Modern
Japanese practice shows first that a modified universal approach is
possible in today's world. The Japanese cases also highlight the
benefits of allowing a regime to be supple enough to accommodate systemic modifications designed for the actual circumstances.
Finally, Japanese experience illustrates the inequities and inefficiencies that occur under a territorial regime. In short, Japan
shows that the modified universal approach has all the elements
of an attractive paradigm: feasibility, flexibility, fairness, and efficiency.
4.1. Modified UniversalismIs Feasible
The drafters of Japan's insolvency statutes recognized that a
universal approach to cross-border insolvency was ideal, but they
rejected such a course as not viable. 3 At the dawn of the twentyfirst century their rationales no longer suffice. First, the drafters'
concerns over doctrinal purity are no longer an obstacle and even
the doctrinal defenders, the academics, predominately endorse
overturning the territorial rule. Second, technology has made the
practical burden of requiring domestic creditors to pursue claims
abroad nearly indistinguishable from pursuing the claims at
home. The liability is particularly lessened by the willingness of
insolvency courts to accommodate foreign participation by means
such as mail and electronic filing, and telephone and video
conferencing." 4 Third, because a majority of states are doing it,
3" See 1 KATO, supra note 233, at 330-331.
4 See In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that foreign creditors would not be inconvenienced or otherwise prejudiced by liquidation proceedings in the Bahamas, because the Bahamian statutes provided
for, inter alia, sufficient notice, submission of claims by affidavit and mail, and
the right to appeal determinations); A.L.I., DRAFT RULES FOR
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY IN UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND MEXICO,
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there is no longer a need to fear that foreign courts will ignore or
be offended by extraterritorial assertions in insolvency. As the
court in 1MB stated: "[T]he modified universal approach] conforms with current fast paced international economy as well as
actual375 transactions which are increasing and rapidly developing."

While modified universalism is feasible today, the alternatives
of pure universalism or corporate-charter insolvency are not. The
impediment for both of these regimes is the same: insolvency law
inherently involves strong domestic public policy issues that no
state is willing to unconditionally surrender. 376 This is reflected

by, among other things, the fact that in both the common law
and civil law systems the choice of law rule for insolvencies is lex

fori.31

Specific examples are also available. For example, cross-

border insolvencies often bring about a conflict of two fundamental yet irreconcilable rules: (1) that a country will not enforce
foreign revenue laws; and (2) that a domestic government will
prioritize its own tax claims."' Added to this, almost all systems
have developed slightly different priorities, avoidance rules, and

tests for the availability of reorganization assistance.37 9 These dif-

ferences are not at issue in every case, but they are often enough
that no country is willing to give blanket recognition to an alternative set of rules, whether those be international rules developed
by consensus and compromise or specific rules adopted by private
agreement between the debtor and its creditors. Universalism
and corporate-charter contractualism are not feasible today or in
the long run, because they do not sufficiently address states' desire
to maintain ultimate control over local insolvency issues.

5(c), 6,7, 8(b), 11 (1999), reprintedin Leonard, supra note 16, at '"4-'10 (providing guidelines to allow cross-border participation in foreign insolvency proceedings by telephone, video, facsimile, mail, courier service, publiclyaccessible electronic system, or other electronic means).

31 IMB, 994 HANREI TAIMuZU at 54. See also Bhala, supra note 16, at 5258 (dispelling the same rationale).
376 See WOOD, supra note 3, at 227; Gaa, supra note 1, at 885, 889-91, 89395.

377 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 300; DICEY &
MORRIS, supra note 60, at 1151-63 (Rules 159(2), 165).

See 11 U.S.C. S 507(a)(7); Bankruptcy Act, art. 47(2).
See supra notes 103-110, 341 and accompanying text (discussing the
slight differences between U.S. and Japanese priority and avoidance rules).
378
171
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4.2. Modified UniversalismIs Flexible
Japan's experience shows that a modified universal framework
can accommodate flexibility. Any system can benefit from flexibility. The modified universal and secondary hybrid approaches
both incorporate and take advantage of two kinds of flexibility.
First, these regimes allow for a court to opt out of cooperating in
an international insolvency. Second, these systems provide the
courts with the flexibility to custom-tailor the specific form of
cooperation to the facts of the case. None of the other options
provide for both types of flexibility; instead, these models merely
impose one-size-fits-all solutions.
The flexibility to deny cooperating with a foreign insolvency
outright is one of the chief attributes of the modified and hybrid
approaches. As noted above regarding feasibility, the discretion
to deny assistance is essential when the insolvency raises important concerns of domestic public policy. Further, this safety valve
allows a state to maintain ultimate control and sovereignty over
those items within its direct control, while still pursuing most of
the goals of universalism. At the same time, this discretion acts as
a disincentive against manipulative behavior such as forum shopping. Some commentators have suggested that universalism and
modified universalism tolerate and even encourage forum shopping by debtors.38 However, under the modified and secondary
approaches, the ancillary courts retain the ability to undercut any
benefits from forum shopping by denying recognition and assistance to the shopped forum.381 Thus, both the actual and potential power to deny assistance act as strong disincentives for the selection of a non-natural or inappropriate forum.382
The second aspect of flexibility- the ability to tailor the process to the facts- may be seen by the different approaches employed by the trustees and courts in Kojima83 and Maruko.384 For
See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 720-23, 730-31.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Hannover Ruckversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft
[1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 497 (C.A.) (denyingmodified universal assistance to a Bahaman insolvency that arguably forum shopped out of a U.S. bankruptcy filing).
382 The "natural forum" is the forum "with which the action has the most
real and substantial connection." See DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 60, at 403.
In cross-border insolvency the natural forum is argably in the jurisdiction
where the debtor's "center of interest" or "principal place of business" is located. See supra note 30.
380
381

383

Kojima, 177 B.R. 696.
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a simple case, a simple answer is usually best. Thus, in Kojima
where there was only one foreign asset in an otherwise entirely
domestic bankruptcy, the best and easiest solution was to allow
the trustee to include that asset in its Japanese administration.385
However, as a case becomes more complicated, the benefits of a
secondary or a coordinated territorial approach increase. Thus, in
Maruko, courts in both the United States and Japan independently
concluded that the optimal approach was to pursue separate, but
coordinated insolvencies.8 6 Certain cases are simply too big or
too complex to deal with using generalized default rules; thus,
these cases benefit from and demand flexibility to opt into more
appropriate arrangements.
Flexibility does come at a cost, however. As the corporatecharter model best highlights, the flexibility of the modified and
secondary systems comes into effect post ante, thus alterations
may cause unpredictability and its associated costs. As long as the
court is mindful of this risk, however, it should actually be able
to use this suppleness to find the arrangement that best reflects
the debtor's and creditors' pre-insolvency assumptions. In other
words, the flexible approach is able to avoid the other models'
presumption that parties in all cases will be making preinsolvency lending decisions based either on the assumption that
the domestic law will apply- the territorial assumption- or that
the home-country law will apply- the universal assumption.
4.3. Modified Universalism Is Fairand Efficient
4.3.1.

DefaultRulesfor the Typical Cross-BorderCase

Given that both the modified universal and secondary approaches are feasible and allow for flexibility, the obvious question becomes which of the two is the better alternative. Adding
to the complexity of this inquiry is the fact that either system
may be designed to allow for the other to exist as a sub-choice. In
the end, resolution between the two options requires a policy decision to be made regarding which of the two models most fairly
and efficiently operates as a default rule. What constitutes the
Maruko, 219 B.R. 567.
311 Kojima, 177 B.R. 696.
386 Maruko, 219 B.R. 567.
114
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fairest and most efficient rule, however, depends on one's assump-

tions regarding two issues: (1) the degree to which most national
insolvency schemes are comparatively similar or dissimilar; and
(2) the likely form of most typical international insolvency scenario.387
Regarding the first assumption, the greater the degree of simi-

larity between national insolvency systems, the fewer conflicts
likely to arise between how a local court and home court would
resolve similar questions at issue. Where there is no difference in
how two courts deal with a problem, the only question that remains is how to most efficiently administrate the case. While experts disagree as to which national insolvency systems are in fact
similar, partially based on the Japanese cases discussed above, it is
presumed here that most insolvency systems will resolve most issues in generally the same manner.388 Of course, I acknowledge
387 Arguably a third and equally important assumption is one's belief that a
theoretical-model may,in practice, be applied rationally, predictably, and even
formalistically. This Article only addresses how Japan's territorial model is
applied and suggests that in practice it results in unpredictability. See supra
note 311. AddIessing this issue for the other models is beyond the scope of
this Article; however, I argue elsewhere that in practice, a rational and predictable standard for modified universalism has developed in both England and the
United States. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 70-72.
24, 32, 33 (summarizing com. See UN REPORT, sup a note 201, at
parative insolvency studies by G22, IMF, and Asian Development Bank and
concluding, inter alia, that there is broad agreement on the key objectives, issues, frameworks, and tools used by developed insolvency regimes). Compare
LoPucki, supra note 10, at 708-11 with Andrew T. Guzman, In Defense of Universalism in Cross-Border Insolvencies, MICH. L. REV. "21-*22 (forthcoming
2000); Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving TransnationalInsolvencies Through Private Ordering,ItCH. L. REV. '22 (forthcoming 2000). See also Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to ComparingU.S. and Canadian Reorganizationof FinanciallyDistressedCompanies, HARV. INT'L L. J. 267,
342 (1994) (emphasis added), stating:

Our thesis is that because both countries [Canada and the United
States] have market economies and share the same assumptions and
broad objectives for formal reorganization, it was highly likely, ifnot
inevitable, that the two countries would develop reorganizationsystems
that function in essentially the same way. The functional aspects of
these systems were shaped not by culture or politics, but by necessity.
An implication of our Article, therefore, is that the functional aspects
of judicially supervised reorganization systems tend to converge. If we
are correct, any country that opts for court-supervised reorganization
againsta similareconomic backgiound is likely to arriveat the samefunctionalsolutions.
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that few systems are identical and differences will arise, particularly with regards to such things as non-consensual and priority
claims; however, I assert that these differences are less likely than
the similarities and thus are better approached as exceptions to a
general default rule.
The second assumption relates to the type of international insolvency for which the model is designed. Stated differently, a
system's approach to cross-border insolvency optimally should be
tailored to the types of scenarios most likely to occur. Unfortunately, empirical evidence does not exist in Japan or elsewhere
that provides a clear picture of the typical cross-border insolvency.3" 9 An intuitive and educated guess might surmise that
from a numerical standpoint most "cross-border insolvencies" do
not involve mega-cases with significant assets in two or more
countries.3"' Rather, more typically international insolvencies in389 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 32 ("Empirical evidence is needed
to ascertain the types of multinational firms which encounter financial dis-

tress.").
In Japan, the International Insolvency Research Group conducted empirical research focused on Japan-originated international insolvencies between
September 1985 and March 1987. See Makoto Ito & Manabu Azuma, Kokusai
tisanjitsumu ni arawaretamondaiten- kokusai tisanjitsumu cbsa hikoku [Problem Areas Evident in the Actual Practice of InternationalInsolvency- Report
from the Survey of the Actual Practice of InternationalInsolvency], in KOKUSAI
TOSAN HO [INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW] 58-84 (Morio Takeshita ed.,
1991). This work combined surveys of trustees with court-filed statistics to
identify seventeen cross-border insolvency cases over this eighteen month period. Id. Its aim, however, was to identify typical problem areas of international cases, not to define the typical type of international case. Id.
In the United States, LoPucki reports that 31% of the 266 large, public
corporations that filed for reorganization in the United States between 1980
and 1997 owned foreign assets. See LoPucki, supranote 10, at 724 n.147. Similar to the situation in Japan, this information unfortunately does not provide a
picture of the typical international debtor (e.g., whether an individual or corporation, if a corporation, whether large or small, and so forth), the typical international proceeding (e.g., whether liquidation or reorganization), the typical
size of the proceeding (e.g., amount of assets and liabilities), the percent ofthe
typical case that is international (e.g., the amount and kinds of assets abroad),

and so forth.
390 See supra note 230 (providing my broad definition of cross-border insolvency). A mega-case is defined as one with over $100 million in assets. S.
ELIZABETH GIBSON, A GUIDE TO THE JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF MEGACASES (1992), availableat 1992 WL 477113. In the United States and Japan, the

vast majority of business insolvencies involve small and medium sized firms.
See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 135, at 216 (providing statistics for the
United States and noting that much of recent insolvency research focuses on
addressing the large, though relatively rare, cases); PACKER & RYSER, supra
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volve the "growing number of Canadian and Mexican border
cases" or their Japanese equivalent, the insolvency of pachinko

parlors owned by Korean nationals. 91 Further, even relatively
large, center-less insolvency cases might best be approached as

analogous to border cases for those portions that involve only
limited assets in non-significant third-country forums, e.g., Maruko's treatment of the Canadian and Korean properties."w The
note 83, at 8 (providing that less than 1%of all business insolvencies involve
large corporations). Furthermore, a large number of individual insolvencies,
approximately 20%, actually represent failed small and medium business entrepreneurs. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 111 (1989).
Westbrook seems to come to a contrary conclusion suggesting that large
insolvencies- not minor insolvencies- should be the focus of an international

universal regime. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at *21.
'9'
Westbrook, Creating International Law, supra note 358, at 563; Remarks of Retained Attorneys of Resolution and Collection Corporation (kabushiki gaishaseiri kaishf kiko at The Meeting of Financial Law Research Forum
at Hokkaido University Gune 10, 2000) (noting one of the problem areas in
pursuing debts assumed by the RCC). See, e.g., In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428,
429 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that '[a]lthough the [U.S. bankruptcy]
courthouse is only a seven story building, Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada is clearly
visible from its upper floors" and going on to describe the close economic connection among actors on both sides of the border).
392 LoPucki asserts that the standard multi-national corporate (MN4C) practice of incorporating subsidiaries under local law creates a de facto territorial
system, because a MNC's foreign assets are held independently by the local
foreign subsidiary corporation. See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 751-52. Westbrook challenges this assumption as a matter of substance. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at *44-*45. Even assuming the accuracy of the assumption, courts
at times have ignored separate corporate identity or allowed joint administration of parents and independent subsidiaries. Thus, though it is far from settled, authority exists for the proposition that a court will pierce the corporate
veil of a subsidiary for the benefit of enlarging the estate of the primary debtor.
See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 59, at S 23.19 (citing sources).
Furthermore, courts will allow the joint administration of related debtors,
both domestic and foreign. See, e. ., Quittner, PLI, supra note 355, at 339 (noting that in the Maruko case, the the court allowed the joint administration in
the United States of the Japanese parent company and a number of U.S. subsidiaries). In InternationalHorizons, the court ordered the joint administration
of a U.S. parent and its various foreign subsidiaries, despite extremely convoluted connections with the United States and the vigorous protests of its creditors. See Bank ofAmerica, 23 B.R. at 1017. The parent debtor, its subsidiaries,
and the creditors had a mess of connections including cross-ownership, crosslending, cross-guarantees, and cross-management. See id. at 1016. However,
the court did not try post ante to untangle the actual legal relationships of the
parties or theparties' assumptions about the significance of those relationships.
Rather, it took a pragmatic route and ruled that due to the "unique symbiotic.
. .interrelationship of the debtors and their affiliates" and the desire to avoid
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few reported Japanese cases anecdotally support these conclusions."'
Pending better empirical evidence, the following arguments
are based on my position that the international insolvency paradigm should address the problems typical of a relatively straightforward border case- rather than those of a complex, center-less
mega insolvency. Of course, one of the underlying assumptions
of this conclusion is that I am discussing a default rule, and I believe that the less frequent complex mega insolvencies may and
can better accommodate the incremental costs of opting out of
that default system.
Accepting these presumptions, modified universalism, and its
tendency to encourage cooperation, appears to be more fair and
efficient system than the secondary insolvency regime and the
other available models. As described above, secondary insolvency
is premised on differences in treatment of secured and priori34
claims and, in practice, produces territorial results in most cases.
Thus, local secured and priority creditors are protected from potentially different treatment by the foreign insolvency law, but
unsecured creditors see no benefits since few gains in efficiency
are possible. For the presumably few complex cases involving
significant assets, the secondary insolvency approach is perhaps
occasionally the better alternative; for most cases, however, such
an approach is not necessary and is to the disadvantage of a large
number of creditors who are either not secured in or not given
priority by a given jurisdiction. On the other hand, the modified
universal framework begins with the presumption that a universal

"[f]ragmentation of thef proceedings," the debtor and its subsidiaries should be
treated jointly for administrative purposes. World of English, 16 B.R. at 821.
This ruling, nonetheless, did not prevent the same court from later finding that
the subsidiary debtors were not the alter egos of the parent. InternationalHo.
rizons, 51 B.R. at 751.
...See, e.g., Ito & Azumu, supra note 389, at 60-68 (reviewing the seventeen
cases identified in their survey); see also supra Section 3.4.5. (reviewing most reported Japanese cross-border insolvency cases). One of the obvious problems
of relying on reported cases for evidence is the fact that smaller debtors generally do not have the resources or motive to pursue an issue to the point of reporting.
114 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the
secondary insolvency model results in minimal contributions to the global
pool of assets for unsecured creditors).
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approach will be followed but gives the court the flexibility to
opt out of this regime if the facts so dictate."'
In practice, the universal approach is taken more often than
not." 6 Believing that most national insolvency systems are in effect similar and that the quintessential cross-border insolvency
case involves relatively minor foreign participation without particularly vexing issues, I submit that the modified universal approach presents a more fair and efficient default rule for crossborder insolvencies.
4.3.2.

Fairness

Fairness is a primary consideration for a cross-border insolvency paradigm; however, it is discussed surprisingly infrequently
in the literature or the cases. Modified universalism is more fair
than the territorial approach- either in the pure form or as the
de facto result of a secondary bankruptcy-- because it treats like
creditors equally and best meets their expectations.
One of the fundamental objectives of modern insolvency law
is fairness in the distribution of like claims- the so-called pari
passu rule."' At the international level, there are two ways to
achieve this equality. First, under a centralized approached (used
by universalism, modified universalism, contractualism, and for
the unsecured portion of secondary insolvencies) all like creditors
must file in one court which applies one standard and eventually
makes distributions on an equal basis. The second method is
known as the "hotchpot rule" and is used in territorialism 98 It
involves creditors filing claims in each court where assets are lo3 Determining "when the facts so dictate" is an important issue beyond

the scope of the Article. As noted above, I argue elsewhere that a rational and

predictable standard has developed under both the English and U.S. approaches
to this issue, and I have recently advocated a standard based on a coinbination
of those rules. See Kent Anderson, Kokusai t6san ho: komon rd shokoku no
keiken ni motoduita teian [Cross-borderInsolvency Law: A ProposalBased on the
Based on the Experience of Various Common Law Countries], Paper presented at

Hokkaido University Civil Law Research Forum (uly 7, 2000) (on file with
author).
396 See Anderson, supra note 22, at 48-61 (discussing the results of the English and American modified universal system).
397 See GOODE, supra note 2, at 141 ("The most fundamental principle of
insolvency law is that of pari passu distribution, all creditors participating in
the common pool in proportion to the size of their admitted claims.").
398 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, art. 32; PHILIP ST. J.
SMART, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 272-78 (2d ed. 1998).
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cated and subsequently having those claims approved by the various local courts pursuant to the assorted local laws and then adjusted depending upon what the debtor has received from the
other proceedings.3
The centralized approach is more fair because creditors are
automatically treated equally. In contrast, the hotchpot rule produces haphazard and inherently unfair results due to the administrative confusion caused by creditors filing in a variety of courts
and courts attempting to make cross-border adjustments. Further, because this inconsistency of results rewards diligent creditors who file in multiple states, it encourages an aggressive race to
the courthouse- known in the literature as the "grab rule."" ° An
example of this was seen in the Kosei Maru where the plaintiffs
benefited by seizing the ship, but to the harm of the debtor's re-'
organization
efforts and the fair treatment of the other credi40 1
tors.
The modified universal rule also produces more fair results
than the secondary or territorial models because it more closely
replicates creditors' expectations. LoPucki argues that creditors
make lending decisions based on assumptions about the local in-

solvency laws.4 °2 While this undoubtedly is the case in purely
domestic consumer transactions (e.g., personal financing to buy a
new Panasonic television) and transactions with large global companies (e.g., financing for the local Honda dealership), the Japanese cases indicate that creditors' lending decisions regarding medium-sized debtors doing transnational business (e.g., financing to
Tanaka Commercial K.K. for a single U.S. construction project)
also consider the international implications. 40' For example,
creditors in both International Horizons and Maruko extended
their credit specifically knowing that it would be used for (and in
many cases secured by) foreign developments."
399 See id
40 See Westbrook, supra note 24, at 460.
4I KoseiMaru, 1 F.C. at 671-72.

See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 751.
Furthermore, as the U.S. Supreme Court held well over a century ago,
when a party does business with someone from a different nation (or extendTed
into another nation), they implicitly accept that the rules of the foreign forum
might apply. See Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Ge hard, 109 U.S. 363 (1883).
4 For a discussion on the assumptions made by creditors in the Interna.
tional Horizons cases, see supra note 276 and accompanying text. See also
Quittner, Supplement, supra note 355, at 544 (discussing Maruko's practice of
402

403
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Efficiency

Beyond the amorphous standard of fairness, modified universalism is the most efficient of the feasible regimes. The modified
universal model achieves this efficiency from a number of angles.
First, as discussed above, the flexibility of the modified choice allows a court to employ the most efficient regime for the facts of
the case. Second, also as noted above, because modified universalism is becoming the international standard, or at least majority
approach, applying it produces greater predictability which correspondingly improves the efficiency of proceedings." 5
Third and more basically, the modified universal approach
can achieve great savings by avoiding the duplicative administrative costs incurred by maintaining two or more full actions, as is
the case with both the secondary and territorial systems. Administration costs can be notably expensive.4"6 The U.S. portion
of the Maruko case alone generated $4.6 million in attorneys'
fees." ° This amount did not include any of the Japanese admini-

"syndicating" foreign properties for sale in Japan). At one point, Bank of
America, as a secured lender of the U.S. debtor International Horizons, argued
that the assets, which debtor's subsidiaries held originally outside of the United
States and on which it was seeking to levy, were not U.S. situs property. See
Bank ofAmerica, 23 B.R. at 1016, 1020 (noting BoA's arument that subsidiaries' assets were not in the United States, therefore, subsidiaries were not eligible
to be debtors under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code); Maruko, 219 B.R. at 568 ("Maruko specialized in developing commercial properties worldwide, after entering
into sale-lease back agreements with Japanese investors."). In other words, this
suggests that the secured lender extended credit to a U.S. debtor based on assumptions about being able to realize on foreign assets as well as domestic U.S.
assets.
405See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting modified universal systems). See also UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, pmbl. (providing an effective mechanism for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency).
411 Of course, the best example of the expense of good administration is
Charles Dickens's Bleak House, where what Mr. Jarndyce referred to as "Wiglomeration" spun the Chancery Court until the entire estate of Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce was consumed by costs. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 98,
ch. LXV (Oxford University Press, 1966) (1853).
407 See How One Bankruptcy Attorney Developed an InternationalPractice,
29 BCD NEWS & COMMENT, Aug. 6, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, Allnws
File. See also Maruko, 160 B.R. at 637 (reviewing the attorneys' request for
$1,533,787 in attorneys' fees and $156,552.74 in costs as of November 1992).
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stration expenses, 40 the U.S. Trustee's statutory fees, 409 other U.S.
administrative expenses such as the court's use of a fee examiner,410 administration expenses inherent in the nature of a real estate reorganization, such as appraiser expenses,411 or even the legal
fees for the remainder of the case which continued for over six
more years. 412 Thus, given what may be extreme administrative
expenses, the default rule in a cross-border insolvency should be
the one where these costs are only triggered when the specifics of
a case demands it.
Furthermore, certain foreign aspects of an international insolvency case are too insignificant to justify even the minimum administrative expenses associated with a simple liquidation. 413 For
example, in both the Swiss trademark case and the Norway corporate resolution case while the trustees could have accomplished
the same results by initiating a concurrent bankruptcy in Japan,
this would not have benefited any Japanese interests and would
have only limited the amount of proceeds available for disruption
to claimants. Many items in cross-border insolvencies are just too
small to substantiate the expense of the territorial or secondary
rules.
Beyond administrative expenses, the modified universal approach is arguably faster than proceeding through the nearly full
40 Japanese administration expenses were notably less than those in the
United States. The Japanese trustee and the five deputy trustees were placed
on a set monthly "salary" as managers of the debtor. See Nakashima Interview,
supra note 105. For example, the deputy stationed in and responsible for the
U.S. portion of the case was paid a monthly salary of approximately $5000 for
all of his services. See id.
409 See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) (1989 & Supp. 2000); Maruko, 219 B.R. at 573
(requiring Maruko to pay the U.S. Trustee a quarterly amount based on a sliding percentage of all distributions made by the debtor even after the confirmation of the reorganization plan).
410

See Maruko, 160 B.R. at 637 (noting the appointment of a fee examiner).

See, e.g., Column, Value & Cents: Allocation ofReal Estate Value Between
Real Property Interests and Intangible Assets, 1994 AM. BANKR. INST. J. LEXIS
2675, at *3-*5 (discussing methods and costs necessary to appraise property as
part of an insolvency).
412 The case was filed on August 29, 1991, and was still pending in both Japan and the United States as late as 1996 and 1998 respectively. SeeMaruko, 200
B.R. at 878 (reporting in the U.S case, on September 30, 1996, that the Japanese
case was stI pen= ; Maruko, 219 B.R. at 568 (reporting that the U.S. case, as
of February 5, 1998, had yet to be dismissed or converted, even though the
court had confirmed the finalized plan).
413 See, e.g., In re McTague, 198 B.R. at 428, 433 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996).
411
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administration of a secondary insolvency. 4 4 'The dilatory nature
of fully completing local proceedings before transferring proceeds
to a foreign insolvency is best seen in the hypothetical case that
would have occurred had the Swiss trustee in !MB pursued a Japanese bankruptcy. The end result would have been the same, but
the cost in time would have been significant. Given .the importance of speed in a cross-border insolvency, one of the advantages
of a universal approach is that it does not duplicate proceedings
unnecessarily and therefore can proceed more rapidly.
In addition, a modified universal proceeding is more efficient
than a secondary insolvency, because it provides a better framework for dealing with international assets and operations. This in
turn ensures that a trustee can achieve the assets' greatest liquidation value or the coordination necessary for a successful multinational reorganization. Under a modified universal approach, the
trustee has the option of selling debtor's property separately or as
a group, whichever will bring the highest amount. For many
cases, there will be no advantage in selling assets in an international package, but where the foreign property is individually insignificant or part of an interlocking group, the ability to sell assets in various jurisdictions together is to the advantage of all
parties. For example, in the 1MB Swiss trademark case the liquidation value of the Japanese trademark by itself was minimal, but
the mark had significant value to the buyer of the debtor's other
international marks or its entire business. Proceeding territorially
or secondarily would sacrifice this added value or complicate the
process of capturing it by requiring the various worldwide trustees to coordinate their sales.
Similarly, reorganizations benefit from being able to coordinate their worldwide assets. Even under a modified universal system this is notoriously difficult, but as an ideal (or paradigm) its
validity is unshakable. The best Japanese example is the Kosei
Maru.4 1 In that case, debtor's reorganization efforts were significantly hampered by one creditor taking advantage of Japan's ter414 See Andre J. Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-BorderInsolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TuL. J. INT'L & COmp. L. 309, 321 (1998).
Modified universal regimes nevertheless involve obstacles to speedy resolution.
Each decision must be approved in ancillary proceedings, which necessarily incorporates a delay. However, under an ancillary proceeding there is no time
lost in educating a new court and trustee on all of the aspects of the case.
415 KoseiMaru,1 F.C. at 670.
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ritorial rule through the jurisdiction of a third country.4 6 In response to this, a shipping debtor in reorganization will have to
forego any attempt at reorganization or curtail its business to
avoid those jurisdictions that will allow creditors to seize and sell
debtor's assets despite the home country's reorganization protection.41 In either event, sabotaging the reorganization efforts and

the corresponding loss of the company's going-concern value injures the rest of the creditors.
The Japanese experience confirms the benefits of modified

universalism. Japan has in modern practice rejected territorialism
and its derivative, secondary insolvency, because both systems
produce relatively inefficient and unfair results. Japan has followed the modified universal model because it provides the flexibility to maintain one's own national sovereignty and address the

exceptional cases. Finally, Japan has adopted a modified universal
framework because it is feasible and practicable in the modern
world.
5.

CONCLUSION

Japan's insolvency statutes dictate the narrowest version of
territorialism. Yet the courts have allowed practitioners and academics to stretch these statutes to the point that the living law is
now nearly a complete model of modified universalism. No restrictions are placed on the extraterritorial extension of domestic
insolvencies, and Japanese courts are willing to assist foreign insolvencies to the absolute theoretical limits. Further, the system
has always been grounded on a non-discriminatory platform.
The experience in Japan suggests that the territorial approach has
failed in the face of the realities of an international and interconnected world. In molding a system that responds to the pragmatic needs of debtors and creditors, Japan has settled on a system
that is feasible and flexible yet achieves gains in fairness and efficiency.
Id. at 671-72.
Seven of the 13 (54%) cross-border insolvencies of Japanese businesses
identified by the Japanese survey between 1985 and 1987 involved shipping or
416

417

shipping-related debtors. See Ito & Azumu, supra note 389, at 60-67. For a
contrary conclusion regarding maritime insolvencies, see Melissa K.S. Alwang,
Steering the Most AppropriateCourse Between Admiralty and Insolvency: Why an
InternationalInsolvency Treaty Should Recognize the Primacy ofAdmiralty Law

over MaritimeAssets, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613 (1996).
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Unlike universalism or corporate-charter contractualism,
modified universalism is feasible today through purely domestic
legislation. Unlike pure universalism, corporate charter contractualism, or territorialism, modified universalism is flexible enough
to allow a court to tailor proceedings to conform with the parties'
original expectations, the practical limitations of the case, and the
optimal economic strategy for either liquidation or reorganization. Finally, compared to secondary insolvency and the other
frameworks, modified universalism creates the fairest and most
efficient set of default rules considering the likely legal conflicts
and factual scenarios.
All of these qualities contribute to the explanation of why
modified universality should be the cross-border insolvency paradigm. As a paradigm, modified universalism should be the model
from which academics, legislators, and courts begin their discussions for improvement of the existing cross-border insolvency regime. Modified universalism is not a second-best alternative in
the evolution towards pure universalism, nor should it be seen as
merely an enlightened or cooperative version of a basically territorial approach. Modified universalism is the paradigm because it
is a realistic option that achieves much more than the alternatives.
Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as individual
nations and groups of nations consider the various proposals for a
global insolvency framework, the discussions should begin with
the best alternative- the modified universal system.
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